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PhD Thesis: Rural Income Generating Activities
ABSTRACT
Qingjie Xia
PhD thesis in Economics
Department of Economics and International Development 
University of Bath
Rural Income Generating Activities: A Case Study of Nine Villages in the 
Northeast China
This thesis provides an econometric analysis of three aspects of Chinese rural 
income generating activities using data from a survey of 450 rural households conducted 
by the author in 1998.
The first topic is the allocation of and remuneration to off-farm activities (OFAs) in 
rural China. A multinomial logit model is deployed to track the determinants of allocation 
of OF As; Mincerian earnings functions and Translog production functions both with 
corrections for selectivity are used to analyse remuneration to different OF As. The findings 
are that although social factors continue to operate in the countryside, market rather than 
political forces are playing an increasing role in determining the allocation of and 
remuneration to private off-farm employment opportunities.
The second topic is an enquiry into what determines rural households’ choice of 
income generating activities and what they gain in term of household income, employment 
and returns to labour from active diversification of income generation activities. Two 
explanatory variables are constructed as surrogates for income source diversification in a 
series of household production functions. The results are that peasants who diversified into 
riskier activities than grain farming were able to raise family incomes and employment, 
and also enjoyed increasing returns to their labour time.
The final topic models Chinese rural labour participation and labour supply 
behaviour adopting Jacoby’s (1993) approach. The findings include that probability of 
female labour participation increases with shadow wage, family property income and 
number of children aged seven to eighteen but decreases with their husbands’ shadow 
wage; female labour supply is much more sensitive to own wage changes than is male 
labour supply, but male labour supply is much more sensitive to compensated cross wage 
effects than female labour supply.
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AHs Agricultural Households only engaged in farming
DHs Diversified Households between farming and non-farm activities
NAHs Non-Agricultural Households specialised in OAE
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Chinese rural income generating activities have been experiencing radical changes 
brought about by the economic reform since the late 1970s. Before the economic reform, 
Chinese peasants were tightly bound to the land of their native village by the collectivised 
agriculture and the constraining household registration system (hukou). The abolition of 
collective agriculture and the relaxation -  but by no means the abolition - of the hukou 
system, has permitted rural households and individuals to take their own decisions about 
choice of livelihood. Although subsistence farming, with its peasant mode of life, 
continues to dominate the countryside, a whole array of off-farm activities (OFAs) has 
emerged. These offer the prospect of diversification of income sources and of enhanced 
earning potential.
This thesis is to examine rural income generating activities using data from a 450 
rural household survey conducted by the author in a cluster of nine villages in Xinmin 
county in the northeast province of Liaoning of China in the year of 1998. The research 
questions are:
(1) What are the determinants of and remuneration to off-farm activities
(OFAs) in rural China?
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Chapter 1 Introduction
(2) What determine rural households’ choice of income generating activities? 
What did rural households gain from active diversification into a broad 
variety of income generation activities compared to conventional grain 
farming?
(3) What are the determinants of Chinese rural male and female labour 
participation and labour supply behaviour?
The rest of this introduction chapter is organised as follows. The historical, social, 
economic and political institutional arrangements related to rural development before and 
after the economic reform will be reviewed in detail in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. 
The issues of rural income generating activities and the related theories are discussed in 
Section 1.3. The detailed description of the fieldwork is in Section 1.4. Finally, Section 1.5 
will review previous studies and lay out organisation of the thesis.
1.1 The economic and social institutional arrangements related to rural 
development in the pre-reform period, 1950s -  1970s
All developing countries are confronted with choosing development strategies, 
which ought to be appropriate for their specific social and economic background and 
conditions. In turn, different development strategies require different social and economic 
institutional arrangements to implement them.
When the new China was founded in 1949, the economy had seriously been 
damaged by nearly half-a-century-long continuous wars. At that time China was generally 
an agricultural country characterised by land scarcity, surplus labour and poverty; 88
2
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percent of her 450 million population inhabited rural areas (State Statistic Bureau, 1997: 
69) and relied mainly on subsistence household farming; in term of industrialization, 
modem mechanized industry accounted for 10 percent of the country’s GNP, the rest was 
the handicraft or non-mechanized industry (Sun, 1992: 25). As a result of such a backward 
economy, all consumer and capital goods especially food were in extreme shortage. 
Internationally, the Chinese government was isolated. Few foreign governments 
recognised it. Therefore, not only was it impossible for her to get any foreign investments, 
loans or aids except from the USSR to which China was then tied, but also the western 
developed countries imposed economic sanctions on China.
  Although encountering such a noorlv develoned economv. the then leaders of China
earnestly desired to make the country strong in order to realize their ardent ideals of 
revolution. They thus faced the problem of choosing a development strategy and the 
appropriate administrative institutions to organize the economic reconstruction in order to 
achieve their purpose relatively fast. After weighing the external and internal political and 
economic environment, and not least the political leaders’ economic intuition, the heavy 
industry-oriented development strategy was selected.
Not only are heavy industries extremely capital intensive, but also their constmction
involves a long gestation period and ideally needs a large amount of imported equipment
and technology from the developed countries that then was out of the question. The
conflicts between the characteristics of heavy industries and of Chinese economy made it
impossible to implement the heavy industry development strategy by means of a market
mechanism. The solution was to make institutional arrangements to lower the barriers to
the development of heavy industries, namely, to suppress the interest rate, foreign
exchange rate, prices of energy, raw materials, agricultural products and wages, so as to
artificially reduce the cost of heavy industry development by providing cheap labour,
3
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capital, raw material, and imported equipment and technology for heavy industry products 
(Lin, Cai & Li, 1996: 20).
About the time that industry and commerce were nationalized,1 agriculture was 
collectivized; the household registration system {hukou) and the state monopoly system of 
procurement and marketing of agricultural products were created. Consequently, a 
centralized, planned resource-allocation mechanism and a puppet-like micro-management 
system were formed (Lin, Cai & Li, 1996:20). There were not much room left for market to 
function. The rest of the section explores the detailed social and economic institutional 
arrangements required by the heavy-industry oriented development strategy and related to 
rural development.
State monopoly of procurement and marketing of key industrial and 
agricultural products. Due to the extreme shortage of all consumer and capital goods, 
and the fact that importing from western countries was not possible in the 1950s, the 
choices remaining for the implementation of the heavy industry strategy were severely 
constrained. To keep the cost of developing heavy industries down, cheaper agricultural 
products and other raw materials were needed. However, the low price policy for 
agricultural products suppressed peasants’ incentives to sell their products to the state. 
Therefore, to guarantee that the factors and products whose prices were suppressed and 
still were transferred to the priority sectors, and to ensure that any economic surplus would 
be used to accelerate the development of heavy industries, the Chinese government turned
1 The industrial sector inherited by the new China in 1950s was very poorly developed and in private hands. 
O f them, ‘bureaucrat capitalist’ firms owned by the capitalists with strong bureaucrat background under the 
defeated Nationalist Party government accounted for two-thirds o f all industrial capital and four-fifths o f the
fixed assets o f industry, transport and communication (Editorial Committee o f China Handbook Series:
Economy, 1984). Through the socialist transformation, ‘bureaucrat capitalist’ firms were confiscated and 
transferred to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the period of 1949-1956. Meanwhile, small business 
and the individual handicraft industry were also transformed to either SOEs or urban collective enterprises. 
These became the base of the Chinese industrialisation.
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to a centralized planning mechanism for carrying out and managing resource allocation. In 
1953, a state monopoly system of procurement and marketing of major agricultural 
products was set up. To comply with this, a rationing system gradually came into being to 
control demand in urban areas with coupons issued for grain, cooking oil, clothes, etc. 
Under this state monopoly system, prices of agricultural products and all other raw 
materials needed by industrial sector were artificially kept low, whereas those of industrial 
products were set high. This is the so-called ‘price-scissors’ policy. Through this state 
price control system, industrial workers’ living costs and hence their wages were 
maintained relatively low in order to reduce cost of industrialisation. In other words, by 
using price control, the Chinese government kept transferring part of cost of urban 
industrialisation to peasants; or, peasants’ interests were sacrificed by this development 
strategy.
Through the state system of monopoly procurement and marketing of agricultural 
products and the centralised planning mechanism of resource allocation, on average 15.5 
billion Chinese yuans of peasants’ income was transferred each year to urban 
industrialisation and urban residents in the period 1950-1978 continuously and invisibly 
(Zhang, 2002). This amount of annual transfer accounted for 44 percent of the country’s 
gross output value of industrial products in 1952 and 17 percent in 1962 (Table 1.1).
Agricultural collectivization. As low price compulsory procurement reduced
peasants’ incentive to produce, it was imperative that the state create an institutional
arrangement that would ensure its control of agricultural production. Following this logic,
the state started pushing forward the agricultural collectivization movement (Lin, Cai & Li,
1996:42). In the period of 1953 to 1956, the Chinese government launched the movement
of collectivization in the countryside after the completion of the nationwide land reform
5
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programme in 1952. The agricultural collectivization was implemented in stages, namely, 
‘mutual aid teams’, ‘elementary agricultural producers’ co-operatives’ and ‘advanced 
agricultural producers’ co-operatives’. Until 1958, under the People’s Commune 
movement, all co-operatives were communised. In the process of collectivisation, all the 
land, livestock, farm implements and other means of production were brought into 
production brigades and communes.
The People’s Commune consisted of three levels in terms of ownership as well as 
economic and administrative management: commune, production brigade and production 
team. The production team was the basic economic unit. Production team members 
worked collectively on collective-owned land organised by production team. The principle 
of income distribution was egalitarian within each of production teams, which resulted in 
the work incentive of team members diminishing steadily. Food and other agricultural 
products were rationed to ensure that the majority of agricultural products were sold to the 
state. Needless to say, collective agriculture was inefficient.
Craftsmen and small handicraft producers were organised along the similar lines 
into ‘supply and marketing small groups’ and ultimately into ‘producers’ co-operatives’ 
and relocated in towns, and administered separately from agriculture by county 
governments (Byrd & Lin, 1990:9; Sun, 1992:149-164; Ho, 1994:14; and Lin, Cai & Li, 
1996: 48). These non-farm ‘enterprises’ were mainly engaged in farm tool-making and 
repair plants, farm product-processing shops and the likes.
Migration control and setting up hukou system. Also because heavy industries 
were capital-intensive, their ability to absorb labour was very limited. Thus China could
2 The Chinese government confiscated all the land from landlords and rich peasants and then freely and 




not realise a very large transfer of rural labour to urban sector. Besides, the supply of food 
and social facilities in cities was limited. Partly because of this, China established the 
household registration system, i.e. hukou. In the early 1950s, the Chinese government 
introduced the hukou whereby every household was classified either as an ‘urban hukou’ or a 
‘rural hukou’. Members with urban hukou were entitled to subsidised grain rations, 
subsidised housing and other amenities (e.g., job assignments by the labour bureau, 
permanent employment, and health insurance). Those with rural hukou could not get access 
to any of these benefits. In response to the rising costs of the entitlements given to those with 
urban hukou, the government in 1959 made it extremely difficult to change one’s hukou from 
rural to urban. Besides, rural residents were also not allowed to move to other relatively 
prosperous rural areas. All ‘peasants’ belonged to rural hukou (Ho, 1995: 382).
To enforce the hukou system, i.e. rural-urban segregation and stopping peasants 
moving to cities, the Chinese government implemented three supplementary measures. 
One was the urban ‘staple food ration system’ under which food coupons were issued to 
the residents with urban hukou. Most of the coupons were distributed locally and were 
only valid locally. Besides, the quota of coupons to each urban resident was rarely 
sufficient. Without food coupons, rural people could hardly survive in cities for long. Even 
eating in restaurants, food coupons were required. The second one was the discipline of the 
People’s Commune. Peasants were required by the People’s Commune to work 
collectively everyday (there wasn’t a concept of weekend). Any absence might be 
punished. Besides, if any rural residents wanted to go to cities even for a short period, s/he 
had to apply for an official document from his/her commune. Otherwise, s/he was not 
allowed to buy a train ticket or live in any hotel in cities. The third one was to set up a 
special police force in cities that spot out and deport those who did not have urban hukou
and did not hold any official documents permitting a temporary urban stay.
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Through the hukou system and the three supplementary enforcement measures, 
peasants were firmly tied to the land and hence rural-urban segregation was guaranteed. 
Furthermore, as emphasised by Solinger (1999: 36) said, the hukou ‘became an ascribed, 
inherited one, determining an individual’s entire livelihood and welfare simply on the 
basis of where the registration was located.’
Human development institutional arrangements. While not allowing peasants to 
move to urban areas, the Chinese government also established and maintained totally 
different, divided and urban-biased human development institutional arrangements 
(referred to HDIAs hereafter) between rural and urban. The much better HDIAs enjoyed 
by urban residents were guaranteed by the state budget, whereas the much weaker and 
worse HDIAs available to rural residents had to be financed by the much poorer People’s 
Communes and Brigades, i.e. by rural residents themselves. Note that, through the state 
monopolised system of procurement and marketing of agricultural products and the ‘price 
scissors’ mechanism, a large part of peasants’ income had been siphoned invisibly to the 
central state budget to finance heavy industries.
In detail, urban residents particularly those state employees were entitled to a list of 
HDIAs. They were life-long job security, free medical care in proper hospitals, free 
education for children in proper schools, retirement pensions, paid sick leave and 
maternity leave, housing benefits (decent houses or apartments with heating, electricity, 
water subsidies), subsidies for food, inner city transport, hairdressing and bathing, 
newspaper and books, even children’s employment. Nearly all these HDIAs were arranged 
through working units. Needless to say, they were absolutely inaccessible to peasants.
In contrast with the relatively luxury and state-guaranteed HDIAs appropriated to
urban residents, what peasants got were really much worse, unstable and very little. These
8
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‘very little’ HDIAs financed by the People’s Commune and Brigade or rural residents 
themselves were commune-run health centres and the famous ‘barefoot doctor’ system, 
free education for children and basic living support for the disabled and orphans and old 
peoples without offspring. The health centres run by the People’s Commune did not have 
qualified doctors, nurses and medical equipments; therefore they were not proper hospitals. 
The ‘barefoot doctors’ were not properly trained so that they could not deal with any 
serious medical needs. Although there was free education for children, few of school 
teachers were qualified, while school buildings and equipments were much worse than 
urban ones. Except for these, there weren’t any other HDIAs. There were no pensions 
(peasants’ pensions were their offspring), nor any housing benefits (rural residents had to 
build houses by themselves), nor any financial subsidies, even no tap water.
In short, compared to urban residents, rural dwellers lived in an environment with 
very poor human development arrangements.
In summary, the heavy industry oriented development strategy chosen by the
Chinese government in 1950s led to establishing a series of institutional arrangements: a
state-owned industrial sector, collectivised agriculture, the hukou system, the state
monopoly system of procurement and marketing of agricultural products, the ‘price
scissors’ mechanism, the centralised planning mechanism for carrying out and managing
resource allocation and the urban-biased HDIAs. Through the hukou system and the
collectivised agriculture in the form of the People’s Communes and Brigades, peasants
were tightly bound to the land of their native village. Consequently, a dualistic pattern of
urban-rural stratification was formed (Solinger, 1999: 27). Through the ‘prices scissors’
mechanism between agricultural and industrial products, and the system of state
monopolised procurement and marketing of agricultural products, a large part of peasants’
9
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income were continuously and invisibly transferred to urban industrialisation and urban 
residents. Through the divided urban-biased HDIAs, rural peoples were kept in very poor 
human development environment. In brief, the heavy industry oriented development 
strategy and the process of implementation of it resulted in rural-urban segmentation, the 
sacrifice of peasants’ interest and discrimination against them in the period from the 1950s 
to the 1970s.
Interactions between rural and urban were: cheap agricultural products went to cities;
• • ♦ ^expensive industrial products came down to countryside; every year a large amount of
money was transferred to the central state budget to finance urban industrialisation and 
urban residents. As far as rural-urban migration was concerned, it was so limited that only 
university graduates and retired military officers up to certain rank were given urban 
hukou and assigned state jobs. Even a rural woman who married a city man was not given 
an urban hukou.4
The negative economic consequences brought by the heavy industry development 
strategy and the process of implementation of it to rural residents were serious. For 
examples, the income gap between urban and rural was substantial: during the period of 
1956-1978, the estimated urban-rural ratio of per capita was between 3.30-2.30 (Table 1.2) 
without considering the huge gap of quality of life between urban and rural; in the end of 
the period of 1952-1978, more than one-third of rural households were in debt and about 
100 million rural populations suffered from food shortage (Zhu, 1991).
Before the Chinese Communist Party took power, people were told that one of the 
Communist Party’s ideals was to remove gaps between urban and rural and between urban 
residents and rural peasants. Ironically, once the Communist Party got power, the two gaps
3 A domestic-manufactured hand watch would cost a rural adult male worker’s whole year earnings from a 
production brigade in 1970s.
4 City women would never want to marry rural men because they are peasants and hence the underclass folks.
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were not removed at all but deepened and widened to their extremes. The severest social 
and economic inequality in China (even up to the twenty first century) is between the rural 
and the urban.
1.2 Economic reform and rural non-farm activities since the late 1970’s 
onwards
While Chinese peasants were fastened tightly to the land and firmly confined to their 
native villages by collectivised agriculture and the hukou system, urban residents, although 
they enjoyed a series of social benefits inaccessible to peasants, were also tied to their 
working units either state-owned or collective-owned. Consequently, there wasn’t any 
labour mobility from rural to urban even between different cities or different production 
teams. Additionally, the majority of consumer products were rationed and nearly all capital 
goods were centrally allocated. The collective agriculture led to inefficient farming, 
poverty of rural residents and countrywide food shortage (Zhu, 1991). The state-owned 
industrial sector caused diminished work incentives for employees, low efficiency, great 
shortages of needed industrial and consumer products on the one hand, and stockpiles of 
unwanted ones on the other. By the 1970s, the centralised planned economy had reached a 
stage of collapse.
Embroiled in such a severe economic crisis, in the late 1970s Chinese Communist 
government headed by Deng Xiaoping, decided to begin economic reform and to open the 
door to the world. At the early stage of economic reform, nobody knew how to carry it out, 
where to start, etc. This was why Deng Xiaoping said that economic reform is like
11
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crossing a river by groping for stones.5 Hence, they were very cautious and hence adopted 
a step-by-step strategy. Chinese economic reform has been greatly deepened during last 
two decades, accelerated by the recent China re-joining WTO, but is still far from 
complete. In the hindsight the Chinese style of economic reform is to gradually abolish or 
abandon centralised planned institutional arrangements designed for the heavy industry 
development strategy in order to let market function and to leave individuals alone to 
pursue their economic interests. In the rest of this section we investigate how the old 
institutional arrangements were abolished gradually.
Abolition of collectivised agriculture. Facing a serious nationwide food shortage 
and the poverty of peasants, the Chinese government started economic reform by 
abolishing collectivised agriculture. The milestone of Chinese economic reform was the 
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
held in December 1978. During this meeting, three decisions were made on rural 
development: (1) to encourage ‘the simultaneous development of farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry, sideline occupations, and fishery’; (2) to allow the individual economy greater 
flexibility to develop in rural areas; and (3) to promote the vigorous and systematic 
development of commune and brigade enterprises (CBEs6) (Ho, 1994: 21).
5 Deng Xiaoping’s theory has been written into the constitution o f the Chinese Communist Party. The theory 
is comprehensive and practical. It was summarised as the famous ‘3 M theory’. The first ‘M’ proposed by Mr 
Deng in the 1950s was that no matter white or black, a cat is a good cat if it can catch mice. Cats in the 
Chinese are called ‘Mao’. This is why the first M is also dubbed as ‘Mao (cat) theory’. The second ‘M’ is just 
‘economic reform is like crossing a river by groping stones.’ ‘Groping’ translated into Chinese is ‘Mo’. This 
formed ‘Mo (groping stone) theory’. The third ‘M’ was put forward by Mr Deng in the early 1990s, which is 
that do not ask whether it is socialist or capitalist in the process o f economic reform and construction. ‘Do not 
ask’ translated into Chinese is ‘Mowen’ which formed ‘Mowen (don’t ask) theory’. The Mowen (don’t ask) 
theory completely cleared all the ideological obstacles that blocked the Chinese economic reform in the early 
1990s and afterwards.
6 The CBEs were rural non-farm enterprises owned either by the communes or by production brigades. The 
existence o f CBEs can be traced far back to the Great Leap Forward period. Their objective was supporting 
agricultural production. Apart from this, any other collective non-farm activities were not encouraged or 
permitted in order not to divert resources from heavy industry. Most o f the CBEs were not based on China's
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Later a series of more radical reform measures were carried out, namely the 
abolition of collectivised agriculture and the countrywide implementation of the 
Household Production Responsibility System (HPRS) that returned the land to rural 
households on the basis of long term lease. Institutionally, by 1983 the People’s 
Communes and production brigades and production teams were replaced by township and
n
village. Then collectivised agriculture was completely supplanted by household farming. 
The farmers’ responsibility was that they turn over a percentage of their output to the state. 
After meeting the state’s target they can freely deal with the rest of their harvest.
The results of the rural reform were remarkable. First, there was a very rapid 
increase in agricultural productivity, grain output, peasants’ income and savings in the 
early years of reform. Grain output rose from 304.8 million tons of 1978 to 379.1 million 
tons of 1985 and further to 504.5 million tons of 1996 (State Statistic Bureau, 1997: 383). 
In the mean time, the urban-rural income per capita ratio fell from 2.36 of 1978 to 1.88 of 
1985 (Table 1.2). This was the only period when peasants’ life was improved relatively to 
urban residents since the People’s Republic was founded. Second, it was revealed that 
there was a vast amount of rural surplus labourers released from collective agriculture.
comparative advantages, i.e. abundant labour. Due to poor management and no incentive for working hard, 
the majority of the CBEs were economically and technically inefficient, particularly in the period o f the 
Great Leap Forward. Detailed information about the CBEs is presented in Table 1.1.
7 The Chinese administrative regime has various levels: central government, province, county, township 
(formerly commune), and village (formerly production brigade). They vary greatly in group size: in 1988, 
rural population per county averaged 364,000, per province 28 millions (Knight & Li, 1997). The typical 
township has a population o f 15,000-30,000. Villages generally have a population o f 1,000-2,000 (Byrd & 
Lin, 1990: 3). In China "rural" refers to only townships and villages, i.e., county cities are excluded. "Rural" 
is not strictly a spatial definition, but a combined spatial-ownership-level concept (Ho, 1994: 7). There are 
three levels o f rural communities in China. The township, now the lowest level in China's administrative 
hierarchy, has an articulated government structure. The village is not a separate level o f government but has 
governmental functions and a community structure. The production team (village’s small group) is purely a 
community structure, having lost most o f  its administrative functions as a result o f the implementation o f  the 
household production responsibility system in agriculture in the early 1980s. The general term o f community 
government is used to refer to authorities at all the three levels (Byrd & Lin, 1990: 3).
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Relaxation of state control over industrial and commercial sectors. At the same 
time as abolishing collectivised agriculture, the Chinese government also gradually relaxed 
control over industrial and commercial sectors in the period 1979-1984. As long as they 
had the permission of the brigade, individuals were permitted to operate all industrial, 
handicraft, commercial, food and beverage, services, repairs, transport and house 
renovation (Ho, 1994: 22). In the terminology used by Chinese authorities, "individual" 
enterprises refer to those employing less than eight v/orkers. Establishments employing 
eight or more workers are termed "private" (Li, 1995). Rural free trade market was also 
sanctioned. Apart from mainly serving agricultural production and local needs, the CBEs 
were allowed to run construction teams in urban areas and to serve the needs of large-scale 
industry and to export. By 1983 peasants were permitted to conduct trade of selected 
goods between counties and between provinces after they met their contribution to the 
state (Sun, 1992: 450). By 1984 rural private enterprises were formally recognised and 
peasants were authorised to own motor vehicles and boats, and to engage in transportation 
services (Ho, 1994: 23).
During the period from late 1978 to 1984, government policies towards non-farm 
activities or rural enterprises were in the process of deregulation. From 1985 onwards, the 
objective of the governmental policies entered a stage of improving, modernising and 
pushing rural enterprises forward to the international market. The slight recession 
following the 1989 Tiananmen Event was turned into a boom by Deng Xiaoping’s 
southern speech in the spring of 1992 (Footnote 5). What’s more, the Deng Xiaoping’s 
southern speech cleared all the ideological obstacles that had blocked Chinese economic 
reforms before.
The series of reforms of the agricultural sector and rural non-farm activities resulted
in a tremendous development of rural enterprises. By 1995, township and village
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enterprises (TVEs) employed 129 million rural labourers which was more than the 
state-owned sector did (in the same year, the state-owned sector’s employment and total 
urban employment were 112.6 million and 173 million respectively) (State Statistic 
Bureau, 1996). In the same year, TVEs’ industrial gross output value accounted for 56% of 
Chinese total’s (State Statistic Bureau, 1996).
Relaxation of the hukou system and rural-urban migration. The fact that 
peasants are allowed to run businesses in urban areas and to trade between rural and urban 
areas, even across provinces, was an actual relaxation of the hukou system and rural-urban 
migration control. By 1984, rural residents were formally permitted to migrate to small 
towns below the level of county cities with a move of hukou as long as they took full 
responsibility for their own food quota (Gao, 1997). Also in the 1980s, state-owned 
enterprises were given certain autonomous powers in the recruitment of labour. At the 
same time, the SOEs found out that use of temporary workers helped them to cut costs. 
However, number of migrant workers employed by SOEs was capped by municipal labour 
departments in order to control rural-urban migration (Solinger, 1999: 51).
Having considered the institutional deregulation of rural-urban migration, we now
look at how the ‘pull’ factors affecting rural-urban migration. Income gaps represented by
the ratio of urban to rural income per capita (in the range 1.88 to 3.30) have existed
throughout the period (Table 1.2). Besides, the high quality of urban life has always been
the dream of Chinese peasants. What’s more, the central government’s special economic
treatment of the southeast coastal region and foreign investment as consequence of the
open door policy led to rapid economic growth of the region. This generated an urgent
need for a low-paid and flexible labour force (Solinger, 1999: 47). Additionally, the
nationwide fast-growing non-state and foreign-owned industrial and service sectors have
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become major suppliers of jobs for both the urban-born labour forces8 and rural-urban 
migrants. Of these jobs, some in the service sector such as fresh food suppliers, dirty 
menial workers, family servants and all sorts of others sometimes could only filled by 
migrants because urban dwellers are ashamed of these jobs. In other words, the relaxation 
of the hukou system or rural-urban migration control as well as the huge labour demand 
caused by the economic reform and open door policies resulted in rural-urban human 
migration on a scale unprecedented in the whole Chinese history. By the mid-1990s, the 
number of rural-urban migrants were about 70 million (Solinger, 1999: 18). In 2001, 88 
million rural-urban migrants worked more than three months in urban areas (Zeng, 2002). 
The 1999 urban household surveys conducted by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS) show that 88.5 percent of rural-urban migrants were self-employed or employed 
in the non-state sector. Certainly, this super-large scale of rural-urban migration was also 
driven by a ‘push’ factor, namely, the enormous amount of surplus rural labourers released 
by the abolition of collectivised agriculture and the return of land to rural households.
However, up to now it is still extremely difficult for rural-urban migrants to get 
urban hukou. In other words, rural-urban migrants are still kept on a temporary basis.
The effect of the economic reform on the human development institutional 
arrangements (HDIAs). Although rural peasants are allowed to work and live in cities, 
they still can’t get access to urban hukou and any urban HDIAs, such as free medical care 
and free education for children. Moreover, rural-urban migrants’ children were even not 
allowed attending any urban state schools unless their parents pay a lump some of money, 
whereas children with urban hukou get free school education. Apparently, few migrants
8 The domestic non-state-owned and foreign-owned sectors employed 44.7 percent o f the whole urban labour 
force in 1995, whereas the corresponding figure in 1978 was 21.7 percent (Table 1.2). Note these statistics 
reported by the Chinese Sate Statistic Bureau are only concerned with workers who have urban hukou.
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could afford that amount of money. What’s more astonishing is that private low-cost 
schools aiming at providing education for rural-urban migrants’ children are not 
sanctioned to exist. In short, people without urban hukou are still extremely discriminated 
against. In general, the urban-rural segmented, divided and urban-biased HDIAs still 
remain largely unchanged after the reform; those high quality HDIAs enjoyed by people 
with urban hukou especially the state employees are still funded by the state budget, 
whereas those much weaker and worsening HDIAs available to peasants still have to be 
financed by the poor local townships and villages; peasants still can’t get any financial aid 
from the central state budget to finance and improve their HDIAs although they have been 
paying tax to the central state budget all the time.
In detail, the abolition of the collectivised agriculture led to the collapse of the free 
medical care system to rural residents. The commune health centres are replaced by the 
township clinics, which charge for any services; the ‘barefoot doctors’ have become 
village medicine men, who survive by providing some basic medical needs as well as 
selling medicine to locals. Fortunately, the nine-year compulsory school education system 
still exists and is protected by the state legislation, although it is financed locally.
Rural surplus labour. As of 1995 rural China was endowed with 450 million
labourers (Table 1.2) but only 94.97 million hectares of cultivable land (0.211 hectares per
rural labour) (the State Statistical Bureau, 1997: 368). The average arable land per rural
labour was less than a third of the world average. The existence of surplus labour in rural
China is supported by the following evidence. From 1978 to 1996, the country’s grain
output increased 66 percent (from 304.8 to 504.5 million tons), whereas during the same
period the number of rural labourers engaged in agriculture only rose by 13 percent (from
284.6 to 322.6 million) (Table 1.1). Note that also in the same period, the rural labour force
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has risen by 47.82 percent (from 306.38 million to 452.88 million) (Table 1.1). By 1995, 
29 percent of rural labourers had moved off-farm without affecting agricultural activities 
negatively at all (Table 1.2). Were it not for more than a hundred million rural labourers 
going off-farm, Chinese agricultural productivity of labour would have been reduced by 
41% even without considering how much the income level of rural residents had been 
raised by the earnings of those going off-farm.
Despite its importance, Chinese official statistics did not provide any information 
about rural-urban migrants. It is commonly estimated that there were about 70 million 
rural-urban migrants in the mid-1990s across China (Solinger, 1999: 18). There shouldn’t 
be any doubt about the number of total rural labour force. Besides, the number for rural 
labourers who engaged in local non-farm activities also should not have problem because 
the government had a good statistics for them since the mid-1980s. Thus, surprisingly, the 
numbers about rural labour force would not add up had rural-urban migrants been taken 
into account. Consequently, the problem might exist in the official statistics about the 
number of rural labour engaged in agriculture. Because the Chinese government had not 
begun collecting information about rural-urban migrants at the village level, out-migrants 
might be classified as agricultural workers. If this were the case, the number of rural 
labourers involved in agriculture in 1995 would be about 250 million instead of 322.6 
million, and hence the rural labour force in agriculture would have fallen by about 11 
percent compared to the counterpart figure of 1978. Therefore, it might be a picture that, 
during the period of 1978 to 1995, China witnessed grain output increasing enormously but 
the labour force involved in agriculture decreased continuously, with about 45 percent 
(about 200 million) of rural labour force going off-farm. Note that Chinese agriculture has 
been run on the basis of household farming, which means that rural labourers going off-
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farm is an instance of individual or household behaviour without intervention from the 
state.
Previous studies (Knight & Song, 1997; Cook, 1999; Song, 2000) showed that the 
returns to labour in non-farm activities were much higher than in household farming. This 
microeconomic evidence suggested that there is still room for Chinese rural labourers to go 
off-farm. Meanwhile, the urban-rural income gap has continuously risen since the mid- 
1980s. This economic factor will continuously attract more rural-urban migration. 
However, non-farm opportunities either in cities or in villages are constrained by the 
demand side rather than by the supply side.
The new development of Chinese economic reform since the mid-1990s. Since 
the mid-1990s, Chinese economic growth rate has fallen from two digits to single digits 
due to weak market demand. To maintain an annual 7 percent growth rate, the Chinese 
government has been struggling by launching a number of public infrastructural 
construction projects financed by a state budget deficit on a large scale. At the same time, 
there is nationwide deflation. Nonetheless, a more radical reform known as xia gang was 
launched by the Zhu Rongji cabinet (which came into office in 1998) aiming at improving 
state-owned enterprise efficiency by reducing over-manning. As a consequence of the 
massive retrenchment of workers by many SOEs (state-owned enterprises), considerable 
pressure has been put upon labour market throughout urban areas across the whole country 
(Appleton et al., 2001 & 2002). The xia gang policy has led to tighter controls on migrants, 
aimed at restricting their numbers and in this way assisting retrenched urban workers.
Also since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has altered its stance on the
ownership of rural enterprises. Most TVEs (township and village enterprises) have now
been privatised (Oi, 1999; Fong, 1999), and this would tend to lessen the degree of overt
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political considerations at work. At the same time, the imperative of finding off-farm 
sources of employment has intensified in the countryside. This is partly because of the 
stagnation of agriculture; in fact, the sector has not experienced much recent growth 
following the dramatic success in raising grain production immediately brought about by 
the 1978 reform (Oi, 1999). By the 1990s, urban-rural income inequality measured by the 
ratio of urban-rural income per capita had regressed to the pre-reform level (Table 1.2; 
Yao & Zhu, 1998; Yao, 1999(b)). In addition, many local governments now levy punitive 
-  and notoriously arbitrary - taxes and ‘fees’ upon both rural enterprises and individual 
residents. Another worrying trend is that after a period of explosive growth, over the last 
few years, rural off-farm enterprises have entered a phase of consolidation and even begun 
to experience recession (Oi, 1999).
Rather than boosting market demand, China’s recent entry into WTO would strip off 
the state protection against cheap and high quality grain imports, and end state-subsidies of 
grain exports. Certainly, this is not good news to the peasants who struggle on grain 
farming (Hua & Liu, 2002).
1.3 Issues and related theories
The task of this section is to outline the issues relevant to rural household income 
generating activities and to review the related theories. These issues and the related 
theories constitute the themes of this thesis.




As we have seen from the last two sections that, a fundamental issue haunting China 
has been its enormous amount of surplus labour. All economic or social studies about 
China can not avoid this profound issue. In other words, it is a starting point for a study of 
rural household income generating activities on which this thesis is focused.
Lewis (1954) dual model is about the development process of countries with surplus 
labour. Accordingly, in some less-developed countries (LDCs) where ‘population is so 
large relatively to capital and natural resources,’ there are two economic sectors with an 
‘unlimited supply of labour’. One is ‘traditional’ sector in which labourers are essentially 
self-employed either in peasant household farming or petty trade. The motive for 
employment, either self-employed or hired, is mainly for consumption. The price of labour 
is based on the subsistence level. The other is the ‘capitalist’ sector, in which the 
exogenously given real wage exceeds earnings available in the ‘traditional’ sector and 
employment is constrained by the demand side rather than the supply side. Given the wage 
and technology, the capital-labour ratio and the profit rate are determined by profit 
maximization; meanwhile the scale of the capital stock determines the employment level in 
the ‘capitalist’ sector. In this logic, the continuous expansion of demand for labour 
wouldn’t drive up the real wage, because the labour reservoir formed by the surplus labour 
or disguised unemployment and the urban unemployed would not be exhausted until the 
economy graduated from the class of ‘developing’.
What the Lewis dual model said seems largely in accordance with China’s
experience after reform. For example, 45 percent of her 450 million rural labour force has
gone off-farm either locally or by rural-urban migration; the difference in returns to labour
between non-farm activities and farming would continuously drag labour off-farm; and the
existence of big urban-rural income gaps would steadily pull labour out of the countryside
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(Section 1.2). Besides, according to the Lewis theory, surplus labour will exist and rural- 
urban migration will continue until China is transformed into a developed country. 
Although unskilled workers’ real wage rate would not rise, the wage rate of skilled 
workers especially those with international recognised skills certainly would go up since 
their supply is by no means ‘unlimited’. Therefore, perhaps only the supply of unskilled 
labour (especially rural-urban migrants) is perfectly elastic.
In the field of rural-urban migration, the dominant model was proposed by Todaro 
(1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970). According to the Harris-Todaro model, migration 
is a phenomenon of economic disequilibrium, and workers migrate between sectors until 
expected incomes are equal. An individual’s decision to migrate from rural to urban 
depends on the real urban-rural income difference and the probability of obtaining an 
urban job. The key institutional assumptions of the Harris-Todaro model include: the rural 
labour market is competitive; the urban formal sector (formed by modem manufacturing 
firms) hires labour at a wage higher than market-clearing level (imposed by trade unions or 
government policy); only urban residents can apply for jobs in urban formal sector; along 
aside the urban formal sector, there is an urban informal sector in which both urban 
residents and rural-urban migrants could make living. A typical migrant can be viewed as 
arriving in the urban area and joining a large pool of unemployed and underemployed 
workers in the urban informal sector. The probability of obtaining a job in the urban formal 
sector is defined as the number of modem sector vacancies divided by the number of job 
seekers in the urban area. The Harris-Todaro model argued that, because expected urban 
income is defined in terms of wage and employment probability, mral-urban migration will 
not stop in spite of the existence of sizeable rates of urban unemployment.
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In fact, once the fixed wage assumption of the Harris-Todaro model is relaxed, the 
migration equilibrium still looks as the conventional Harris-Todaro model (Bardhan & 
Udry, 1999: 55).
Except for the competitive rural labour market, the Harris-Todaro model’s 
institutional assumptions suit the urban sector of the after-reform China well. Indeed, there 
are formal and informal sectors. Only urban residents (residents with urban hukou) can 
apply for a job in the formal sector that is largely controlled by government. The majority 
of the rural-urban migrants are employed or self-employed in the informal sector. In spite 
of this, rural surplus labours have continue migrating to urban sector.
1.3.2 The double character of the rural household
The main economic units in the after-reform rural China are households. This thesis 
examines rural income generating activities from the perspective of the rural households. 
Thus, theories about the rural households are key to the analysis.
A typical rural household is characterised by its being a family and an enterprise, a 
consumer and a producer at the same time. The earliest model concerning the rural 
household is Chayanov’s (1925) peasant household model. According to Chayanov 
model, a peasant household maximises its utility. Chayanov’s main assumptions are: (a) 
there is no market for labour; (b) farm output can be retained for home consumption or 
sold in the market, and is valued at the market price; (c) all peasant households have 
flexible access to land for cultivation; (d) each peasant community has a social norm 
regarding the minimum acceptable consumption level. Combining the characteristics of
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consumer and producer, a peasant household’s decision making is based on the 
requirement of satisfying the consumption needs of the household and the amount of 
family labour. This subjective decision is seen as a trade-off between the drudgery or 
irksomeness of farm work (disutility of work) and the income required to meet the 
consumption needs of the household. The main factor influencing the trade-off is the size 
of the peasant household, and its composition between working and non-working 
members, i.e. the demographic structure of the household. Because of the existence of the 
flexible access to land, it defers the onset of diminishing returns as labour use increases. In 
other words, the production function may have a linear or near linear portion (constant 
marginal returns) before diminishing returns set in. In essence the model is a demographic 
explanation of household motivation. In the words of modem economics, a peasant 
household’s consumption and production are non-separable.
Clearly, the Chayanov model and its assumption do not suit rural China, where land 
is limited and almost half of the rural labour force has gone off-farm. However, due to poor 
information and the weak state of communication links, rural labour markets are, in many 
respects, both incomplete and imperfect so that household demographic factors might still 
affect mral households’ decision-making process.
After the Chayanov peasant household model, modem economists have also 
proposed the agricultural household model (Singh et al. 1986). It is supposed that in a 
complete or perfect market, an agricultural household with two members possess a utility 
function and a budget constraint that incorporates production using assets owned by the 
household. Each of the two members gets utility from consuming a share of total 
consumption good C and from leisure (/i and I2), so that the household utility function is:
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(1) M axU (l,J2,C ) 
subject to
(2) C + w(l, +l2)<!r" + w(L{ +L{ +L” +L") + rE
where w is market wage rate; L{ denotes family member i’s time on own farm; L" denotes
family member /’s time on market wage jobs; r is rent for land and other property; E 
denotes the land and other property owned by the household; finally n  denotes profit from 
own agricultural production:
(3) n * (w, r, p) = F(L , A, I ) - w L - r A -  p i
where L denotes all labour time (including hired labour) used on agricultural production; A 
denotes all land (including hired land) used; I  all other inputs, vector p  denotes vector I ’s 
prices.
Under the circumstances of complete or perfect markets, the agricultural household 
would firstly pursue profit maximisation from its agricultural production from Equation (3) 
on the basis of the market prices for labour, land and other inputs. In other words, if 
complete or perfect markets exist, agricultural households’ production and consumption 
decisions are separable. Then the household decision making process are in two stages, 
first, agricultural profit is maximised, and then household utility is maximised constrained 
by the given income budget. In short, the household agricultural production and
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consumption process is recursive. If labour and land markets are imperfect or incomplete, 
or in the case of subsistence farming, these decisions are made simultaneously.
Clearly, the agricultural household model is implicitly a unitary model of the 
household, which supposes that a family pools its income and maximises utility from total 
family consumption and their members’ leisure subject to a family budget constraint. Such 
unitary models have been criticised for treating the family decision making process like ‘a 
black box’, more fundamentally as not being built on individualism -  the core of the 
neoclassical microeconomics (Chiappori, 1992), and as being inadequate in explaining 
intra-household inequalities. To overcome these drawbacks, collective models have been 
proposed, which suppose that members of a family share non-labour income according to 
some given rules, and that each family member is characterised by specific preferences and 
hence optimally chooses his/her own consumption and labour supply (Chiappori, 1992). In 
rural China or other developing countries, the agricultural household - with its workers 
exclusively working on its own farm and no hired labour - functions as a family enterprise. 
Its income is the outcome of the family’s collective effort such as decision making, 
management, labour, etc. Within the household, how much a working member should 
work and can earn cannot be fully explained by her/his own human capital, because it is 
decided at the household level, and profoundly influenced by the household production 
function incorporating existing agricultural technology and the household’s management 
ability. Therefore, whether the unitary model or the collective model is more suitable to 
rural China is uncertain and worth exploring.
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1.3.3 Diversified rural households
Surplus labour, shortage of land and low returns to agriculture would certainly 
encourage or even force some rural households to diversify their income generating 
activities in order to secure more employment for their surplus labour and to generate more 
income. In rural China, possible options for diversification of income sources include 
choosing more labour-intensive and less land-intensive agricultural activities, local non­
farm family business, local wage employment and rural-urban migration.
Diversification could be seen as risk-averse behaviour, for an example, Stark (1991) 
argued that a household could reduce the variance of its income by spreading its labour 
across different activities providing there is less than perfect positive correlation between 
incomes from different activities. This “portfolio investment” in urban earning activity by 
rural-urban migrants as a risk-alleviating device assumes, in particular, that economic 
activities in the urban sector is statistically independent of agricultural production. Rural- 
urban migration is one of the main options for spreading risk.
However, it isn’t clear-cut whether rural households’ diversifying behaviour is 
income-driven or security-motivated. In rural China, subsistence-farming-dominated rural 
households’ diversification could be driven by a desire to raise income, whereas non-farm- 
activities-dominated households still not abandoning household farming might be seen as 
risk-spreading. However, even only engaging in farming activities, poor small-farmers are 
also of necessity of risk-averse because they cannot afford not to cover their household 
food needs (Lipton, 1968).
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Aside from consideration of income generation or risk-spreading, households or 
individuals’ characteristics can also influence their diversification behaviour. On this issue, 
Knight and Song (1997) postulate a theory about rural labourers’ choice of income 
generating activities based on neo-classical economics. Accordingly, even when marginal 
returns are the same across different activities, heterogeneity among workers can give rise 
to clear preferences. There can be heterogeneity in tastes as well as in productive 
characteristics. In equilibrium, the market sets a value on taste, in the form of a 
compensating wage differential. Those with stronger taste for migration will derive rent 
from migrant labour, and so will prefer it to other activities. Unless there are problems of 
joint supply of characteristics, rents of characteristics are competed away. It is 
heterogeneity not of productive characteristics but of tastes, therefore, that gives rise to 
worker preferences among activities in competitive equilibrium. In competitive conditions, 
labour allocation among activities is therefore influenced by preferences and productive 
characteristics. Preferences should be interpreted broadly to include the attractiveness of an 
activity to an individual and the transaction costs faced by the individual. Among the 
factors governing taste for an activity might be age and gender (for instance, young men 
are keener to migrate than others). Transaction costs might be reflected in the local 
availability or otherwise of rural industry and the cost of migration (workers with non-farm 
opportunities at hand or nearby have an advantage). If there are differences in production 
functions across activities, the equilibrium distribution of productive characteristics among 
activities will be uneven.
1.4 Fieldwork: a rural household survey
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The research is based upon a dedicated survey of rural households conducted in 
1998. The area comprises a cluster of villages located in Xinmin County of the 
northeastern province of Liaoning. This is situated some 50 km west of Shenyang, the 
provincial capital. Shenyang is one of the largest cities of the PRC with a current 
population of around four million. It enjoys front-rank status in terms of heavy industry. 
Xinmin is well placed in terms of transport and communications, and enjoys relatively 
favourable endowments of cultivable land and other natural resources. For example, its 
arable land per capita of the rural population is 4.9 mu (0.326 hectares), and per rural 
worker, 13.6 mu (0.906 hectares). These averages are well above Liaoning’s and indeed 
most other provinces in the country at large (Table 1.3). Population pressure upon land is 
therefore not quite as acute as elsewhere.
The southeast of Xinmin, which lies to the east of the River Liaohe and just to the 
south of the main-line railway, is the richest and most developed part. This is because of its 
close proximity to both Shenyang and the nearby oil field. In contrast, the rest of the 
county is much poorer. Case studies of households such as ours, based as they are upon 
detailed fieldwork investigation, can never claim to be representative of rural areas in 
general in a country the size and population of the PRC. However, we maintain that as 
these relatively fertile and land-rich households in Xinmin county evidently still feel a 
pressing need to diversify their sources of income, either by engaging in less land-intensive 
forms of additional cash production or by entering off-farm activities, then other less well- 
endowed parts of China are more likely to face even greater pressure to move away from 
conventional grain farming.9
9 The other reason that Xinmin County was chosen as my fieldwork area is that as a research student, my 
financial resource is very limited so that I have to choose an area where I have strong contacts and associates 
in order to facilitate my fieldwork. This is the major behind motivation.
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The spatial variation within Xinmin afforded the opportunity of drawing from 
different types of rural household. Nine villages were selected. Following a consultation 
exercise with officers working for the county’s Department of Statistics, the villages, 
drawn from townships from throughout the county, were identified so as to capture as 
much diversity as was practicable.10 In each village, fifty households were chosen 
randomly based on a list of names obtained from the local government.11 In brief, their 
individual characteristics may be described as follows. Villages coded 2 and 9 possessed 
the most developed privately owned OAEs in the county. Villages 4 and 5 had relatively 
well-established OAEs, partly because of their closeness to thriving market townships. 
Village 3 had an advanced, mixed, commercial agricultural sector; whereas Village 7 
enjoyed a reputation for cash crop farming, especially vegetable seeds. Village 6 was well- 
known for its collectively owned non-farm enterprises, although its residents were as poor 
as those in Villages 1 and 8 -  both of which were almost entirely reliant upon subsistence 
pursuits. As we conducted the fieldwork ourselves and visited each household in every 
village, we have full confidence in the integrity of the primary sources.
We were able to distinguish three main categories of income-generating households:
(1) 259 (58.6%) “Agricultural Households” fAHsI:
• 128 (30%) were almost exclusively engaged in conventional grain-oriented 
farming;
• 131 (28.6%) practised mixed grain farming with cash-crop production.
10 There are about six types o f villages within Xinmin County: industrialised villages, villages with 
developed commercial activities, villages with traditional advantages such as industrial skills and cash-crop 
farming, villages with developed collective non-farm enterprises, and poor agricultural villages. The village 
samples are chosen to represent the types o f villages and the proportion o f each type o f  the villages. For 
example, two villages mainly engaged in agricultural activities are selected to represent its proportion.
11 For example o f a 200-household village, 50 households are chosen from every other four of the 200 
households according to the order o f the village’s household namelist provided by the village authority.
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(2) 134 (30.3%) “Diversified Households” [DHsl:
• 86 (19.4%) combined agricultural pursuits with wage employment in an off -farm
activity (OFA hereafter);
• 48 (11%) combined agricultural pursuits with running an OAE.
(3) 49 (11%) “Non-Agricultural Households” [NAHsl:
• 15 (3.4%) were engaged in wage labour in OF As;
• 34 (7.6%) operated exclusively an OAE.
In the rest of this section, the characteristics of each village will be described in the 
order of poor to rich (detailed information about the sampled villages and households are 
also presented in Tables 1.4 - 1.8).
Village 8 is the poorest of our sampled villages (annual income per capita was only 
340 Chinese yuans in 1997). Only very recently can the village and the township to which 
it belongs get access to a highway. Even up to the time when this fieldwork was conducted, 
this township did not have an organised country market, which is a common establishment 
of nearly all other townships in the county. Majority of the village’s residents did not 
bother to mix maize and wheat planting but buy wheat flour for consumption. While in 
other sampled villages, mixing maize and wheat planting has become a norm, which not 
only helps maize growing but also solves the problem of the villagers’ consumption needs 
of wheat flour. In term of population, the village is at the middle level (1998 residents) but 
rich in land (4.85 Chinese mu per capita) with com and wheat as its main crops. Its non­
farm activities are the least developed of our village samples, with only thirty-nine people
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engaged in local OFAs and twenty out-migrants. Apart from several local groceries and 
grain processing businesses, its typical local OFAs are local transportation (fifteen 
households have this kind of business).
Of the fifty sampled households, only 11 or 22% engaged in both farming and non­
farm activities.
Village 6 is the second poorest of our village samples (annual income per capita was 
483 Chinese yuans in 1997) although it sits along two main highways. The village is 
famous for its collective-owned non-farm enterprises that have created 115 non-farm 
waged jobs for the villagers; in contrast, none of other sampled villages had collective- 
owned non-farm enterprises. This is because the village was lucky to have a very 
entrepreneurial village head. In population it is a middle-size village but with the highest 
level of arable land (5.58 Chinese mu per capita). Apart from the main crops of com and 
wheat, the residents of the village also grew cash crops like sugar cane and vegetable seeds 
organised by the village community committee. In addition to the collective-owned 
enterprises and several groceries and repair shops, the village main non-farm activities 
were family-owned transportation services and restaurants. 42 percent of fifty sampled 
households of the village had diversified into OFAs of which the majority were local wage 
jobs in the collective-owned enterprises.
Village 1 is the third poorest of our village samples (annual income per capita was
1,017 Chinese yuans in 1997) and the township to which it belongs is also one of the
poorest townships of the county. The village is quite far away from the highway and even
its township (5.5 km). Residents of the village live in shabby houses; they appear to be
simple and honest, lacking in commercial sense. In population it is the second smallest
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village (1180 people) but with a middle level of arable land per capita (3 Chinese mu), and 
with rice and com as its main crops. Its non-farm business and number of non-farm jobs 
created (32 non-farm-employed jobs) are low relative to the sample but the level of out- 
migrants working outside the township is about average (37 out-migrant workers). In other 
words, its residents mainly rely on household farming. Needless to say, the village’s non­
farm activities are underdeveloped. There are only some common rural non-farm 
businesses like local groceries, grain processing and tiny restaurants. Seven households 
own restaurants; five of them are at the township locale; two of them are outside the 
township. Six households owned local grocery shops, and sixteen households engaged in 
transportation business.
Of the fifty sampled households, only 26 percent had diversified into non-farming 
activities: six are DHs with non-farming employed jobs; four are DHs with OAEs; three 
are NAHs with OAEs; there is only one household with all its labour in non-farm 
employment.
Village 3‘s annual income per capita (1,217 Chinese yuans in 1997) is at lower 
middle level. Next to the township of Village 2, the township of Village 3 is the second 
closest to Shenyang -  the provincial capital alongside the main highway that also connects 
Xinmin county city to Shenyang. However, the village is a bit far away from the township 
locale and the highway (5 km). In population it is a middle-sized village (1,865) but with 
relative low level of arable land per capita (2.7 Chinese mu). The village has the highest 
number of people engaged in local OFAs (555 people) and out-migration (73 people). In 
term of the number of immigrant workers, the village ranked the third after Villages 2 and 
9. However, only ten of the fifty sampled households had diversified into OFAs. 83
percent of the village’s lands were used for rice production.
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Village 7’s annual income per capita (1,443 Chinese yuans in 1997) is also at a 
lower middle level. Although being far away from its township and highways, both this 
village and its parent township were famous for their vegetable seeds that are sold in many 
provinces of the country. Its non-farm activities are even less developed than those in 
Village 8. In population it is lower middle-sized village (1345 people) but with the highest 
level of arable land per capita (5.39 Chinese mu). Apart from grain like corn and wheat, the 
majority of its land grows vegetable seeds that are much more profitable than grain.
Of the fifty sampled households, 28 percent had diversified into non-farm activities, 
whereas the rest were engaged in vegetable seeds farming.
Village 9’s annual income per capita (2,516 Chinese yuans in 1997) is at a middle 
level. It is not far away from its township but a bit away from highways. However, the 
village is famous for its private business of processing plastic products. In total, the village 
had 65 enterprises of this kind. Apart from self-employment, these private enterprises also 
created 315 non-farm waged jobs; of them, 215 were occupied by the villagers, the rest 
went to the workers from other neighbour villages. As a result, 60 percent of the sampled 
households in the village were engaged in this particular business. In population it is small, 
with only 970 residents but its level of arable land per capita is the highest (5.50 Chinese 
mu). Its main crops are rice and com; forty-three percent of its land were used for rice.
Village 4 is the third richest of the sampled villages (annual income per capita 3,714
Chinese yuans in 1997). The village is just located at its township which is the next
neighbour to the township of Village 3 and also on the main highway connecting Xinmin
county town to Shenyang, but it is closer to Xinmin county town (20 km) than to Shenyang
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(50 km). This township locale is famous for its country market in which lots of businesses 
are conducted, such as garment, timber, vegetable seeds, food and vegetables, house 
decorating, restaurants, transportation, etc. On scheduled market day, tens of thousands 
gathered there either trading or shopping. This is why the village has more than two 
hundred businesses related to transportation services, garment and restaurants. Besides, in 
term of the number of people involved in non-farm activities, the village ranked second of 
the sampled villages, with 376 employed or self-employed non-farm workers. 
Coincidently, the village also ranked the second in population but its arable land per capita 
is the lowest (2.18 Chinese mu) with com and wheat as main crops. Of the village’s fifty 
sampled households, 54 percent had diversified into non-farming activities.
Village 5 is the second richest of the sampled villages (annual income per capita 
4,389 Chinese yuans in 1997). The village is also located at its township locale but far 
away from the main highway, and is alongside a lake that had already been developed as a 
famous sightseeing area. This is why the village had 300 labourers engaged in non-farm 
activities. Although half of the village’s households were still in agriculture, they had 
extensively diversified into aquatic products (fish) and animal husbandry. For example, 
there are 900 Chinese mu of fish ponds in the village. The village ranked number one of 
the sampled villages in population but has the second lowest land per capita (2.18 Chinese 
mu). In term of non-farm activities, the village is at the same level with Village 4. The 
main crops of the village are rice and com. Of the 49 valid sampled households, 47 percent 
were engaged in non-farming activities.
Village 2 is the richest and most prosperous of all the villages under the
administration of Xinmin County (annual income per capita 5,421 Chinese yuans in 1997).
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The reason for this is that the village is very close to and along the main highway leading
to the provincial capital -  Shenyang (only 15 km). The township to which the village
belongs even has an industrial estate. The villagers’ houses were of good quality by local
standards. Some rich residents even bought apartments of the apartment buildings in the 
12 * *nearby town . The village hall is a three-storey building, very rare among villages in 
Xinmin County. Its non-farm sector was so developed that 489 non-farm waged jobs were 
created; of them, 289 were occupied by the villagers (which accounts for 58% of the 
village’s labour force) and the rest went to immigrant workers. Besides, 74 peoples worked 
outside its belonged township. The village had some important industrial projects such as 
an electric cable manufacturer that employed 46 workers, a soft drink factory, a 
construction material manufacturer, a tractor garage, a garment factory, several electronic 
appliance mending shops, forty-five transportation businesses and seven hotels. Of course, 
there are some rural ordinary non-farm businesses as well like local groceries, grain 
processing and mending shops. Its arable land per capita (2.21 Chinese mu) is almost at the 
lowest level of the sampled villages with rice as main crop. Of the fifty sampled 
households, 74 percent had diversified into non-farm activities.
In the summer of 1999 when I went to this village again to collect some missing
IT ♦values , the village accountant told me that the village just taken in about 70 migrants who 
migrated due to a reservoir constructed in their original village. I asked whether this would 
put more pressure on its limited arable land. The accountant answered that, not only 
wouldn’t it put any pressure on its land but also the migrants could take farming jobs left 
behind by the villagers going off-farm.
12 Peoples in the northeast rural China prefer flats in town to houses in villages.
,3 The missing values arose from that some non-farm households were unable to report their self-estimated 
household agricultural capital values. The reason for this is that some non-farm households mainly earn their 
income from non-farm activities so that their agricultural capital is negligible and not reported. However, the 
household capital value is a key variable for estimating household production. To solve this problem, I went 
back to these nine villages to collect these missing value in the year of 1999.
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1.5 Earlier studies and the organisation of the thesis
The earlier studies. There are numerous studies14 on Chinese rural income 
generating activities. Certainly it is not possible to cover all of them here. Therefore, only 
the studies based on Chinese rural household surveys and closely related with this thesis 
are to be reviewed.
A major study on Chinese rural labourers’ choice of occupation was done by Knight 
and Song (1997). Based on the 1995 nationally representative rural household survey 
conducted by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Knight and Song examined 
the allocation of labour among farming, local non-farm and temporary migration activities. 
Both individual and household characteristics were used to model the unconstrained and 
constrained choices. They found out that not only the preferences of workers but also their 
productive characteristics and the opportunities available to them were relevant, and the 
returns to non-farm activities greatly exceed those to farming. There was clear evidence 
that peasants were constrained in their choice of non-farm activities. The constraints 
include restricted access, imperfect information and risk, and transaction costs. The 
relaxation of those constraints is vital for rural development in China.
Knight and Li (1997) investigated cumulative causation and inequality among 
villages of China using a survey of 1000 households in seven villages in Hebei province. 
They found out that, apart from a good natural resource endowment helping to initiate 
development, the main causes of differential village development are non-farm sources of
14 Such as Parish et al. (1995), Knight & Li (1997), Knight & Song (1997), Sato (1998), Cook (1998, 1999), 
Rozelle et al. (1999), Song (2000), Hare & Zhao (1996), Hare (1999), Zhao (1999), Liu & Zhuang (2000),
Pal (2000), Fan (2000), Yao et al (1998), Yao (1999a, 1999b, 2002), etc.
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income: migration and village industry. Cumulative causation was claimed to be important 
in rural development. For instance, migration requires a village network of information and 
contacts, and village industrialization depends on the accumulation of local skills through a 
process of leaming-by-doing and on reinvestment of profits.
Song (2000) inquired into the determinants and outcomes of diversification of rural 
household income generating activities also on the basis of the 1995 nationally 
representative rural household survey conducted by the CASS. She found out that rural 
households in prosperous regions are more likely to have the freedom to choose high return 
activities; the larger the size of a village is, the more likely its residents pursue non-farm 
activities.
Cook (1998 and 1999) explored the determinants of allocation of rural labour 
between different economic activities and the issue of surplus labour in rural China using a 
rural household survey conducted in Zouping county of Shandong province in the early 
1990s. The findings are that individual characteristics particularly age and gender as well 
as non-market mechanisms were very important in the transfer of labour into more 
remunerative activities. Besides, that returns to non-farm activities were much higher than 
that of household farming suggested that rural households still employed excess labour on 
farm.
The above are the existing major empirical studies on Chinese rural income 
generating activities based on different rural household surveys. To my knowledge, one 
issue, which has not been addressed by the existing literature about rural China, is the 
determinants of Chinese rural male and female labour participation and labour supply 
behaviour, which constitutes one of the three main inquiries of this thesis.
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Although some of the existing literature on rural China has investigated the 
diversification of Chinese rural households, this issue is questioned and examined in 
different ways in this thesis. In detail, the questions to be asked are what determines rural 
households’ choice of income generating activities and what rural households gain from 
active diversification into a broad variety of income generation activities compared to 
conventional grain farming. The latter question is to be examined in terms of household 
income, the level of employment and the returns to labour of household members engaging 
in a range of rural-based activities. Besides, two explanatory variables are to be 
constructed as surrogates for income source diversification in a series of household 
production functions.
Finally, the previous studies had indeed explored the determinants of and
remuneration to off-farm activities (OFAs) in rural China which is also one of the three
main inquiries of this thesis. However, these previous studies by no means devalue this
part of the thesis. The reasons are as follows. First, to my knowledge, this thesis is the first
attempt to disclose labour prices and determinants of earnings during agricultural peak
time in Chinese context. Second, China is so big in terms of area and population that a
typical province is as big as a middle-sized country like Britain or France. Besides, there
are so many varieties of climate, culture, geography especially economic development
levels, and agricultural cultivation practices and styles across the country that, perhaps the
best and practical way of understanding rural China is to study her by province or at least
by a cluster of provinces bordered together. Moreover, nobody has conducted a rural
household survey in the same area where I went for this thesis. Third, given the rapidity of
Chinese economic transition, it seems likely that some of the influences mentioned by the
previous studies will steadily erode. For example, since 1995, the government has altered
its stance on the ownership of rural enterprises. Most TVEs (township and village
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enterprises) have now been privatised (Oi, 1999; Fong, 1999). Moreover, as a consequence 
of the massive retrenchment of workers by many SOEs (state-owned enterprises), 
considerable pressure has been placed upon labour markets throughout urban areas across 
the whole country (Appleton et al., 2001). The agricultural sector has not experienced 
much recent growth following the dramatic success in raising grain production 
immediately resulted from the 1978 reform (Oi, 1999). Another worrying trend is that after 
a period of explosive growth, over the last few years, rural off-farm enterprises have 
entered a phase of consolidation and even begun to experience recession (Oi, 1999). All 
these factors would surely re-shape rural economic activities to some extent.
More importantly, I myself conducted the whole rural household survey by using 
scientific sampling methods with purpose-designed questionnaires. I spent more than four 
months in the field. I went to the sampled households and villages again and again so that I 
got relatively good grasp of their economic and social background and current situation. 
Finally, I myself typed all village and household data one by one into my computer. Later 
on when I got problems, I went back to the questionnaires over and over to check the 
correctness of the data so that in the end I almost remember the majority of the sampled 
households’ livelihood, their well-being and even their names. This meticulous way of 
fieldwork certainly helps me thoroughly understand the people’s livelihood of the targeted 
region and obtain data of high quality. Furthermore, it also makes me interpret the 
econometric results better and even can deal with some strange econometric results (see 
Chapter 5 for details). This kind of rigorous study should be valued.
The organisation of the thesis. This thesis consists of five chapters (including this
general introduction chapter). Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 are the key chapters in which the
focuses are econometric analysis of Chinese rural income generating activities in three
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aspects based on the fieldwork of 450 rural households surveyed in a clustering of nine 
villages in Xinmin County in the northeast province of Liaoning.
Chapter 2 focuses on the determinants of and remuneration to off-farm activities 
(OFAs) in rural China from the perspective of individual rural workers. A multinomial 
logit model is deployed to track the distribution of OFA opportunities between wage 
labour in OF As, those opting for self-employment in own-account enterprises (OAEs) and 
out-migrants. With respect to the related issue of financial remuneration, Mincerian 
earnings functions for wage labour and out-migrants and Translog production functions for 
the self-employed - both with and without correction for relevant selectivity, are used. 
Besides, this chapter is the first attempt to disclose labour prices and determinants of 
earnings during agricultural peak time in Chinese context. The argument is that although 
the contemporary structure of the rural labour market is far from complete or perfect, there 
is powerful evidence that conventional market signals -  rather than overtly political factors 
-  are becoming instrumental in allocating private OFA wage and self-employment, and in 
determining earnings.
In contrast with Chapter 2’s emphasis on off-farm activities and the perspective of
individual workers, Chapter 3 examines both farming and off-farm activities from the
angle of rural households. This is because some income generating activities such as off-
farm wage employment can only be addressed from the perspective of individual workers,
whereas other activities like household farming and family non-farm business have to be
studied at household level. Therefore, this multi-angle approach of analysing Chinese rural
income generating activities would render us better understanding of it. In detail, Chapter 3
investigates what determines rural households’ choice of income generating activities
(including household farming) and what rural households gain from active diversification
into a broad variety of income generation activities compared to conventional grain
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farming. In particular, it is to identify and then measure the effects upon household income, 
the level of employment and the returns to labour of household members engaging in a 
range of rural-based activities. Two explanatory variables are constructed as surrogates for 
income source diversification in a series of household production functions.
In addition to the enquiry into the allocation and remuneration to Chinese rural 
income generating activities either from the perspective of individual workers or from the 
angle of households, the multi-angle approach of examining Chinese rural income 
generating activities should also include a study of Chinese rural labour participation and 
labour supply behaviour, in particular female labour participation and labour supply. 
Indeed, there has not been any published work addressing this issue. Therefore, exploring 
the unknown characteristics of Chinese rural labour participation and labour supply 
behaviours constitutes the main theme of Chapter 4. The main obstacles for conducting 
this kind of study are that rural labour markets are incomplete or even barely exist, with the 
majority of the rural labour force working on their own farms or family enterprises. Hence, 
market wage rates are not available to most of rural workers. Without them, modelling 
households or individuals’ time allocation seems very difficult. Fortunately, this 
methodological obstacle has been cleared by Jacoby (1993), who developed a general 
methodology for estimating structural time-allocation models for agricultural households 
whose labourers do not work for wages, and applied it to rural Peru. The key of Jacoby’s 
approach is to estimate the opportunity cost time, or ‘shadow wage’ which is determined 
from within the household, rather than by markets. By adopting Jacoby’s approach, 
Chapter 4 examines Chinese rural labour supply behaviour.
Chapter 5 summarises and concludes.
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Table 1.1 Rural Non-farm Activities 1949-1978
A B C D E F G H I J K L
Year GOV of GOV GOV of D/B E/B D/C Growt No. of No. of J/I No. of
Total of Industri (%) (%) h Rate Rural Rural (%) CBEs
Industri CBEs al CBEs Labou Non­ (thous
es (RMB (RMB r farm and)
(RMB billion billion) (millio Labour
billion) ) n) (million)
1949 14.02 1.16 8.27 12
1950 19.12
1951 26.35
1952 34.90 1.83 5.24 182.43
1954 2.20 >10
1957 70.40 2.30 3.27 205.66
1958 6.00 154.92
1959 10.00 18 700
1960 1.98 117
1961 1.98 45
1962 92.00 0.79 0.86 213.73 25
1963 0.42 11
1964 0.46 11





1970 211.70 9.25 4.37 281.2
1971 237.50 10.20 8.25 4.29 3.47 80.88 10.27
1972 248.00 12.30 4.96 20.59
1973 274.10 14.10 5.14 14.63
1974 273.00 16.70 6.12 18.44
1975 320.70 21.30 17.90 6.64 5.58 84.04 27.54 299.46
1976 315.80 27.20 8.61 27.70
1977 372.83 39.10 10.49 43.75
1978 423.70 49.31 38.53 11.64 9.09 78.14 26.11 306.38 28.27 9.23 1524
Average 23.63
Note: GOV—Gross Output Value
Sources:
1. GOV of Total Industries 1949-51, 66-69, 71-74, 76, 77 (State Statistical Bureau, 1983: 16-18).
2. GOV of Total Industries 1952, 57, 62, 65, 70, 75, 78-1978(State Statistical Bureau, 1996: 403).
3. GOV o f Total Industries 1960 in constant prices (State Statistical Bureau, 1983: 149).
4. GOV of Rural non-farm Activities (Including Sideline and Home Industry) 1949 and 1952 in 1957 
constant prices (Ho, 1994: 13).
5. GOV of CBEs 1957-1965 (Zhou, Dillon & Wan, 1992: 204).
6. GOV of CBEs 1970 (Byrd, Lin, 1990: 10).
7. GOV of CBEs 1971-1977 (Zhou, Dillon & Wan, 1992: 205).
8. GOV o f CBEs 1978 (State Statistical Bureau, 1996: 389).
9. GOV of Industrial CBEs o f 1971, 75 in 1975 constant prices (Ho, 1994: 19).
10. GOV of Industrial CBEs 1978 in Current Prices (State Statistical Bureau, 1996: 389).
11. No. o f Rural Labour (State Statistical Bureau, 1996, P91) Except for 1958 (State Statistical Bureau, 
1983: 122).
12. No. o f Rural Non-farm Labour 1950 (Ho, 1994: 13) and 1959 (Zhou, Dillon & Wan, 1992: 204).
13. No. o f Rural Non-farm Labour 1978 (State Statistical Bureau, 1996: 91).
14. GOV of Non-farm activities and No. o f these workers in 1954 (Byrd & Lin, 1990: 9).
15. No. o f CBEs (Zhou, Dillon & Wan, 1992: 204).
16. No. o f CBEs in 1978 (State Statistical Bureau, 1996: 387).
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Table 1.2 The economic indicators of grain output, rural-urban employment and income comparison
































1978 2.57 304.8 306.38 284.56 95.14 74.51
1979 2.42 332.1 310.25 290.72 99.99 76.93
1980 2.50 320.6 318.38 298.08 105.25 80.19
1981 2.20 325.0 326.72 306.78 110.53 80.19
1982 1.95 354.5 338.67 311.53 114.28 83.72
1983 1.82 387.3 346.90 316.45 117.46 86.30
1984 1.83 407.3 359.68 316.85 122.29 87.71
1985 1.95 379.1 370.65 303.52 128.08 89.90
1986 2.12 391.5 379.90 304.68 132.93 93.33
1987 2.17 403.0 390.00 308.70 137.83 96.54
1988 2.17 394.1 400.67 314.56 142.67 99.83
1989 2.29 407.6 409.39 324.41 143.90 101.09
1990 2.20 446.2 420.10 333.36 166.16 103.46
1991 2.40 435.3 430.93 341.86 169.77 106.64
1992 2.58 442.7 438.02 340.37 172.41 108.89
1993 2.80 456.5 442.56 332.58 175.89 109.20
1994 2.86 445.1 446.54 326.90 184.13 108.90
1995 2.71 466.6 450.42 323.35 190.93 109.55
1996 2.51 504.5 452.88 322.60 198.15 109.49
1997 2.47 494.2 459.62 324.35 202.07 110.44
1998 2.51 512.3 464.32 326.26 206.78 90.58
1999 2.65 508.4 468.96 329.12 210.14 85.72
2000 2.79 462.2 479.62 327.98 212.74 81.02
Sources: State Statistic Bureau, 1991-2001.
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Jilin Ningxia Gansu Liaonin
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Shanxi Qinghai Shaanxi
15.1 9.81 9.09 6.28 4.78 3.93 3.89 3.82 3.72 2.55
Tianjin Hebei Beijing Tibet Hainan Shangd
ong
Hubei Henan Anhui Jiangsu










1.55 1.50 1.31 1.28 1.20 1.18 1.14 1.03 0.91 0.77
Source: State Statistical Bureau, 1997, pp. 367 and 368.
Note:
1. Land unit — /ww (1/15 hectares).
2. A good comparison of arable land o f different the provinces would be “arable land per rural capita”. 
However, due to the unavailability o f statistics for the provinces’ rural population, it was necessary to 
use the provincial total rural labour to divide the provincial total arable land to get the arable land per 
rural labour by province.
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Table 1.4 Characteristics of the sampled villages
Villages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
No. o f Households 271 470 585 743 748 420 382 536 286
Population 1128 1810 1865 2605 2678 1343 1345 1998 971
Arable land per capita (Chinese mu) 3.00 2.21 2.70 2.18 2.10 5.58 5.39 4.85 5.50
Distance to Shenyang (km) 55 15 34 50 60 60 60 90 30
Distance to Xinmin county town 
(km)
40 35 30 20 30 40 20 32.5 25
Distance to the township locale (km) 5.5 3.5 5 0 0.5 10 10 6 3
No. o f  jobs created by village 
owned enterprises
0 0 0 0 0 115 0 0 0
No. o f jobs created by village’s all 
non-farming enterprises
32 289 555 376 299 245 25 39 215
No. o f  out-migrants got non farming 
job outside own township
37 74 73 15 18 25 23 20 15
No. o f immigrants from other 
township working at the village
5 200 32 20 50 20 35 35 100
Source: the fieldwork survey.
Note: 1 Chinese mu equals to 1/15 hectares.
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Main crops Cash crops No. o f households that run 
husbandry
1 0.15 21 Corn, rice Fruit and cotton 5
2 0.70 300 Rice Fruit and vegetable 4
3 0.85 1600 Rice Vegetable and fish 6
4 0.00 40 Com, wheat Vegetable 40
5 0.65 900 Rice, com Vegetable 150
6 0.00 0 Com, wheat Cane, vegetable seeds 80
7 0.00 0 Com, wheat Vegetable seeds 5
8 0.02 0 Com, wheat Peanut, cane, vegetable seeds 45
9 0.43 50 Rice, com Vegetables 0
Source: the fieldwork survey.
Note: 1 Chinese mu equals to 1/15 hectares.
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Table 1.6 Non-farm enterprise type and quantity of the sampled villages
Villages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Construction and 1 2 4 4 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
materials
Manufacture n.a. 3 10 n.a. 1 2 n.a. n.a. 65
Transport 15 45 75 120 64 40 n.a. 15 6
Garment n.a. 1 3 28 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hotel n.a. n.a. 9 n.a. 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Repair shop 1 2 n.a. n.a. 5 1 2 n.a. n.a.
Retail and catering 12 16 9 12 12 7 8 3 8
Other services n.a. n.a. 5 60 8 1 8 n.a. n.a.
Grain processing 1 3 3 2 3 3 n.a. 3 n.a.
Source: the fieldwork survey.
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2 5,421 43.5 16 21.8 34.8 3,013 5,080 9,958
5 4,389 64.8 14 25.3 9.9 2,905 4,095 8,221
4 3,714 60.3 16 25 14.6 2,234 3,279 8,200
9 2,516 56.9 14 23.9 19.4 1,401 3,099 4,030
7 1,443 86.3 3 3.5 10.3 1,107 2,309
3 1,217 87.6 5 8.6 3.8 971 3,224 1,233
1 1,017 76.4 5 10.9 12.7 306 2,405 5,133
6 483 75.2 3 4.3 20.5 -151 1,360
8 340 88.9 2 2.0 9.1 183 898
Average 2,283 71.5 13.5 14.8 1,087 3,051
Source: the fieldwork survey.
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Table 1.8 The characteristics of the sampled households of each village
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Village Valid AHs DHs DHs Overlap Overlap NAHs NAEH Household with
households (1) (2) o f (4)& o f (8)& s only farming
(5) (9) employed jobs
1 50 37 6 4 1 0 3 1 0
2 50 13 17 10 1 0 7 4 0
3 49 39 3 2 0 0 3 0 2
4 48 21 9 10 1 0 7 2 0
5 49 26 6 7 1 0 8 3 0
6 50 29 19 3 1 0 0 0 0
7 50 36 11 3 0 0 0 0 0
8 50 39 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
9 48 19 15 8 1 1 5 3 0
Total 444 259 95 49 6 1 33 13 2
Source: the fieldwork survey.
Note:
1. AHs denotes households with only household farming which includes farming and husbandry;
2. DHs (1) denotes households with household farming activity and non-farm-employed jobs;
3. DHs (2) denotes households with household farming and household owned non-farm business;
4. NAHs denotes households with only household owned non-farming business;
5. NAEHs denotes households with only non-farming-employed jobs;
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Chapter 2
EMPLOYMENT DIVERSIFICATION IN RURAL CHINA: DETERMINANTS
AND CONSEQUENCES
2.1 Introduction
The abolition of collective agriculture in China in the late 1970s, and the relaxation -  
but by no means the abolition - of the constraining household registration system (hukou), 
has permitted rural households and individuals to take their own decisions about choice of 
livelihood. Although subsistence farming, with its peasant mode of life, continues to 
dominate the countryside, a whole array of off-farm activities (OFAs) has emerged. These 
offer the prospect of employment diversification and of enhanced earnings potential. Of 
course there is a price to pay for the new opportunities, and for those worried about equity, 
there is indeed mounting evidence of significant social and spatial differentiation 
emerging, not only between provinces, counties and townships, but even extending down 
to villages lying within close proximity of each other (Knight & Li, 1997).
The context of these important national developments is clear enough. Long ago, 
Arthur Lewis (1954) argued that during the normal transition process, developing countries 
were characterised by having “unlimited” supplies of labour in the traditional sector. Half a 
century later, with population having expanded enormously, and with the institutional 
barriers to inter-sectoral migration progressively reduced, China finds herself in the
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position of possessing about half a billion rural workers (State Statistical Bureau, 2000). It 
is estimated that agriculture itself can productively absorb, at best, only half of this huge 
number. Internal migration to the towns and cities is obviously one solution to “surplus” 
person-power, but there are several practical obstacles standing in the way, not least the 
fact that many of the urban sprawls are already close to, or even beyond, the limit of their 
sustainability and effective carrying-capacity. Furthermore, due to poor information and 
the weak state of communication links, rural labour markets -  not just in China -  are, in 
many respects, both incomplete and imperfect so that even substantial differences in 
comparative levels of productivity, may not always have the desired effect of inducing 
farmers to leave land-intensive agricultural pursuits. Therefore, in a liberalising 
environment, establishing rural OF As not only becomes a matter of responding to market 
signals, but is also a stratagem for survival and a means of elevating the marginal product 
of worker left behind (Lewis, 1954). Recent research confirms that returns to labour in 
OFAs are much higher than in farming (Knight & Song, 1997; Song, 2000).
With respect to the determination of the actual destination of off-farm employment, 
the literature points to a variety of forces at work. For those studies using rural surveys 
conducted prior to the mid-1990s, non-market variables occupy a prominent place (Cook, 
1998; Sato, 1998; Parish et al., 1995). Based upon a survey of seven villages in Hebei 
Province, Knight and Li (1997) identified a whole raft of forces including location, natural 
resources, transportation, access to cities, and accumulation of local skills. However, given 
the rapidity of the transition, it seems likely that some of the influences will steadily erode. 
For example, since 1995, the government has altered its stance on the ownership of rural 
enterprises. Most TVEs (township and village enterprises) have now been privatised (Oi, 
1999; Fong, 1999; Rozelle, Huang & Zhang, 2002), and this would tend to lessen the 
degree of overt political considerations at work. Moreover, as a consequence of the
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massive retrenchment of workers by many SOEs (state-owned enterprises), considerable 
pressure has been placed upon employment levels throughout urban areas across the whole 
country (Appleton et al., 2001). Migrants thus encounter more competition for jobs. At the 
same time, the imperative of finding off-farm sources of employment has intensified in the 
countryside. This is partly because of the stagnation of agriculture; in fact, the sector has 
not experienced much recent growth after the dramatic success in raising grain production 
immediately following on from the 1978 reform (Oi, 1999). In addition, many local 
governments now levy punitive -  and notoriously arbitrary - taxes and “fees” upon both 
rural enterprises and individual residents. Another worrying trend is that after a period of 
explosive growth, over the last few years, rural off-farm enterprises have entered a phase 
of consolidation and even begun to experience recession (Oi, 1999; Zhao & Wong, 2002).
It may be inferred then, that market -  rather than political - factors are of rising 
importance in allocating private off-farm employment among rural residents, and hence in 
determining their earning capacity from such activities. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide some solid empirical evidence in support of this contention. In order to simplify 
our task we have adopted what has now become something of a conventional typology, but 
with one addition. Following the work of Knight and Song (1997) and Cook (1998), a 
three-fold division of economically-active rural participants was established: wageworkers 
in off-farm jobs; those who are self-employed in own-account, off-farm enterprises 
(OAEs); and out-migrants. We then realised that it would not be wise to exclude a fourth 
category of work i.e., wage workers engaged in farming on land in the possession of other 
households (in effect, part-time agricultural labourers), and probably it is the first attempt 
to disclose the labour prices and determinants of earnings of waged farming jobs during 
agricultural peak time in the Chinese context.15 In practice, this latter category tends to be
15 To my knowledge, there hasn’t been any published study about Chinese agricultural peak time labour.
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of an essentially temporary, casual and supplementary nature and chiefly arises at peak 
agricultural seasons; the great majority of such inhabitants are already normally involved 
in household farming. As we would expect then, comparison of earnings and earnings 
functions for these farming waged workers with household farming and other OFA 
categories will reveal some vital clues of labour prices of agricultural peak time in the 
Chinese context, of whether human capital of those farming waged workers are rewarded 
differently from other OFA categories. As far as financial remuneration is concerned, we 
are able to deploy a standard earnings function approach for all but those running OAEs. 
Clearly, given the circumstances of rural OAEs, the self-employed invariably interact with 
other household members, and their conduct is therefore the outcome of family, rather than 
just individual, deliberation. This suggests that a production function approach be used for 
this group of respondents. The structure of the paper follows this logic. In Section 2.2, our 
data set is outlined. Section 2.3 presents our methodology. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discus the 
findings of the econometric analysis, and Section 2.6 contains our conclusions.
2.2 The fieldwork data
As we have given in Chapter 1 a detailed description of the fieldwork -  a survey of 
450 rural households conducted by the author in a clustering of nine villages scattered 
across Xinmin County of Liaoning Province of the northeast China in 1998, here only the 
relevant specification and variables are to be presented.
Table 2.1 and, in derivative summary form, Tables 2.1A, 2.IB and 2.1C, presents the 
relevant data. Altogether 450 rural households were surveyed, and this yielded information 
on 949 rural workers. A detailed Questionnaire was administered seeking information 
about the material circumstances of the household as a unit, and then of individual
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members. The initial classification reveals that 675 (71%) were engaged in household 
farming; 97 (10.2%) in OF As as wageworkers; 134 (14%) in OAEs through self- 
employment; and 43 (just 4.5%) had migrated out of their home village. In addition, we 
learnt that 66 rural workers found some (part-time) employment on farms run by other 
households. To avoid any suggestion of double counting, in Table 2.1 A we identify these 
workers in a separate column; the vast majority, 60, were, not surprisingly, drawn from the 
ranks of household farmers, with the remaining 6 from the wageworkers in the OFAs. The 
mean number of working days per year put in by these 66 persons was only 47, and just 
seven worked for more than 100 days. This confirms the seasonal and part-time nature of 
these jobs, and the fact that unlike other peasant-based societies that have long been 
exposed to the penetration of capitalist relations, such as India, in the PRC they are in their 
infancy.
It might also be helpful if we indicate the sort of OFA wage-work undertaken: 25 (of 
the 97) returned were engaged in public sector jobs including political cadres and 
schoolteachers; 27 were involved in collectively-owned TVEs; and the remaining 45 were 
employees of privately-owned OFAs such as plastic fabrication factories, and food 
processing units.
To demonstrate the extent of occupational diversification among the 231 OFA and 
OAE groups, we identified their continued involvement with household farming (Table 
2.IB). We found that 69 of OFA wage workers (71%), and 59 of those in OAEs (44%) 
remained partially engaged with their household farming chores. The range of OFAs was 
quite wide and included cycle repair shops, the manufacture of spare parts for agricultural 
implements and machines, hairdressers, street vendors, and a miscellany of shop 
proprietors.
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Before we proceed to specify our model, it may be helpful to provide a brief sketch 
of three salient characteristics of the sampled households. As far as their educational 
attainments are concerned, out-migrants possessed an average of 8.05 years, compared 
with 7.73 for OFA wageworkers, 7.27 for those operating OAEs and only 6.73 for 
household farmers. Predictably, individuals holding down public jobs had the greatest 
educational attainment (9.04 years). Second, and equally predictably, with respect to the 
average number of working days (in 1997), out-migrants put in the highest number at 272, 
followed by those in OAEs at 249, and wage workers in OFAs at 226, with farmers trailing 
at only 206 -  so revealing the extent of underemployment on the land. Naturally there were 
substantial differences between those households that had diversified into OFAs and those 
that had not (Table 2.1C). Finally, just under half of those holding public office, and 
around one in five of all wageworkers in OFAs were members of the CP, whereas only a 
tiny percentage of all others held party membership.
2.3 Econometric Specification
2.3.1 Modelling the allocation of OFAs among rural workers
The probability of a rural worker engaging in an OFA may be estimated by using a 
multinomial logit model. We were compelled to exclude from the exercise the (66) 
wageworkers engaged in agriculture given the part-time nature of these jobs, and in any 
event most were captured elsewhere in the household-farming group. Aside from these, 
according to the classification schema outlined above in Section 2.1, and taking our cue
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from the existing literature (Knight & Song, 1997; Cook, 1998)16, we assume that choice 
of activity is the result of stochastic utility maximizing behaviour. Let U h h f  denote the 
utility derived from household farming; U ofa the utility from wage work in OFAs; U oae  
the utility from OAEs; and U m  the utility from out-migration. Then, rural workers would 
choose:
(1) Household farming if U h h f >  U o f a , U o a e  and U m \
(2) OFAs if U ofa  >  U h hf , U o a e  and U m \
(3) OAEs if U o a e  > U h h f , U ofa and U m ',
(4) Migration if U M >  U Hh f , U 0 fa and U 0 a e -
If it is further assumed that these utilities are functions of personal, household and 
location characteristics, then:
where j  is the choice of activities of the rural workers, y denotes a vector of regression 
coefficients, W denotes the vector of explanatory variables, and rj is an error term. Further, 
the distribution of probabilities of choice of activities can be computed by:
(2) probability^)? = j )  =---- ---------
i + j v * '
k=\
where j  = 0,1, 2, ..., J. (Greene, 1997(a): 915)
In rural China, arable land has been distributed on a generally equitable basis 
between cultivating households according to either the number of members or the number
16 Previous studies such as Knight and Song (1997) and Cook (1998) employed the multinomial logit model 
analysing the determinants o f the allocation process o f farming, local non-farm, and out-migrating 
opportunities between Chinese rural workers or households. Obviously, one reason that I adopted this 
particular model is just taking a cue from the existing literature. The other reason for this is that the 
multinomial probit model is very demanding in term o f computation, whereas semi or non-parametric 
methods more or less aim at modelling binary choices rather than multiple choices.
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of farmers registered in each village. In principle, therefore, all householders can work on 
their plot, so that farming occupies a fallback position. For this reason, we set household 
farming as the default option in the model.
The independent variables include the individual and household characteristics of the 
rural workers and location effects (Table 2.1). Being a member of the party and having a 
township or village leader in the household will be used as convenient surrogates for “non­
market” or political influences. For human capital, as related to market forces, we used 
fairly standard variables namely, “experience” (defined as potential working years after 
completion of full time education), “experience squared”, “education” -  as measured by 
years of schooling, “possessing trained agricultural skills” and “possessing non-agricultural 
skills”.
We chose “gender”, “marital status” and the variables identified under household 
characteristics, inclusive of the “number of workers in the household” and the 
“dependency ratio” as representing an array of social factors. However, the role of “arable 
land per worker”, when considered as a household variable, might well be endogenous. 
This is because although a household’s parcel of land still cannot be sold outright, it may 
certainly be either leased out or rented in. A household with a member engaged in an off- 
farm pursuit could opt to lease out all or part of the holding; while, equally, a household 
whose members cannot manage to obtain work off-farm could rent in land to enhance its 
income generating activities. During the course of the fieldwork several village leaders 
reported that their respective community committees had leased out collectively owned 
land in order to obtain additional sources of revenue (to cover various administrative 
expenses). Moreover the land in the possession of a rural household we defined in terms of 
the acreage actually planted and cultivated. The practical implication of this decision was 
that the amount of land cultivated by a rural household was adjudged equal to the holding
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sanctioned by local regulation, minus the quantity leased out, but plus the quantity rented 
in. This definition would thus suggest that the quantity of arable land per worker depended 
upon whether - or to what extent - a household member worked off-farm. For this reason, 
the “arable land per worker” variable was excluded from the particular regressions.
In theory, location dummy variables (by village) should be able to capture a 
spectrum of factors.17 This is because, for peasant societies all around the world - not just 
China, the village functions as a distinctive, focal unit almost from the cradle to the grave. 
Socially, kinship, trust, marriage, work and much else revolve around the rhythm and 
routines of village life. Land, natural resources, access to information and traditional 
cultural assets are part of a single fabric. Similarly, distance to nearby market towns or 
urban areas, especially in terms of transportation and communications links, clearly exert a 
profound effect upon the potential level of development through off-farm opportunities and, 
not least, out-migration. As Knight and Li (1997) have argued, following on from Gunnar 
Myrdal’s original insight, once a virtuous cycle of cumulative causation commences, the 
degree of OFA and OAE involvement in a village, probably combined with the ebb and 
flow of migration, enhances the capacity of households to create new off-farm jobs, and 
allow networking to occur. We also know that the physical size of a village has some 
importance for developmental prospects: the greater the population the more active is its 
off-farm capacity (Song, 2000). Table 2.1 provides some basic details of the distribution of 
employment in each of the sample villages. For the relatively better-off villages i.e., 
Numbers 2, 4, 5 and 9, the proportion of the work force involved with household farming 
is in the range of 44-65%; and between 12-16% of work is in OAEs. This is in contrast to
17 Variables like transportation conditions, distances to township or nearby cities, size o f a village, 
development level o f non-farm activities, number o f out-migrants, etc., all can be used to proximate 
characteristics o f the sampled villages. However, no matter how many these variables are specified in an 
econometric regression, people still point out more o f these kinds o f variables. Arguably, these variables are 
non-exhaustive, whereas the number of observations are limited and some o f these variables might be 
correlated. After weighing and pondering, I simply chose the village dummy variables to control the location 
factors.
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the “middle-range” group of villages 3 & 7, and the poorer group, 1, 6 & 8 whose share of 
household farming is never below 75% and ranges as high as 87%, with only a very small 
or even zero shares of OAEs. These figures obviously suggest that the establishment of an 
OAE sector is an important step on the road to rural development.
2.3.2 The earnings and production functions
As the process determining earnings for those engaged in waged work is not the 
same as that determining earnings for those in OAEs, our modelling procedure needs to 
reflect this difference.
The earnings function. For wageworkers the semi-logarithmic form of an earnings 
function is used:
(3) LnWi = fikX t +
where Wj is daily wage or earnings, X  denotes a vector of explanatory variables, p  a vector 
of coefficients, and s  is an error term.
The dependent variable is the log of daily earnings (see Table 2.1 for results in 
summary form). In our study, the OAEs generated the highest mean daily earnings, 38.39 
yuans. The out-migrants stood in second position with 30.84 yuans. We found it somewhat 
surprising that wage labour in agriculture was as high as 27.24 yuans but, upon reflection, 
this is explicable in so far as it denotes a return to peak periods when labour time is scarce. 
The mean earnings of household farmers were the lowest of this group at just 11.83 yuans - 
and that was before deductions for tax and fees. For those wage workers engaged in OFAs
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the mean earnings amounted to 18.69 yuans or only 6.86 yuans higher than that for 
household farming. There were, of course, differences within the broad OFA category 
(Table 2.5.2): public sector jobs paid the most at 21.89 yuans, and TVE work secured the 
lowest at 14.78 yuans.
The earnings functions for OFAs, out-migrants and casual farm workers were 
estimated in Mincerian form, i.e., the explanatory variables of the log of earnings were 
years of schooling, experience and its quadratic term (Mincer, 1974). Experience is defined 
as potential working years since the completion of full time education. In addition, sex and 
location dummy variables are also included. This restricted form of the earnings function 
is, arguably, of more use in capturing the full effects of human capital (Appleton et al., 
2000). In the full specification, apart from education and experience, each separate 
function possesses its own specific variables to proxy for human capital. For employment 
in OFAs and for the out-migrants, the additional variables are non-agricultural skills and 
party membership.
The production function. For analysing the determinants of income in OAEs, 
household production functions were estimated. As, at the outset, it was unknown whether 
a Cobb-Douglas model would be appropriate or not, the function was estimated by using 
the Translog model (Bemdt & Christensen, 1973; Jacoby, 1992; Appleton & Balihuta, 
1996; Song, 2000). Then, an F-test or Likelihood Ratio test could be used to test the null 
hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas model. A main drawback of Cobb-Douglas model is that 
it imposes strong separability between different production factors. In contrast, the 
Translog production function imposes no separability restrictions; in other words, it allows 
flexibility in the effects of the factors of production. Besides, Translog function has both
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linear and quadratic terms with an arbitrary number of inputs, therefore, it can be reduced 
to the multiple inputs Cobb-Douglas function as a special case.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is stated as:
(4) InY = Pq + p, \nL + PK\nK + PiX j + s,
1 ftwhere Y  is the value-added income from OAEs ; L is the labour input to OAEs; K  the 
capital; and X  represents the other relevant variables including education of the head of 
household in school years, the experience of the household head, household head 
experience squared, and location. This is the restricted form. In the full specification, 
variables capturing non-agricultural skills and party membership are also included.
The Translog production is as follows:
(5) InK = A  + £ a  l n Xk + T £ 5 > h lnX„ InX,  +s
k=1 ^ *=1 /=l
where X  is a vector of production factors (labour and capital). Due to the existence of 
second order terms, the coefficients of log linear terms are difficult to interpret. This
obstacle can be overcome by substituting ( \ n X k - \ n X  ) for InX^ where X  is the
geometric mean of input Xk. This transformation means that Pk are just the production 
elasticities evaluated at means of explanatory variables because all the second order terms 
vanish as at that point (Jacoby, 1992). As in the Cobb-Douglas function, other variables, 
including human capital and location may be added, but only in a non-logarithm form.
2.3.3 Sample selection
18 When designing the questionnaire and conducting the fieldwork, I ask the households with non-agricultural 
own account enterprises (OAEs) to report their net income from their from OAE activities after deducting 
expenditure on all sorts o f input and wages to hired workers, but not their own income or wages because it is 
hard to estimate their own income or wages. Therefore, the value-added income ought to be the net income 
from OAE production inclusive of own labours’ earnings or wages.
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As we have shown, in general, earnings from OFAs, and especially OAEs, and those 
from out-migration, are much higher than in household farming. However, not every 
village inhabitant of working age can -  or indeed desires - to enter the non-agricultural 
labour market. Clearly there is an element of self-selection involved rather than just 
random choice. It might be reasonably expected that rural workers opting for OFA wage 
employment, running an OAE, or out-migrating would be receptive to new incentives, be 
endowed with some particular talent for establishing a business or be prepared to expose 
themselves to more risk. Under such circumstances, ceteris paribus, the unobserved 
determinants of earnings (the error terms in the earnings equation) should be greater than 
those for the rural dwellers who decide to remain with the traditional pursuit of tillage. 
Unless we control for this effect, our results may imply rather unrealistically high earnings 
for a random member of the rural work force. The unobserved determinants of earnings 
might well be correlated with the unobserved determinants of the activity selected. If such 
unobservable determinants are also correlated with some independent variables in the 
earning equation, a bias could creep into the estimated coefficients (Appleton, et al., 1999).
As there are more than two choices available to the rural population in our 
specification, the Heckman sample selection cannot be deployed here. Instead, Lee’s (1983) 
two-stage sample selection procedure was selected. In the first stage, the choice of 
activities was based upon a multinomial logit model. The number of workers in each 
household and the dependency ratio (the ratio of dependants to the number of workers in 
each household) can be identified as instrumental variables. The reason for this is simply 
that these two variables can, at least to some certain extent, determine what kind of off- 
farm activities is chosen, but they should not affect earning capacity directly. In the second 
stage of the model, the probabilities Py that an individual i being in an activity j  predicted
63
Chapter 2 Employment Diversification in Rural China
by the multinomial logit are used to construct Mill’s inverse ratios, Xy .  The earnings 
function corrected by sample selection would then be:
(6) /.»(!•„ -  a/’/.,, +v„
where Xi} - <f)(hu) /0 (/2y) and htJ = 0 (p{-) and &{•) are the density and cumulative
distribution functions of the standard normal distribution respectively, and v is an error 
term (Appleton et al., 1999).
These sample correction procedures are not appropriate for those engaged in OAEs 
as, we have already argued, self-employment is more reflective of household rather than 
individual choice. Therefore, the first step of sample correction is to model the kind of 
activities that these households are occupied with. We again divide our sample rural 
households into the three categories, pure farming households, households with their 
member engaged in OFAs, and households running OAEs. We also deploy the same 
explanatory variables as selected earlier. In addition, we also identify the number of 
workers in each household and the dependency ratio as instrument variables. In our second 
stage, the probabilities P y  that a household i being in an activity j  predicted by the 
multinomial logit are used to construct Mill’s inverse ratios, Xy.  Then the sample correction 
variable X y  is placed in the production function for a household’s OAE. It should be noted 
that the multinomial logit estimation results for the rural households’ choice of income 
generating activities are not presented here because our emphasis is upon individual - 
rather than household - behaviour.
When trying to control for sample selectivity in estimating the earnings functions for 
local waged OFAs and rural-urban migrants, it is necessary to conduct several tests for the
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validity of our instruments for the selection correction. According to a likelihood ratio test, 
our two proposed instruments for selectivity are significant in the multinomial logit -  the 
first step for the sample correction. However, at the 5% significance level they did not pass 
a Chi-squared over-identification test for whether it is valid to exclude the instruments 
from the earnings function for migrants.19 The tests indicate that the instrumental variables 
proposed for correcting sample selection are not valid. Consequently, the sample 
selectivity corrected earnings functions cannot be used in the final results.
Regarding the production function for OAEs, a likelihood ratio test indicated that the 
two instruments for selectivity are significant in the first step of the sample selection 
procedure and also passed the Chi-squared over-identification test at the 5% significance 
level. This implies that the sample selectivity correcting procedure for the production 
function for OAEs is valid. Therefore, the sample corrected production function for OAEs 
ought to be used in the final results. In the multinomial logit estimation of the choice of 
income generating activity, the first stage of the sample selection model, both the 
instrument variables i.e., the number of workers in each household and the household’s 
dependency ratio, are significant at the 1% level, and possess a positive sign. The 
correction for the selectivity variable in the production function is significant at the 5% 
level and has a positive sign. This suggests that there are positive correlations between the 
unobserved factors that determine which households engage in OAEs and the 
determination of their earnings.
2.4 The results of the multinomial logit estimation for the allocation of off- 
farm work
19 The test is described in Deaton (1997: 112).
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Model Description. The results of the multinomial logit model include the 
coefficients of the independent variables (Table 2.2.1); their marginal effects (Table 2.2.2); 
and predicted probabilities evaluated at various values of the dummy independent variables 
(Table 2.2.3). For the dummy variables, the effects upon the workers’ choice of activities 
are assessed by the predicted probabilities estimated at the means of the other explanatory 
variables - since the marginal effects may be misleading (Greene, 1997(a): 878; Appleton 
et al, 2002: 261). For the continuous variables - such as experience and education - the 
marginal effects are informative. Overall, the goodness of fit of the model as measured by 
the likelihood ratio is 0.21 or 79% as measured by the percentage of correct predictions. 
The base probabilities for the rural workers’ choice of activities at the mean of the 
explanatory variables are 80.2% for household farming, 7.2% for wage work in OF As, 
11.3% for those in OAEs and 1.4% for out-migrants.
The Effect of Political Factors. The variables representing “non-market”, or what 
might be fairly described as political factors, include “being a party member”, and “having 
a village or township leader in the household”. It is clear that, as expected, the former 
helps rural dwellers to secure waged employment in OFAs. A majority of the 97 OF As 
were either in the public sector or in collectively owned TVEs. Equally logically given the 
private enterprise nature of OAEs, party membership does not seem to be important in 
terms of self-employment. This seems to be the case for two specific reasons. First, if the 
OAE were only of a very small-scale or petty capitalist type, then it would tend to be less 
remunerative than a public sector post. Second, if the OAE was of a more substantial 
nature, then a degree of entrepreneurial aptitude might be necessary for success, and this 
would not be related to political affiliation per se. As far as the predicted probabilities are 
concerned, party members have a higher probability (24.31%) of securing employment in
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the off-farm sector than those who are not members - whose probability is only 6.78% 
(Table 2.2.3). The effect of “having a village or township leader in the household” is nearly 
same as that of party membership except that its probability to secure a waged job is a little 
lower (21.80%). Migration may also be out of local institutional and political control. We 
may therefore conclude that although political factors still help rural workers to secure 
local public sector jobs, market forces are now of considerable importance in allocating 
private off-farm employment among rural dwellers. From Table 2.1 it may be observed 
that as the mean of OFA earnings is well below that of both OAEs and out-migration, there 
would be a social as well as a private gain if labour resources were to be shifted to OAEs 
and migration. This result is consistent with the previous studies such as Knight and Song 
(1997) and Song (2000).
The Effects of Market Factors. In this research, human capital (and by extension 
market forces) comprises the variables “school years”, “experience”, “experience squared”, 
“possessing agricultural skills” and “possessing non-agricultural skills”.
We may see from Table 2.2.1 that experience and experience-squared are both 
insignificant in allocating off-farm work among our sample of rural dwellers. The most 
likely explanation is that most inhabitants possess a basic level of common experience 
(perhaps acquired from household farming), and that this is not particularly appropriate for 
OF As or indeed for OAEs.
An important aspect of human capital endowment is obviously education. Our 
results (Table 2.2.2) reveal that the marginal effects of the number of school years are 
significant in terms of household farming, wage work in OFA jobs and out-migration - but 
not upon OAEs. This latter result is not especially surprising in the light of our knowledge 
of entrepreneurial traits elsewhere. An additional year’s education enhances the possibility
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of obtaining a wage job by 1.3%, and raises the prospect of out-migration by 0.5%. In 
contrast, and in general consonance with experience all over the developing world, an extra 
year of education would lower the probability of working in household farming -  in this 
instance by 2.1%.
In our context, the most practical and tangible dimension of human capital is skill 
(Table 2.2.3). In principle, the possession of non-agricultural skills might be expected to 
help rural workers go off farm. As anticipated, our results confirm this for wage work in 
OFAs, also for those in pursuance of OAEs and for out-migrants. One rather anomalous 
finding is that the possession of agricultural skills actually reduces the probability of a 
village inhabitant of working age engaging in household farming -  though it does assist in 
obtaining wage work in OFAs. We can only speculate that, on the one hand, additional 
farming skills may have little relevance for household cultivation; and, on the other, that 
those rural workers with agricultural skills may be more motivated than others and hence 
be more inclined to seek off-farm employment.
The Effects of Social Factors. We next consider those variables that are social in 
character. We begin with the combined gender and marital status variables, “male single”, 
“female single”, “married male” and “married female”. The last named has been chosen as 
the default in order to avoid dummy variable trap. It was discovered that the predicted 
probabilities suggest that being single and male elevates, significantly, the probability of 
obtaining off-farm employment compared to married female respondents (Table 2.2.3).
With regard to household characteristics, the “number of household workers” 
variable exerts a significant effect upon OAEs. An extra worker at home would raise the 
probability of establishing and running an OAE by 3.2%. This result is in keeping with 
experience elsewhere, and is not unexpected on logical grounds given the labour-intensive
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nature of most off-farm enterprises in China. The other household variable highlighted, the 
“dependency ratio”, also has a very significant effect upon OAE work (an increase by one 
unit of the ratio induces a rise of 7% possibility of pursuing OAE), as well as upon the 
more directly obvious household farming activity (a fall of 7.1%). Low income and 
underemployment in household farming (reported in Table 2.1), and especially the acute 
barriers of securing the scarce OFA opportunities are now conspiring to push rural 
dwellers with surplus labour and heavy life burden into OAEs.
The influence of the dependency ratio upon migration however, although positive 
and in the expected direction, is comparatively slight (1%). The reason is almost certainly 
associated with the effective limits of local networking in that although there may well be 
pressure to find work in the towns and cities, village cadres may not know (at all or so 
well) contacts further afield.
Location Effects. We can see from Table 2. 1 that none of the sampled inhabitants 
of villages 3 and 8 have migrated, so these two (village) dummy variables have been 
omitted from the rest of the analysis. Village 7 was selected as the default. This particular 
village, as we have noted above, has secured a county-level reputation for cash crop 
production, but it is situated far from any sizeable town or the provincial capital, and it 
generally lacks convenient transport and communication links. Because of these location 
factors, its OFAs remain in an undeveloped condition. For the other three activities, viz. 
household farming, OFA employment and OAEs the default villages are 3, 7 and 8. The 
two former units have earlier been ascribed “middle-income” status as a consequence of 
their agricultural pursuits; and village 8 is the poorest in the sample, and is almost entirely 
dependent upon farming. Compared to the three default farming-oriented villages, the
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workers in the four comparatively richer villages 2, 4, 5 and 9, are less likely to be farmers, 
and more inclined to pursue OAEs.
In further contrast to the default units, workers in both the richer villages 2 & 9, and 
in the poorer village 6 have a higher probability of securing off-farm wage employment. In 
the case of the two former villages this is attributable to the job-generative OAEs located 
there; whereas village 6 possesses relatively developed collectively owned TVEs. 
Regarding out-migration, for quite different reasons associated with “pull” and “push” 
factors, the inhabitants of the richer villages 2 & 4, and of the poorer 1 & 6 exhibit the 
greatest propensities to seek employment elsewhere.
To conclude, location plays a very important role in determining the destination of 
employment for our sample of rural workers. Close proximity to a big city (relevant for 
villages 2, 4 & 5); being in the vicinity of good highway communications (villages 2 and 
4); occupying a township seat (villages 4 and 5); possessing industrial capacity (village 9); 
and having the inherited advantage of collective OFAs (village 6), all turn out to be of 
considerable significance.
Apart from using village dummies to control location effects, we also conduct an 
exercise by employing village-level proximity factors to control location effects. These 
village-level proximity factors are distance to the provincial capital city, distance to the 
nearby highway, located at the township seat, possessing industrial capacity, having 
advantage of collective non-farm enterprises. The estimated results are reported in 
Appendix Tables 2.1 and 2.2. When comparing Appendix Table 2.1 to Table 2.2.1, we find 
out that the pseudo-R squared statistic (0.19) decreased a bit in Appendix Table 2.1; all 
major coefficients and their significance levels do not change significantly; the predicted 
results of the allocation of non-farm opportunities between rural workers do not change 
significantly either; finally, even the base probabilities for the rural workers’ choice of
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activities at the mean of the explanatory variables are basically kept a original level.20 Two 
Likelihood Ratio tests were also conducted to test the significance of location effects. In 
both the cases of village dummies and village-level proximity factors, the test results are 
far bigger than the critical values of Chi-squared statistics. This suggests that including the 
location effects is essential to the model. Therefore, it could be argued that using village- 
level proximity factors instead of village dummies haven’t improved the estimated results.
However, the estimated results about these proximity factors did tell some 
interesting story (see Appendix Table 2.2). First, villages located at the township seat 
marginally help rural individuals set up and run OAEs. Second, villages possessing 
industrial capacity facilitate significantly encourage locals to go off farm, to get local 
waged OFAs and to set up OAEs. Finally, three variables - the distance to the provincial 
capital city, the distance to the nearby highway and villages having collective enterprises - 
are not significant at all statistically.
2.5 The econometric results for returns to labour of OFAs
2.5.1 Model description
In this section, the earnings functions of wageworkers in OFAs and those for out- 
migrants are estimated with and without sample selection. The functions are estimated in 
both full and restricted specification, with the latter stressed in this section. The production 
function for those running OAEs is also estimated. The econometric estimating results are 
presented in Tables 2.3, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3 & 2.4.4.
20 The base probabilities for the rural workers’ choice o f activities at the mean o f the explanatory variables 
are 79.5% for household farming, 7.7% for wage work in OFAs, 11.1% for those in OAEs and 1.7% for out- 
migrants. The original figures are 80.2% for household farming, 7.2% for wage work in OFAs, 11.3% for 
those in OAEs and 1.4% for out-migrants.
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To determine whether any two earnings functions under the restricted specification 
could be pooled, structural tests (Chow tests) were conducted. The null hypothesis of the 
Chow tests is that the coefficients of two earning functions are similar or, that the two 
earning functions can be pooled. Of the three main functions we have estimated, i.e., for 
wage work in farming, for OFAs and out-migration, none actually exhibited 
heteroscedasticity on the Breusch-Pagan test. However, pooling of any other two (of the 
three) functions were all rejected by the Chow test (Table 2.3). These results suggest that 
the rural workers in our sample are rewarded differently according to the type of activity 
engaged in.
In addition to these functions, further sub-estimations were conducted for 
employment in both privately owned (45 in our sample) and collectively owned (27) 
TVEs, and for public sector jobs - for example, teachers and professional party cadres (25)
9 1(Table 2.4.4). The results of the pairwise Wald test demonstrate that some of coefficients 
are significantly different at the 5% level between each pair of these three particular 
functions. It was thus necessary to explore these in greater detail. In fact, the results of the 
Chow test indicate that these earning functions may indeed be pooled.
The hypothesis of the production function for the OAEs in Cobb-Douglas form is
79rejected by the F-test at the 2% level of significance. Additionally, a LR test was also 
conducted to test the null hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas model. The Chi-squared statistic 
of the LR test is 15.58, whereas the critical value of the Chi-squared statistic with degrees 
of freedom of six are 12.59 at the 5% significance level and 16.81 at the 1% significance 
level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas model was rejected at the 5% 
significance level. Based on these two tests, the translog form was adopted. A further test
21 (/?, -  P2) / (Var(fi{) + Var(P2)) ~ x10) » where and are coefficients o f the same explanatory 
variable estimated in different earnings functions.
22 For detail, see Greene (1997(a): 161-162).
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on the validity of the production function concerns the question of whether any 
endogeneity may have crept in. For this production function, the most dubious variable 
was the annual labour input by the household expressed by the number working days. To 
detect this problem, an instrumental variable model (IV model) was used. In order to derive 
the predicted household labour input, demographic variables were used as instruments. 
These are the ratios of each of five age groups to the total number of household members. 
The groups are: 0 to 6 year-old; 7 to 10; 11 to 15; 16 to 60 female; and 61 and above; (the 
16 to 60 male group was dropped to avoid perfect collinearity). Despite this allowance, an 
application of the F-test and the Hausman Test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
labour inputs are not endogenous.
For the main three earnings equations (Table 2.4.1), the adjusted R-squared statistics 
was found to be in the range 0.32 - 0.45. For the OAE production function, the adjusted R- 
squared statistics was much higher at 0.73 but exhibited heteroscedasticity on the Breusch- 
Pagan test. So, the OLS production function coefficients are not effective. As a 
consequence, the earnings functions were estimated with the Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares (multiplicative heteroscedastic) model24; nevertheless this still proved to be 
unsuccessful. Under such circumstances, the only choice open to us was to use the White’s 
heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in presenting the production function.
2.5.2 Explanatory variables
23 This tests whether there is any endogenous problem. The null hypothesis is that there is no such 
endogeneity under which both b (the least square estimator) and b{V (the IV estimator) are consistent 
estimators o f /?; however the former is an efficient estimator whereas the latter is not. However, if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, only the IV estimator is consistent. As the Hausman test, in this context, is simply the
Wald test, the formula is: W — (bjv —b) [Vlv — V\(biv —b)~  %,2\k\ , where V = s 2 (X 'X )~] is the
estimated covariance matrix for the least square estimator, and Viv is the estimated asymptotic covariance 
matrix for the IV estimator (Greene, 1999: 383-387).
24 We used the HREG command o f the LIMDEP econometric software, modelling the error variance as the 
exponent o f the vector of explanatory variables and associated coefficients.
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As concluded in Section 2.3.3, the earnings functions for local waged OFAs and 
migrants without sample selection (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.4.1), and the sample 
corrected production function for OAEs (Column 3 in Table 2.4.2) should be used to 
interpret the final results here. The earnings and production functions are presented in 
Tables 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.
Now the rest of this sub-section will be devoted to interpreting the explanatory 
variables. Measuring human capital is the most important task in estimating an earnings 
function. In the restricted specification, the variables proxy for these form of capital are 
education and experience. In the restricted specification, the variables that proxy for human 
capital are education and experience. In the fully specified form of the earnings and 
production functions, variables such as farming skill and non-farm skill can also proxy for 
human capital. Party membership is a surrogate for political influence. The earnings and 
production function of restricted form will be stressed.
For the wageworkers in agriculture, those engaged in OFAs and in OAEs, and for 
the out-migrants, education is the only significant for those migrating and those running 
OAEs. For the migrants, the Mincerian return to education is 30.3% in the restricted 
specification. Our reported rate for out-migrants is greater than that found by other 
researchers. Appleton et al (2001), using a large national data set for the Chinese urban 
labour market as a whole, found the return to education was of the order 7% for both rural- 
urban migrants and non-retrenched urban workers. One plausible explanation for these 
differences may be that our results for the out-migrants capture local rather than national 
trends. As regards educational investment for those in OAEs, the rate of return to the 
household head education is 12.6% (Column 3 in Table 2.4.2). Therefore, the returns to 
education in the earnings and production functions are quite different according to the 
category of off-farm activity undertaken. We have already reported that education seems to
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act as a barrier to engaging in the pursuit of OAEs. However, once rural inhabitants 
manage to obtain a foothold in an OAE, education does then yield significant returns. 
Education is also helpful in securing wage employment in OFAs, but thereafter did not
9Sraise the earnings threshold. Education is of considerable importance for the out-migrants 
too.
As far as experience is concerned, and with the focus still on the restricted 
specification form, with the exception of those in OAEs, the variable is statistically 
significant for all other OFAs and migration. The earnings of the three OFAs had an 
inverse-U relationship with potential experience, peaking at 24 years of experience for the
9 f \farming wageworkers; 36 years for OFA waged workers; and 27.5 years for migrants.
After human capital, the next point of attention is gender. In our sample, the sex of 
the respondent appears to be of significance only for wageworkers in OFAs, and it also 
favours males - in view of the ingrained prejudices still very much alive in most places in
97rural China. For those in wage work in farming and for the sample of out-migrants, 
gender does not seem to be of much importance; both results are comprehendible.
In addition to education, experience and gender, the other aspects of human capital 
such as the possession of farming and non-farming skills, and political factors - such as 
party membership - are included in the full specification form of the earnings and 
production functions. It is clear from the results that the acquisition of a complement of 
non-farming skills has significant positive effects upon the earnings of the migrants.
25 For the OFA sub-groupings the returns to education are only available in the full specification form of the 
earnings function. For those in the public sector the return is 10.8%. For wage workers in the TVEs the 
returns in our sample are actually negative (-12%). We can think o f several plausible reasons for this rather 
odd result, all connected with the special (clientist) nature of hiring and retention in collectively owned 
enterprises (Table 2.4.4).
26 For those employed in the OFA sub-groupings, the earnings also have an inverse U shaped relationship 
with potential experience, peaking at 33 years of experience for the public job holders, 27 years for the 
collectively-owned enterprise workers but the coefficients for the workers in private enterprises are not 
significant at all (Table 2.4.4).
27 For the OFA sub-groupings, gender is only significant for jobs in the private sector. Gender seems to have 
no significant effect upon earning potential in public sector and TVE employment (Table 2.4.4).
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Further, party members earn more than those who do not join, but only for those employed
j o  t
in OFAs. Given the household structure of farming, it is not surprising that the possession 
of agricultural skills does not determine the level of earnings of farming wageworkers.
Overall, then, these results point to the gradual emergence of more competitive rural 
labour markets. On the one hand, education and experience does not turn out to be 
significant for all of the earnings and production functions that we have been able to 
estimate. But on the other hand, with the exception of public sector jobs and employment 
in the collectively owned TVEs, party membership does not seem to influence the earnings 
capacity of all the other participants in off-farm activities. We would therefore be inclined 
to argue that the evidence points to a period of transition underway: for the older categories 
of work, earnings are still affected by political considerations, but for the newer, the 
market is winning out.
2.5.3 Simulation from the earnings functions
In this section we investigate a series of counterfactual propositions. For this 
purpose, simulations from the earnings functions are deployed. Such simulations are only 
possible for wageworkers in agriculture, those engaged in OFAs and the out-migrants, as 
no earnings functions are available for either household farmers or those running OAEs. 
Wageworkers in farming have been chosen as an exemplifier of the method. The following 
equation sets out the simulation:
28 Concerning the sub-groups composition o f the OFAs, party members earn more in both the public sector 
and in collectively owned TVE jobs as anticipated; and membership exerts no influence upon private off- 
farm employment. The possession of non-agricultural skills does not affect the earnings o f anyone in these 
sub-groupings (Table 2.4.4).
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(7) E(JYi) = &up(PjXt + \o '2j )  (for detailed discussion about this equation, please see 
Greene (1997(a): 71); and Appleton et al. (2001))
where we intend to simulate: how much Group i would earn if they were put in Group f  s 
position and paid as Group j.
E(Wj) stands for simulated daily earnings for Group i;
pj is the vector of coefficients from the earnings function for Group j\
Xj is a vector of the means of the corresponding explanatory variables for Group /; 
oj is the standard error of the earnings function for Group j.
Table 2.5.1 presents the results of the simulated mean earnings for wageworkers in 
OFAs and out-migrants. As we have mentioned above, wage work in agriculture is 
temporary, casual and secondary, and is only available at peak periods. So the relatively 
high daily earnings reported (27.24 yuans) reflects the labour price at agricultural peak 
times. Surprisingly, these peak-time farming waged workers would earn less if they were 
put in a position of either wage OFA or migration. For those in OFA waged work, 
migration would only be of marginal benefit. However, when we disaggregate this group 
into the three constituent elements, a slightly more complex picture emerges (Table 2.5.2). 
All three would not experience any gain by shifting within the OFA category. This implies 
that these respondents have indeed made a rational choice given their own circumstances. 
Not unexpectedly, for those who have actually migrated, changing to any other activity 
would certainly reduce their earnings. Although we do not have effective data for the two 
other categories, it is evident from the absolute figures presented in Table 2.5.1 that they 
occupy different ends of the earnings spectrum. Those in household farming are quite 
unambiguously worse off, and it therefore seems likely that even after adjustment is made
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for their particular circumstances, a move to an OFA, or to take the decision to migrate 
would, ceteris paribus, enhance their potential earnings. The exact opposite holds for those 
running OAEs. Conclusively, except for those still staying on own farm, it seems that all of 
those managed off-farm, inclusive of the agricultural peak-time waged workers, could have 
reached their best earning capacity by exploiting their specific earning potential 
respectively.
2.6 Conclusion
On the basis of our case study of nine villages in northeast China, we have argued 
that there is mounting evidence that market - rather than political - forces are assuming an 
increasing role in the allocation of private off-farm employment opportunities. Education is 
proving to be a potent factor in assisting rural inhabitants to secure local off-farm waged 
jobs, and is a significant human-capital attribute for migrants. The possession of a 
complement of non-agricultural skills further encourages rural workers to gain off-farm 
jobs. The political factors that we have been able to identify and model - party membership 
or having a local government official in the household - still have a positive influence, 
helping rural dwellers to obtain some increasingly restricted types of local off-farm wage 
employment. However, they have little or no effect upon the establishment and functioning 
of OAEs, and nor do they influence the chances of migrants securing urban employment.
As far as the determination of earnings are concerned, once again we have 
assembled robust evidence to the effect that market forces are far more important than 
political factors, particularly in the fast growing private off-farm sector. The results of our 
earnings and production functions modelling procedure reveal that returns to education are 
significant for those running OAEs and those out-migrating. Further, the variable
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“experience” has positive effects upon all the OFAs we have managed to capture in our 
survey.
Naturally, as China is at such a relatively early and still immature stage in regional 
and local economic development, there are many indications that the rural labour market is 
far from perfect in the neo-classical sense. We have demonstrated that a host of variables, 
broadly under the heading of “social” forces, continue to operate in the countryside. 
Gender, marital status and household demographic characteristics - such as the number of 
household members of working age, and the dependency ratio, all combine to exert a 
significant influence upon the allocation of household farming and off-farm activities. 
Certainly being male and single seems to strongly motivate rural inhabitants to strive for 
off-farm employment to a much greater extent than other household members.
Moreover, the accident of one’s birthplace remains a potent determinant of work 
destination and earnings capacity and in this respect our findings are similar to those of 
research covering regions elsewhere in China (Travers, 1992). Compared to all the other 
factors we have considered, location continues to exert a powerful influence upon well­
being. The distance from a village to either cities or even to one or other of the township 
administrative centres is still of great importance -  as indeed is the ease of transport and 
communications. Both the initial conditions and natural endowments present in a village, 
as well as the industrial and commercial advantages built up over the last two decades, 
have a decisive influence upon the degree of job choice and the ensuing level of 
remuneration. As far as policy matters are concerned, this suggests that the uneven process 
of liberalisation of off-farm activities should be deepened and speeded up, and that more 
support and encouragement from all responsible components of the Chinese state would 
yield considerable private and social returns. In the wider sphere, a further re-allocation of
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labour from household farming to the better-paid and competitive OFA sector would 
certainly help promote development in China and in other rural, peasant-based societies.
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Table 2.1 The variables (and their mean values) used in the regression equations
1 2 3 4 5
Household Wage Wage OAEs Migrants
farming work in work in
farming OFAs
Number of observations (949 in total) 675 66 97 134 43
Average daily earnings (in Yuan) 11.83 27.24 18.42 38.39 30.84
Average number o f working days p.a. 206 47 226 249 272
Individual characteristics
Age of respondent 36.78 34.88 35.52 35.54 30.53
Male (%) 50.22 63.64 75.26 62.69 62.79
Marital status (%) 91.41 87.88 83.51 84.33 69.77
Education (in years) 6.73 6.44 7.73 7.27 8.05
Working experience (in years) 24.05 22.44 21.78 22.27 16.49
In possession o f agricultural skills (%) 1.33 4.55 9.28 3.73 6.98
In possession o f non-agricultural skills 2.22 1.52 18.56 16.42 13.95
(%)
Party member % 2.52 3.03 18.56 3.73 2.33
Household characteristics
Household size (persons) 3.54 3.52 3.63 3.91 3.81
Arable land per worker (in mu) 8.07 5.37 5.66 3.35 3.02
Number o f workers 2.32 2.03 2.40 2.35 2.35
Number o f dependants 1.22 1.48 1.23 1.56 1.47
Dependency ratio 0.597 0.849 0.577 0.820 0.754
Township or village leader in the 2.81 4.55 14.43 2.24 2.33
household (%)
Village No. 1 (%) 12.44 16.67 2.06 8.96 27.91
Village No. 2 (%) 6.07 25.76 19.59 16.42 27.91
Village No. 3 (%) 13.19 9.09 5.15 7.46 0.00
Village No. 4 (%) 9.93 6.06 8.25 22.39 18.60
Village No. 5 (%) 8.59 13.64 9.29 16.42 2.33
Village No. 6 (%) 13.04 1.52 17.53 3.73 16.28
Village No.7 (%) 14.81 1.52 11.34 3.73 2.33
Village No .8 (%) 13.04 4.55 9.28 1.49 0.00
Village No.9 (%) 8.89 21.21 17.53 19.40 9.30
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 2.1 A The distribution of the sampled rural workers by occupation




No. o f workers 
farming for other 
households
The percentage of  
workers farming for 
other households
Household-Farmers 675 71.1 60 8.9
OFAs: Wage-workers 97 10.2 6 2.2
OAEs: Self-employed 134 14.1 0 0
Migrants 43 4.5 Not-applicable Not-applicable
Total 949 100% 66
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Table 2.1 B The number of OFA and OAE workers engaged on their own household farms
The No. o f workers engaged on their The percentage o f workers engaged in their
own household farms own household farms
Wage- workers 69 71% (69/97*100)
Self- employed 59 44% (59/134*100)
Note: the numbers in the brackets are the standard deviations o f the means.
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No. o f observations 69 28 59 75
Average No. o f off-farm 192.71 311.32 185.68 298.13
working days p.a. (102.40) (64.65) (100.82) (84.14)
Average No. o f working 120.28 141.14
days on household farm (82.67) (100.94)
Average daily earnings 20.08 14.35 38.76 38.10
off-farm (in RMB Yuan) (13.65) (8.05) (53.20) (32.93)
Note: the numbers in the brackets are the standard deviations o f the means.
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Table 2.2.1 The application of the multinomial logit model (1): the value of the coefficients and their 
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1.403

























































































































0 649 10 14 2 675
1 67 19 11 0 97
2 98 4 30 2 134
3 30 5 3 5 43
Total 844 38 58 9 949
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%. The t-ratios are in 
brackets.
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Table 2.2.2 The application of the multinomial logit model (2): the marginal effects and their level of 
significance____________________________________________________________________________________
1 2 3 4
Household
farming
Wage work in 
OFAs
OAEs Migration
Constant 0.783 -0.276 -0.395 -0.112
(6.43)*** (3.72)*** (4.26)*** (3.08)***
Male single -0.160 0.098 0.050 0.012
(2.23)** (2.26)** (0.91) (1.05)
Female single -0.170 0.094 0.058 0.018
( 1.88)* (1.71)* (0 .88) (1.32)
Male married -0.095 0.061 0.031 0.003
(3.12)*** (3.15)*** (1.34) (0.55)
Experience 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.46) (0.13) (0.60) (0.45)
Experience squared -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00003 0.000003
(0.22) (0.13) (0.37) (0.14)
School years -0.021 0.013 0.004 0.005
(2.39)** (2.40)** (0.55) (2 .11)**
In possession o f agricultural skills -0.167 0.086 0.065 0.016
(2.05)** (2.23)** (1.05) (1.37)
In possession o f non-agricultural -0.311 0.106 0.187 0.019
skills (5.47)*** (3.66)*** (4.67)*** (1.84)*
Party membership -0.096 0.099 0.001 -0.004
(1.30) (3.01)*** (0 .01) (0.27)
Village or township leader in the -0.064 0.089 -0.014 -0.012
household (0.78) (2.54)*** (0 .20) (0.65)
Village 1 -0.036 -0.117 0.096 0.057
(0.61) (2.38)** (2.36)** (3.92)***
Village 2 -0.303 0.082 0.169 0.053
(6.04)*** (2.99)*** (4.42)*** (3.75)***
Village 4 -0.257 0.005 0.203 0.049
(5.51)*** (0.17) (6.07)*** (3.73)***
Village 5 -0.215 0.023 0.168 0.024
(4.34)*** (0.76) (4.67)*** (1.39)
Village 6 -0.070 0.054 -0.031 0.046
( 1.22) (2.17)** (0.58) (3.74)***
Village 9 -0.279 0.062 0.177 0.040
(6.29)*** (2.45)*** (5.23)*** (3.22)***
No. o f workers in each household -0.024 -0.008 0.032 0.0001
(1.56) (0.79) (2.73)*** (0.05)
Dependency ratio -0.071 -0.009 0.070 0.010
(2.51)*** (0.49) (3.59)*** (1.81)*
Probabilities at the mean vector 80.2 7.2 11.3 1.4
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note; *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%. The t-ratios are in 
brackets.
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Table 2.2.3 The application of the multinomial logit model (3): Simulated Employment Probabilities of 
Individual Characteristics
1 2 3 4
Gender & marital status
Household
farming
Wage work in 
OFAs
OAEs Migration
Male single 68.02** 15.46** 13.94 2.58
Female single 66.63* 14.49* 14.97 3.91
Male married 76.71*** 9 59*** 12.35 1.35
Female married 
In possession o f  
agricultural skills:
85.57 4.10 9.27 1.06
“Yes” 58.23** 20.47** 17.53 3.78
“No”
In possession o f non- 
agricultural skills:
80.61 6.97 11.11 1.31
“Yes” 39.16*** 19 95*** 37.38*** 3.52*
“No”
Party membership:
82.08 6.55 10.14 1.24
“Yes” 64.53 24.31*** 10.24 0.91
“No”
With a township or 
village leader in the 
household:
80.56 6.78 11.28 1.37
“Yes” 68.41 21.80*** 9.23 0.55
“No”
Village dummy variables
80.39 6.86 11.34 1.40
Village 1 78.93 1.07** 11.06** 8.93***
Village 2 56.07*** 16.75*** 20.89*** 6.29***
Village 4 60.59*** 5.91 28.77*** 4 72***
Village 5 68.39*** 8.12 22.66*** 0.83
Village 6 79.82 12.23** 3.79
Village 9 60.55*** 13.40*** 23.51*** 2 54***
Default village 88.91 5.86 5.09 0.14
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey. 
Note:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%;*= Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets. Villages 3 and 8 were omitted, as there were no recorded migrants.
3. Village 7 was defined as the default village for migration but for the remaining activities, the
default villages were 3, 7 & 8.
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Table 2.3 The Structural Test Results Between Different Earning Functions
Wage work in agriculture Wage work in OFAs Migrants
Wage work in agriculture 
Wage work in OFAs 
Migrants
Chow test rejected at H0 1% 
Chow test rejected H0 at 1% Chow test rejected H0 at 1%
Note: H0 denotes the null hypothesis.
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Table 2.4.1 The Earnings Function (key variables)
Without Selectivity Correction With Selectivity Correction
1 2 3 4 5
Wage workers Wage workers Migrants Wage workers Migrants
in agriculture in OFAs in OFAs
Constant 2.75 1.865 -0.117 2.680 0.880
(8.09)*** (6.40)*** (0.18) (6.43)*** (0.94)
Male 0.100 0.251 -0.213 0.164 -0.234
(0.92) (1.92)* ( 1.11) (1.39) (1.29)
Education (in 0.018 0.031 0.303 -0.015 0.257
years) (0.61) (1.29) (4.93)*** (0.48) (3.83)***
Experience 0.048 0.071 0.110 0.072 0.102
(2.59)*** (3.23)*** (2.46)** (4.35)*** (2.38)**
Experience squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(2.19)** (2 .66)*** (1.30) (3.88)*** (0.99)
Village 1 -0.04 0.594 -0.389 0.753 -0.540







Village 4 -0.33 -0.381 -0.685 -0.174 -0.706
(1.41) (1.82)* (2.48)** (0.83) (2.57)***
Village 5 -0.14 -0.422 -0.413 -0.264 -0.261
(0.91) (2.57)*** (0.93) (1.36) (0.41)
Village 6 -0.25 -0.674 -0.455 -0.613 -0.488
(1.94)* (3.96)*** ( 1.66) (3.90)*** (1.95)**
Village 7 0.12 -0.534 -1.289 -0.391 -0.882







Village 9 -0.42 -0.296 -0.100 -0.216 0.126
(3.00)*** (1.82)* (0.38) (1.38) (0.38)
Correction for -0.317 -0.384
selectivity (2.63)*** (1.47)
No. o f observations 66 97 43 97 43
Mean o f dependent 3.187 2.721 3.048 2.721 3.048
variable
Adjusted R- 0.32 0.37 0.45 0.409 0.467
squared
Standard error of 0.413 0.496 0.578 0.481 0.571
equation
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%;*= Significant at 10%. The t-ratios in brackets.
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Table 2.4.2 The production function for OAEs (in Translog form)
1 2 3 4
Restricted form Restricted form Full specification Full specification
without sample with sample without sample with sample
correction correction correction correction
Constant term 9.941 9.551 10.091 9.328
(12.47)*** (11.13)*** (12.36)*** (10.40)***
Log Labour (in working 0.429 0.452 0.439 0.460
days) (1.36) (1.45) (1.34) (1.50)
Log Capital 0.159 0.220 0.223 0.210
(1.77)* (2.54)*** (2.05)** (2.06)**
Log hired labour (working days) 0.186 0.159 0.143 0.173
(1.38) (1.24) (1.05) (1.40)
Education o f household head 0.105 0.126 0.100 0.135
(years in full time schooling) (1.84)* (2.05)** (1.78)* (2.11)**
Experience o f the head of -2.172E-02 -4.27E-02 -1.908E-02 -4.354E-02
household (0.53) (0.95) (0.44) (0.92)
Experience o f the head of 1.799E-04 5.97E-04 1.183E-04 6.467E-04
household squared (0.29) (0.84) (0.18) (0.86)
Village 1 -0.540 -0.913 -0.613 -0.972
(1.29) (2.07)** (1.39) (2.10)**
Village 3 0.148 0.170 0.304 0.040
(0.22) (0.27) (0.43) (0.06)
Village 4 -0.565 -0.568 -0.620 -0.564
(1.90)* (1.97)* (2.04)** (1.92)*
Village 5 0.197 0.211 0.223 0.194
(0.64) (0.68) (0.69) (0.59)
Village 6 -2.993 -3.523 -3.053 -3.601
(2.33)** (2.71)*** (2.36)** (2.74)***
Village 7 -0.443 -1.024 -0.494 -1.125
(1.02) (1.81)* (1.02) (2.00)**
Village 8 0.495 -0.097 0.632 -0.353
(0.48) (0.1) (0.60) (0.32)
Village 9 -0.660 -0.833 -0.606 -0.877
(2.62)*** (3.14)*** (2.41)** (2.96)***
Log labour squared term -0.533 -0.566 -0.584 -0.525
(2.00)** (2.21)** (2.02)** (1.90)*
Labour * capital 0.263 0.238 0.258 0.229
(1.65)* (1.56) (1.65) (1.51)
Labour*hired labour -0.015 0.016 0.007 0.011
(0.21) (0.22) (0.09) (0.15)
Log capital squared term -0.006 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.40) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05)
Capital*hired labour -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.020
(1.31) (1.43) (1.45) (1.30)
Hired labour squared term 0.024 0.014 0.015 0.015
(0.56) (0.34) (0.34) (0.40)
Possession o f non-farm skills -0.292 0.154
(1.02) (0.45)
Being CP member -0.001 -0.129
(0.00) (0.29)
Correction for selectivity 0.576 0.691
(2.20)** (2.17)**
Daily marginal products of 18.97
labour
Daily marginal products of 13.47
hired labour
No. o f observations 82 82 82 82
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73
Standard error o f equation 0.886 0.870 0.894 0.884
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%. The t-ratios are in 
brackets.
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Table 2.4.3 The Earnings Function (full specification)
Without Selectivity Correction With Selectivity Correction
1 2 3 4 5
Wage Local wage Migrants Wage Migrants
workers in OFAs workers in
farming OFAs
Constant 2.771 1.964 -0.107 3.014 0.676
(8.39)*** (6.27)*** (0.17) (6.44)*** (0.73)
Male 0.099 0.244 -0.275 0.091 -0.280
(0.91) (1.97)** (1.44) (0.74) (1.54)
School years 0.017 0.029 0.295 -0.014 0.260
(0.59) (1.04) (5.18)*** (0.42) (3.97)***
Experience 0.048 0.065 0.123 0.078 0.114
(2.55)*** (3.00)*** (2.95)*** (4.60)*** (2.67)***
Experience-squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(2.18)** (2.53)*** (1.78)* (4.01)*** (1.29)
Village 1 -0.051 0.440 -0.440 1.219 -0.550







Village 4 -0.324 -0.355 -0.672 -0.018 -0.691
(1.39) (1.63) (2.45)** (0.08) (2.57)***
Village 5 -0.140 -0.422 -0.322 -0.106 -0.218
(0.87) (2.63)*** (0.83) (0.51) (0.35)
Village 6 -0.250 -0.720 -0.673 -0.542 -0.660
(1.90)* (4.27)*** (2 .12)** (3.26)*** (2.39)**
Village 7 0.116 -0.570 -1.684 -0.288 -1.293







Village 9 -0.438 -0.309 -0.126 -0.178 0.057
(3.02)*** (1.97)** (0.44) (1.13) (0.16)
Possessing agricultural -0.016
skills (0.16)
Possessing non- -0.110 0.527 -0.298 0.432
agricultural skills (0.75) (2.01)** (1.94)** (1.33)
Party membership 0.153 0.213 -0.586 -0.311 -0.481
(0.45) (2.06)** (1.57) (1.29) (0.75)




No. of observations 66 97 43 97 43
Mean of dependent 3.187 2.721 3.048 2.721 3.048
variable
Adjusted R-sq 0.293 0.376 0.453 0.423 0.453
Standard error of 0.420 0.495 0.579 0.476 0.579
equation
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%;*= Significant at 10%. The t-ratios in brackets.
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Table 2.4.4 Earnings Functions for Sub-groups of Local waged OFAS
Key variables More variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
Public jobs TVEs jobs private jobs Public jobs TVEs jobs Private jobs
Constant 0.037 2.786*** 1.906*** -0.075 3.784 2.022
(0.07) (6.54) (3.69) (0.15) (9.05)*** (4.15)***
Male 0.253 0.173 0.662*** 0.228 0.083 0.676
( 1.12) (1.09) (3.46) ( 1.12) (0.58) (3.41)***
Education in 0.097 -0.041 0.032 0.108 -0.120 0.014
years (1.43) (0.92) (0.70) (1.83)* (2.72)** (0.31)
Experience 0.131*** 0.053* 0.040 0.112 0.024 0.043
(2.92) (2 .00) (1.41) (2.34)** (1.15) (1.54)
Experience -0.002** -0 .001** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
squared (2.39) (2 .21) (0.70) (2.34)** (2.25)** (0.94)
VI 1.506*** -0.183 1.578 -0.408
(5.82) ( 1.20) (9.63)*** (0.91)
V3 0.730** -0.333 0.817 -0.232
(2.29) (0.96) (3.69)*** (0 .88)
V4 -0.407 -0.502** -0.440* -0.282 -0.420 -0.439
(1.46) (2.38) (1.69) (1.71) (1.85)* (1.71)*
V5 -0.295 -0.272 -0.424 -0.331 -0.068 -0.412
(1.05) (1.46) (1.38) ( 1.86)* (0.36) (1.34)
V6 -0.578** -0.481** -1.260*** -0.327 -0.707 -1.296
(2.41) (2.33) (4.95) (2.65)** (5.41)*** (5.07)***
V7 0.002 -0.497* -1.206** 0.215 -0.586 -1.199
(0 .01) (1.98) (2.32) (1.26) (3.01)*** (2.30)**
V8 -0.273 -1.157*** -0.149 -1.117
(1.07) (5.56) (0.83) (6.13)***
V9 0.025 -0.311 -0.284 0.180 -0.320 -0.282







No. of 25 27 45 25 27 45
observation
Mean of 2.881 2.589 2.710 2.881 2.589 2.710
dependent
variable
Adjusted R-sq 0.423 0.279 0.47 0.467 0.514 0.464
Standard error 0.494 0.378 0.505 0.475 0.310 0.508
of equation
Source: calculated from the Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at 1%, ** = Significant at 5%, * = Significant at 10% and t-ratios are in the bracket.
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Wage workers in 
OFAs
OAEs Migrants
Household agriculture 11.83 23.24 12.79 11.89
Wage workers in farming 27.24 22.34 23.88
Wage workers in OFAs 25.45 18.42 20.89
OAEs 25.58 29.72 41.96 22.74
Migrants 28.03 27.34 30.84
Sources: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Notes:
1. Mean earnings are per day (in Yuan).
2. The highlighted figures along the diagonal are the reported earnings.
3. Comparisons o f earnings should be across different columns in the same row.
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Public-sector employment 21.89 15.63 17.76
Employment in TVEs 9.70 14.78 11.61
Employment in privately owned OFAs 13.33 17.91 18.69
Sources: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Notes:
1. Mean earnings are per day (in Yuan).
2. The highlighted figures along the diagonal are the reported earnings.
3. Comparisons o f earnings should be across different columns in the same row
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Appendix Table 2.1 The application of the multinomial logit model (1): the value of the coefficients and 



































































































































The Likelihood ratio index 0.19
Number of observations 949
Predicted
Actual 0 1 2 3 Total
0 650 10 14 1 675
1 67 21 9 0 97
2 96 7 30 1 134
3 31 6 4 2 43
Total 844 44 57 4 949
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%. The t-ratios are in 
brackets.
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Appendix Table 2.2 The application of the multinomial logit model (2): the marginal effects and their 
level o f significance_____________________________ _________________ _________________ ____________
1 2 3 4





































































































































1.2 8 E-02 
(0.74)




























Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey.
Note: *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%. The t-ratios are in 
brackets.
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Chapter 3
DIVERSIFICATION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES IN 
RURAL CHINA: DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES29
3.1 Introduction
It has long been recognised that the rural sector of most developing countries 
contains a veritable army of largely underemployed peasant households (Lewis, 1954), and 
is characterised by “incomplete or partial markets” (Ellis, 1993:13). Since at least the end 
of the 1970s, the countryside of the PRC is no exception. Although it is difficult to be 
certain about the precise size and incidence of the problem, it is estimated that there are at 
least 200 million “surplus” rural workers (the State Statistic Bureau, 2001). This waste of 
human resources and potentially explosive social situation has arisen from a variety of
29 Before formally starting Chapter 3, it would be necessary to explain how this chapter adds to the general 
results already expressed in Chapter 2, this is because at surface these two chapters look rather similar.
The purposes of Chapter 2 are aimed at modelling the allocation process o f off-farm activities 
between individual rural workers, and investigating the determinants o f the earnings o f a variety o f off-farm 
activities. In short, Chapter 2 emphasizes on the perspective o f individual workers. This is because some 
income generating activities such as off-farm wage employment and out-migrating employment can only be 
addressed from the perspective of individual workers.
In contrast, Chapter 3 examines the allocation process o f both farming and off-farm activities between 
rural households, and what rural households can gain from diversifying income sources away from the 
conventional grain farming. The reason that the focus o f Chapter 3 is moved away from individual rural 
workers to rural households is that some income generating activities such as household farming and family 
non-farm enterprises are more or less household behaviour, their income are the outcome o f the family’s 
collective effort such as decision making, management, labour, etc. Within the household, how much a 
working member should work and s/he can earn couldn’t fully be explained by her/his own human capital, 
because it is decided by the entire household’s decision making, management level, etc.
From these reasoning, It could be argued that Chapter 3 is complementary to Chapter 2 in the sense 
that putting Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 together would render us better understanding o f Chinese rural income 
generating activities.
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underlying sources over the last quarter century of rapid change. A raft of wide-ranging 
institutional reforms, beginning in 1978, has transformed the erstwhile collectivist 
organisational arrangements into something resembling a proto-capitalist structure. The 
main milestones have been the abolition of the collectivised agriculture and the 
introduction of the household contract responsibility system, the relaxation of the hukou 
(household registration) and, most recently, in 1998, the revision to the Land 
Administration Law. In principle, peasant households are now free to make their own 
decisions about choice of livelihood, and how and when to participate in emerging 
markets. In reality, as our field work and other literature (Byrd & Lin, 1990; Knight & 
Song, 1997; Cook, 1999; Song, 2000; Chapter 2 of this thesis) have shown, rural 
households have extensively diversified from grain farming into a range of other 
agricultural and non-agricultural income generating activities: cash-crop production, local 
non-agricultural family business, local non-farm wage employment and out-migration. The 
main aim of this chapter is to explore an important dimension of this process at the 
provincial, grass-roots level. Rather than examine diversification of rural livelihood in 
broad sense (Ellis, 1997), this chapter is to investigate on the determinants of rural 
households’ choice of income generating activities, and what rural households gain from 
active diversification into a broad variety of income generation activities compared to 
conventional grain farming.
As our rural household survey has shown, the majority of rural households (71%) 
have diversified their income generation activities. Those who are left behind continue 
selling their conventional grain products to the government at fixed prices assume least 
market risk, hence reap the fewest rewards and encounter predictable and growing 
constraints such as rising land scarcity, informational blockages and seasonal 
underemployment. Most of the early models of rural development, such as those associated
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with Lewis (1954), and Ranis and Fei (1961), assumed that the marginal product of these 
farmers was low or even negative. Here we are not concerned with rehearsing the twists 
and turns of the debate that followed (Harriss, 1982; Breman and Mundle 1991); rather, 
our purpose is to place firmly the experience of the PRC as a “late-starter” into this general 
context.
One type of income source diversification, although still wedded to agriculture, is to 
opt for different extents of a more variegated mix of labour-intensive crops, animal 
husbandry, market gardening, poultry rearing and aquatic production -  particularly fish­
farming (all hereafter shortened to “cash crops”). Both Lu (1998) and a joint UNDP-World 
Bank study (2000) demonstrate that the incidence of this sub-sector is growing strongly. 
Clearly the prospective returns are outweighing the enhanced level of risk associated with 
rapid price shifts and the difficulties of storing perishables. This pattern of what might be 
called “first-step” diversification is reasonably consistent with both the labour-release 
(Lundhal, 1983) and aspects of the neo-Populist traditions (Lipton, 1977).
Two further types of household take diversification much further down the line of 
non-agricultural activities. In addition to selling any product or service to hand, a third 
category might choose to deploy the surplus labour time of members by seeking waged 
work, perhaps locally, but more likely through distance-migration. Evidently, to set against 
the prospect of tapping into new streams of money income there are risks to this strategy in 
the form of employment uncertainties. Were it not for the continuation of the hukou, this of 
course, would be the classic case of the traditional sector - shedding younger generations 
of unattached household members. Nevertheless there is mounting evidence suggesting 
that the incidence of this redistribution of labour has been accelerating (Song, 2000) and 
that the returns exceed those possible in farming (Knight & Song, 1997). Finally, at the 
end of this rather simplified spectrum, there is the option of starting a non-agricultural
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own-account enterprise (OAE hereafter). As the great majority of such rural enterprises are 
labour-intensive and operate in a milieu of low barriers to entry (or exit), local market 
conditions tend to be speculative: risks can be considerable, but so too can rewards 
(Guldin, 2001). The now extensive body of literature on the growth of TVEs - and their 
antecedents - in the Chinese countryside attests to the significance of this route of 
diversification (Byrd and Lin, 1990; Ho, 1994; World Bank, 1999; Chen, 2000).
Identifying the importance of the range of factors that determine the choice of 
income-generating activity of rural households is the principal goal of this study. In 
Chapter 2, it was argued that although certain political, demographic and locational 
circumstances have exerted a degree of influence upon micro-level decision-making, 
particularly with respect to helping some household members secure wage employment, by 
far the most compelling forces at work are straight-forwardly material.30 The conclusion is 
that the more capable rural workers opted for off-farm activities. Further to that, this 
chapter identifies and analyses the determinants of rural households’ choice of income 
generating activities, and investigates what rural households gain from diversification into 
cash-crop production and running OAEs in comparison to grain farming in terms of 
income, employment and returns going to household labour. To this end, in section 3.2 we 
introduce the data collected, outline our methodology and specify the models. In sections
3.3 and 3.4, we present and discuss the results. Finally, in section 3.5, we offer some 
general conclusions.
3.2 Data, methodology and model specification
30 Such as that education is proving to be a potent factor in assisting rural inhabitants to secure local off-farm 
waged jobs, and is a significant human-capital attribute for migrants; the possession o f a complement o f non- 
agricultural skills further encourages rural workers to gain off-farm jobs; the political factors that we have 
been able to identify and model - party membership or having a local government official in the household - 
still have a positive influence, helping rural dwellers to obtain some increasingly restricted types of local off- 
farm wage employment.
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3.2.1 Data
As we have given in Chapter 1 the detailed description of the fieldwork -  a survey of 
450 rural households conducted by the author in a clustering of nine villages scattered 
across Xinmin County of Liaoning Province of the northeast China in 1998, here only the 
relevant specification and variables are presented. Tables 3.1 & 3.1 A present the relevant 
data in detail. Altogether 450 rural households were surveyed. We were able to 
distinguish three main categories of income-generating households (see Section 1.4 of 
Chapter 1).
It is quite clear that most of the households had diversified to some degree (see 
Section 1.4 of Chapter 1). We can also report that this was not an irreversible decision as 
even those who had severed their links with farming (the NAHs) and decided to specialise 
in non-agricultural pursuits could, at least in principle, recall land rented-out since it 
remains collectively owned by the village as a whole. In this regard, Chinese rural dwellers 
are advantageously placed relative to many other peasant societies where title has been 
privatised. Although we had little direct access to reliable historical information on the 
evolutionary process of household diversification, it can be reasonably inferred that most 
NAHs passed through several phases of movement away from grain farming prior to either 
taking up wage work or operating an OAE. We concur with the general argument put 
forward by Ellis (1993: 96f) that changes in the relative value of labour time on- and off- 
farm is crucial when householders come to consider undertaking different commercial 
risks.
31 Eight of the sample households were excluded as six did not engage in any productive activity whatever 
due to the elderly age composition, and two depended entirely upon farm labouring.
102
Chapter 3 Diversification of Household Income Generating Activities
3.2.2 Modelling rural households’ choice of income generating activities
The issue of why a rural household chose a particular income generating activity could be 
analysed by the multinomial logit model. It has been shown that apart from the 
conventional grain farming, a rural household can diversify its income source by engaging 
in cash crop producing, securing waged OFAs for its surplus labourers, and establishing 
and running an OAE. We divide the sampled households into three groups: those only 
engaged in farming, those diversified between farming and waged OFAs or only occupied 
in waged OFAs, and those diversified between farming and non-farm OAEs or specialised 
in OAEs. It can be assumed that the allocation of different types of income generating 
activities among rural households is the result of stochastic utility maximizing process. In 
general, the econometric modelling process here is almost the same to that in Section 2.3.1 
of Chapter 2. To save space, we do not repeat here.
In rural China, arable land has been distributed on a generally equitable basis 
between cultivating households according to either the number of members or the number 
of farmers registered in each village. In principle, therefore, all households can work on 
their plot, so that household farming as an income generating activity occupies a fallback 
position. For this reason, we set household farming as the default option in the model.
The independent variables include household characteristics and location effects 
(Table 3.1). ‘Having a party member in the household’ and ‘having a township or village 
leader in the household’ will be used as convenient surrogates for ‘non-market’ or political 
influences. For human capital, as related to market forces, the fairly standard variables are 
chosen, namely, ‘household head experience’ (defined as potential working years after 
completion of full time school education), ‘household experience squared’, ‘household 
head education’ -  as measured by years of schooling, ‘possessing agricultural skills’ and
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‘possessing non-agricultural skills’. Additionally, the ‘number of workers in the 
household’ and the ‘dependency ratio in the household’ are included to representing 
demographic factors. However, ‘arable land in the household’ cannot be regarded as an 
explanatory variable (the reasons detailed in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2).
In end, location dummy variables (by village) should be able to capture a spectrum 
of factors (also detailed discussion about this issue referred to Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2).
3.2.3 Methodology and modelling the consequence of rural households9 
diversification of income generating activities
Three procedures are to be constructed to examine what rural households gain from 
diversification into cash-crop production and running OAEs in comparison from grain 
farming in terms of income, employment and returns to household labour. In the first, we 
set out to compare average daily net income and the number of working days for each of 
the different activities identified in the data set. In the second, we highlighted a group of 
factors that proxy the degree of diversification and then incorporated them as explanatory 
variables into household production functions. Rural households would benefit from higher 
degree of diversification if those variables were found to be statistically significant and 
possess positive signs. As far as the sample of agricultural households was concerned, to 
capture degree of diversification, there were two procedural options open: either to 
consider the existence of cash crop production as a dummy variable or, to determine the 
proportion of cash crop production in total agricultural output. Both could reasonably 
proxy the degree of diversification for rural households engaged in cash-crop producing. 
The latter would, measure of course, the degree of diversification for cash crops more 
accurately than the mere existence of such products; but for reasons of non-comparability,
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we were unable to identify similar variables for the other household categories. For the 
third procedure, we compared returns to labour i.e., the marginal product across the 
different income-generating activities.
The second and third procedures hinged upon estimating household production 
functions. At the outset, it was unclear whether the Cobb-Douglas or the translog model 
would be the most appropriate (Bemdt and Christensen, 1973; Jacoby, 1992). An 
important drawback of the former was that it imposed strong separability between the 
different factors. In contrast, the translog function permits flexibility, and allowed for 
linear and quadratic terms with an arbitrary number of inputs. Furthermore, it could be 
reduced to the multiple-input Cobb-Douglas function as a special case. Given these 
advantages, the translog production function was selected for the initial estimation 
exercise, and was followed-up with an F-test in order to consider the null hypothesis of a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form.
The well-known Cobb-Douglas production function is:
( 1) In y  = /? „ + £ /* , In J O + 2 > Z  + *
7=1
where Y is the income derived from household agriculture or the production of OAEs. X  
represents a vector of production factors including household labour - measured in working 
days, capital, land, and inputs in the case of agriculture, whereas for households running 
OAEs, the vector includes the number of working days of household members and hired 
workers, and capital. Z represents other relevant variables including: the educational 
attainment of the household head - measured in school years; the experience of the 
household head - defined as years of working following the completion of full-time 
education (after Mincer, 1974); the experience squared; and, finally, location dummy 
variables.
The translog function is:
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K  i K  K
(2) In Y = A  + £  A  In X„ + -  £  £  In In X, + £  yZ + *
k =l ^  *= l /=|
where X is a vector of production factors. Z represents other relevant variables as specified 
above. Due to the existence of the second-order terms, the coefficients of the log linear 
terms are difficult to interpret. This obstacle, however, can be overcome by substituting
( InX  k -  In A') for InXk, where X  is the geometric mean of input A*. This transformation
means that are just the production elasticities since all the second order terms vanish as 
the Taylor Series is expanded at X  (Jacoby, 1992). As in the Cobb-Douglas function, other 
shift variables such as human capital and location may be added in a non-logarithm form.
A central purpose of estimating the production function was to derive the marginal 
product of the factors. For the labour input, for example, the marginal product may be 
derived from equation (1) as follows:
(3) Y = ALaK pLand7s
where Equation (3) is just the original form of Cobb-Douglas production, Y  denotes output,
A denotes the constant term, L for labour input, K  for capital, Land for land input, s  for
error term, superscript a  for elasticity or share of labour, superscript /? for elasticity or
share of capital, superscript y  for elasticity or share of land. If we put Equation (3) in
logarithm and differentiate it by labour T, then we get:
5(lnT) _ d(lnZ) d (ln l)  d(lnA) 3(lnland)
8L 5L + 01 8L + dL + /  8L
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where dY/dL is the marginal product of labour and Y/L the average product of labour. 
Therefore, the former is the product of a  and the average product of labour. Of course, the 
marginal product of the other factors of production may be derived by the same method.
In the translog function, the transformation of the factors of production makes the 
coefficients of the first-order term of the log of the production factors be their production 
elasticity. Hence, the marginal products were derived in this manner.
The dependent variable for OAE production was a household’s annual net (OAE) 
income (or value-added) (see Footnote 18). However, for the production of agricultural 
commodities contributed by the “Agricultural Households”, we needed to consider annual 
total agricultural income. This was because no less than 73 households received negative 
net income and we would lose much information if they were to be excluded from the 
analysis. Such procedure did not prove to be a particularly distorting step as our regression 
results using total income are comparable to those using only the net figure.
(4) Value-added = total output -  inputs
 ^ d(Value -  added) _ d(Totaloutput) d(lnput)
d(Labour) d(Labour) d(Labour)
where d(lnput)/d(Labour) is zero, because the inputs here were intermediates including 
seed and fertiliser, and had little or no direct relationship with labour. Therefore, using 
total production, rather than value-added, did not affect the derivation of the marginal 
product of labour.
The explanatory variables of household agriculture and the production functions of 
the OAEs included: logarithmic production factors, the number of school years of the head
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of household, the experience of the household head and its quadratic term, and dummy 
variables for location. This form of the production function may be of considerable use in 
capturing the full effects of important explanatory variables such as productive factors and 
human capital (Appleton et al., 2000).
We use gross outputs before taxes and fees in our analysis of agricultural production 
since many local governments exhibit a pronounced tendency to levy notoriously arbitrary 
charges. Thus, were we to have deducted them, the productivity of household agricultural 
production would have been distorted. We should note that the lump sum tax on each of 
individual villagers did not unduly affect the decision-making process of the farmers 
concerned.
3.3 Results of econometric modelling of rural households9 choice of income 
generating activities
The results of the multinomial logit modelling include the coefficients of the 
independent variables (Table 3.2.1), their marginal effects (Table 3.2.2) and the predicted 
probabilities of the dummy independent variables (Table 3.2.3). For the dummy variables, 
the effects upon the households’ choice of activities are assessed by the predicted 
probabilities estimated at the means of the explanatory variables. For the continuous 
variables - such as experience and education, the marginal effects are informative. Overall, 
the goodness of fit of the model measured by the likelihood ratio is 0.20 or 80% as 
measured by the percentage of correct predictions. The base line probabilities for the rural 
households’ choice of activities at the mean of the explanatory variables are 73.0% for 
household farming, 14.6% for diversification into wage work in OFAs, 12.4% for 
diversification into OAEs.
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Now we turn to the explanatory variables. Of the two “non-market” or political 
variables, namely, “having a party member in the household” and “having a village or 
township leader in the household”, only the latter have a marginally significant effect on 
the probability securing a waged OFA. This result is not unexpected because in the 
Chinese context, being a member of the communist party itself would not mean political 
influence or power taken for granted unless the relevant person was an appointed official 
holding certain power in the same time (other detailed explanations have been discussed in 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2).
After the non-market factors, the next host of explanatory variables is market forces 
embodied by human capital. In this research, human capital comprises the variables 
“household head’s years of schooling”, “household head experience”, “household head 
experience squared”, “household possessing agricultural skills” and “household possessing 
non-agricultural skills”. We may see from Table 3.2.1 that experience and the experience- 
squared term are both insignificant in affecting rural households’ choice of income 
generating activities. This result is similar to the findings in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.
With respect to the most important aspect of human capital endowment -  education, 
we can report (Table 3.2.2) that the marginal effects of school years are marginally 
significant in terms of household farming, members of a household engaged in waged 
OFAs - but not upon OAEs. An extra year’s schooling raises the probability of a household 
diversified into a waged OFA by 2.6%. In contrast, an extra year of education would 
reduce the probability of a household staying at household farming only -  in this instance 
by 2.8%. These findings are consistent with that were reported in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.
The next recognizable human capital is skill (Table 3.2.3). It could be expected that 
the possession of non-agricultural skills encourage rural households to diversify into off- 
farm activities. This expectation is confirmed by our results. However, we also find that
109
Chapter 3 Diversification of Household Income Generating Activities
the possession of agricultural skills actually reduces the probability of a rural household 
engaging in household farming and helps its members obtaining waged OFA jobs. The 
findings about the effect of skills here are also in harmony with we have found in Section
2.4 of Chapter 2.
The third group of explanatory variables are demographic or social factors. Both the 
two demographic variables “number of household workers” and “dependency ratio” exert 
significant effects upon household farming and OAEs but not on households involved with 
waged OFAs. An extra worker at the household would raise the probability of the 
household engaged in non-agricultural OAEs by 10.9% and reduce the probability of 
remaining with household farming by 17.3%. An increase by one unit of the dependency 
ratio induces a rise of 11.5% probability of pursuing OAE as well as upon the more 
directly obvious household farming activity (a fall of 14.5%). As we have stressed that low 
income, underemployment in household farming (reported in Table 3.1), heavy life burden 
and in particular the scarcity of waged OFA job opportunities are working together to push 
rural dwellers without much political contacts into non-agricultural OAEs.
Finally, location effects are to be interpreted in the same way as in Section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2, so that it not necessary to repeat it here again.
3.4 Results of econometric analysis of rural households9 gains from 
diversification of income generating activities
Here we discuss the modelling process of the production functions and go on to 
interpret the results. Our points of reference are in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.4A.
3.4.1 Model description of the production functions
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We estimated the production functions for (i) the agricultural production, inclusive 
of cash crops, of the AHs and the DHs; and, (ii) the value of the non-agricultural 
production of the DHs and the NAHs. To determine the pattern of rewards for the range of 
agricultural activities with and without cash-crop products, Chow’s structural tests were 
conducted. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the two production functions are 
similar or that two groups of observations can be pooled. However, the result rejected the 
null hypothesis. This led us to conclude that indeed there were different patterns across the 
agricultural production of the AHs and DHs.
Choice of function. For the agricultural productions of both the AHs and DHs, we 
simply adopted Cobb-Douglas production function. The reasons are as follows. For DHs’ 
agricultural production without or with cash crops, the number of observations is less than 
the number of explanatory variables (77) that Translog function imposed. To the AHs 
without or with cash crops producing, although the number of observations is a bit more 
than that of explanatory variables of Translog function, the small number of degree of 
freedom would lead to biasness of estimation.
To the DHs and NAHs’ OAE production functions, the F tests cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas model and so for these two production functions, the Cobb- 
Douglas form was utilised.
Treatment for the potential endogenous variables. The number of working days 
by household (subsequently referred to as “labour”) has the potential of being endogenous 
to the explained variable, value of agricultural or non-agricultural output. To overcome this 
problem an instrumental variable model (hereafter IV) was deployed. In order to derive the
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predicted number of working days, demographic variables revolving around the ratio of 
each of five age groups to the number of household members are constructed. The groups 
were: 0 to 6 year-old; 7 to 10; 11 to 15; females from 16 to 60; and those above 61. The 
age group, 16 to 60 year-old male, was dropped to avoid statistical trap.
For estimating all the production functions bar the NAHs’ OAE activities, the OLS 
approach was used. This was for two reasons. First, an application of the F test could not 
reject the null hypothesis that demographic IV  variables were not statistically significant in 
predicting labour. Second, an application of the Hausman test also cannot reject the null
' i ' j
hypothesis of no endogeneity for the (five) production functions. With respect to the 
exceptional case of the NAHs, the Two-Stage Least Squares method was used for 
estimation. The reasoning here was that, an F test at the 8% significant level marginally 
rejected the null hypothesis that these demographic IV variables are not statistically 
significant in predicting labour, and Hausman test also at the 8% significant level 
marginally rejected the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Furthermore, the over- 
identification tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
Heteroscedasticity. For three of the production functions namely, AHs’ agricultural 
activities without cash-crops, and DHs’ agricultural and OAE productions, an application
32 The Hausman test is for detecting measurement error. The null hypothesis is no measurement error under 
which both b (the least square estimator) and b]V(the IV estimator) is a consistent estimator o f /?, but that the 
former is efficient and the latter, not. Should the null hypothesis be rejected, only the IV estimator is 
consistent. The formula is:
w  = (bl, - b j [ V l„-V](blv- b ) ~  x 2\k\
where V = s 2 (X' X)~] is the estimated covariance matrix for the least square estimator, and Viv the 
estimated asymptotic covariance matrix for the IV estimator (Greene, 1999: 383-387).
33 The over-identification test is used to test the joint hypothesis that original model is correctly specified and 
that the instruments are valid. To get the over-identification test statistic, one firstly need to regress the IV 
model residuals on the instrumental variables, then multiply the (unadjusted) 7?-squared statistic from the 
regression by the sample size n. The null hypothesis is that the original model is correctly specified and the 
instruments are valid. The test is distributed as Chi-squared distribution with degree o f freedom k ’-k, where 
k ’ is the number of IV variables which include the other independent variables in the model and the 
demographic instrumental variables, and k is the number of independent variables o f the original model. 
(Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993:235-236; Deaton, 1997:112).
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of the Cook-Weisberg (STATA 7 Reference, Volume 3, pp. 107) test can not reject the null 
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity. For NAHs’ OAEs production function, 
heteroscedasticity could not be tested as it had been estimated by the Two-Stage Least 
Squares method {IV model). This left the cash-crop function of the AHs with 
heteroscedasticity. In this case, we use White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error.
Goodness of Fit. The AHs and DHs’ agricultural production functions without cash 
crops got relatively high goodness of fit measured by the adjusted R-squared statistic; they 
are 0.75 and 0.72 respectively. However, for the AHs and DHs’ agricultural production 
with cash crops, and DHs and NAHs’ OAEs production functions, the adjusted R-squared 
statistics are somewhat lower but still fairly respectable; they are in the range of 0.47 to 
0.54.
Sample Selection. The only feasible correction was for the NAHs’ OAE production 
by utilising the Heckman procedure, i.e., with a probit modelling whether rural households 
specialised in non-agricultural OAEs. The selectivity correction term was not found to be 
significant statistically. For the other production functions, there were no appropriate 
procedures. This was because the DHs operating OAEs overlapped with their agricultural 
activities with or without cash crops. Moreover, even the AHs’ agricultural activities 
would have to be estimated in two sub-groups viz. with or without cash crops. Therefore, 
all the production functions presented here were without correction of sample selectivity.
3.4.2 Results of the three procedures of investigation
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Our initial procedure is to compare average daily net income and the number of 
working days across the different activities. Based on our survey, the annual income per 
capita of the DHs (3051 yuans) was found 2.8 times as much as that for the AHs (1087 
yuans). A far larger differential, over 6.6 times, was earned by the NAHs (7174 yuans). 
The average number of days worked per annum for those AHs engaged in grain cultivation 
was just 192; for those AHs producing cash-crops it was 225; for the DHs, 244 days; and, 
finally, for the NAHs, it was 296. In addition, those DHs (17%) and NAHs (32%) that 
operated OAEs created wage-work for fellow villagers: each of the former hired-in the 
equivalent of 390 working days, and each of the latter as many as 433 days. Finally, with 
regard to differences in product of labour (Table 3.4A), the average daily net product of 
labour for those AHs producing cash-crops (11.70 yuans) was slightly higher (7%) than the 
grain producers (10.91 yuans). A very similar result held for the agricultural production of 
the DHs with cash crops compared to those without. More generally, the average returns 
to labour in agriculture for DHs were almost twice those for the AHs. The OAEs of both 
the DHs and the NAHs produced far more in term of the average daily net income than the 
AHs: for the former, the figure was 2.5 times (35.32 yuans); and for the latter, four times 
(53.87 yuans). We may therefore conclude that the higher degree of diversification of 
income sources, the higher the level of income and employment.
The second procedure was to ascertain the significance of those variables 
representing the degree of diversification for the agricultural activities of the AHs and 
DHs’ (Table 3.3). We used the existence of cash crops as a dummy variable for measuring 
the influence of diversification (with a score of one indicating a household engaged in 
cash-crop production, and zero without). For the AHs, the coefficient of the variable (0.24) 
was statistically very significant, whereas for the DHs, the coefficient of the same dummy 
variable (0.23) was marginally significant. The results suggest that the total agricultural
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output of both the AHs and DHs households be around a quarter higher than those who had 
not diversified into cash crops. To examine the degree of diversification associated with 
cash-crop production in further detail, we proceeded to include its proportion in the total 
agricultural output of each household as an explanatory variable in the production 
functions estimated for both AHs and DHs (Table 3.3). For the former, the coefficient 
(1.06) proved significant suggesting that the output of these households will increase by 
10.6% as the proportion of cash crops rises by 10%. For the latter, however, the coefficient 
of the variable (0.54) was nearly marginally significant statistically; if we interpret in the 
same way, the output of the DHs would be boosted by 5.4% as the proportion of cash crops 
goes up by 10%. On this criterion of assessing degree of diversification, then these 
rigorous results indicate that rural agricultural households do gain significantly from 
diversification into cash-crop production in term of income.
Our third procedure was to compare the marginal product of labour among the 
different household income-generating activities (Tables 3.4 & 3.4A). As this was the most 
complex, the approach involved two stages. In the first stage, we considered agricultural 
activities with and without a cash-crop component. To avoid the influence of the other 
diversification effect caused by non-agricultural activities, we commenced with the AHs. 
As we have already noted above, the average daily net product of labour for the AHs 
producing cash-crops was slightly higher than those who did not. Their elasticities of 
labour are 0.42 and 0.22 respectively and statistically are very significant. Consequently, 
the hourly marginal product of labour (subsequently MPi) for cash crop producing AHs 
was 0.61 yuans; this doubled the MPi for the grain-producing households (0.30 yuans). A 
similar result was obtained when we made a similar comparison with the DHs that 
produced both with and without cash crops. Note that the hourly MPi of those DHs not 
engaged in cash crops (0.47 yuans) was much bigger than the figure for those AHs also
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without an involvement in cash crops (0.30 yuans). A similar result held when we 
compared DHs with AHs when both produced cash crops. Additionally, we also found that 
land elasticity for those AHs and DHs that had diversified into cash-crops were not 
significant at all, whereas the counterpart figures for AHs and DHs without cash-crops 
were 0.66 and 0.58 respectively and they are very significant statistically. This implies that 
cash-crop farming was rather less land-intensive (or at least less land-constrained) than 
grain cultivation. These findings not only suggest that diversification through cash-crop 
production leads to a higher (or equivalent) MPi than those continuing to practice 
conventional grain farming, but also is consistent with the classical Lewis (1954) 
proposition that moving surplus labour out of the traditional sector raises the marginal 
product of labour left behind, in other words, the DHs diversifying into waged OF As or an 
OAE raise the MPi for their household workers left behind in agriculture.
The second stage of comparing the marginal products concerned the case of the 
OAEs in comparison with agricultural activities. We found that the elasticity of labour for 
DHs’ OAE production (0.53) was much higher than the highest elasticity achieved by AHs 
diversified into cash-crop production (0.42). In turn, the corresponding figure for OAEs 
operated by the NAHs (0.83) was much higher than that of the DHs’ OAE production 
(0.57). It has been stated above that average products of labour for these three kinds of 
households are also in the similar pattern. As regards the elasticity of hired labour, there 
were statistically very significant results for the OAEs operated by both the DHs (0.14) and 
the NAHs (0.15). With respect to the elasticity of capital, for the range of agricultural and 
OAE production, the results proved to be of little significance, though we should report 
that for the OAEs operated by the DHs (0.05) and the NAHs (0.03) the figures were not 
much different from the grain farmers (0.04). It therefore seems reasonable to infer that the 
OAEs run by both DHs and NAHs’ were essentially labour-intensive, partly no doubt to
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minimise the risks of operating in a market environment characterised by many types of 
imperfection.
The MPi for the three categories of household also exhibit a similar pattern of 
differentials. The hourly M P l  for the OAEs run by DHs (2.34 yuans) was nearly one and 
half times in excess of the highest cash crops producing DHs MPl (1.00 yuans); and, in 
turn, the M P l  of the OAEs run by the NAHs (5.56 yuans) was greater than that achieved in 
the OAEs run by the DHs by virtually the same order of magnitude. It was also found that 
the hourly M P l  of hired labour in the OAEs run by the NAHs (3.40 yuans) was 30% 
greater than that for the OAEs run by the DHs (2.59 yuans). Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that deeper diversification into non-agricultural activities has increased the returns 
to rural labour, and that the M P l  earned in the OAEs more than compensated for the 
enhanced levels of risk experienced by the DHs and indeed provided an incentive for these 
households to graduate to the ranks of NAHs. On the other hand, the considerable 
differentials of M P l  across the households amply confirm the constraining nature of the 
rural economy in terms of household members both acquiring wage employment and 
establishing an OAE. For the standard neo-classical position to hold there would need to be 
a tendency for the MPl to equalise or at least converge. As this does not appear to be 
occurring in this instance, it can only be concluded that rural markets remain imperfect and 
incomplete; and there is robust evidence that this is not confined to our study area as 
similar results have been reached in other studies (Knight and Song, 1997; and Song, 2000). 
Nonetheless, there are some indications of equalisation within the general circumstances of 
partial markets. For example, the daily M P l  of OAEs contributed by DHs’ own workers 
(18.72 yuans) is close to the average daily wages paid in the locally based OF As (18.42
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yuans).34 In addition, the daily M P l  of hired labour working in the OAEs operated by both 
DHs (20.72 yuan) and NAHs (27.16 yuan) are not very far apart, and reveal that hiring 
workers must have been profitable. More speculatively, since the MPl of these OAEs 
could not be separated from any rewards accruing to entrepreneurial ability (they would 
not be fully picked up by controlling the other variables in the production function 
including the educational attainment of the household head, experience and the quadratic 
experience term), the composite nature of the term for this category of households does 
cast some doubt upon its generality.
3.4.3 Returns to scale
Of the production functions considered (Table 3.4), increasing returns to scale were 
found in the exclusively grain farming AHs (1.14). The OAEs operated by the NAHs 
exhibited almost constant return to scale (1.01). Decreasing returns occurred in AHs 
engaged in cash-crop production and all of the recorded activities of the DHs. These results 
imply that, in term of scale economies, the specialised households were more efficient than 
those that had diversified -  taking cash-crop production as evidence of that tendency.
In principle, since the average number of working days per annum of grain 
producers was considerably lower than that of the cash-crop producing AHs, there is 
potential for an expansion of cultivation. However, as the supply of arable land is very 
restricted, it would only be feasible for the grain farmers to acquire more of this vital 
resource when “surplus” labour has moved out of the sector thereby releasing some land. 
Compared with grain farming, the production of cash crops did generate additional local 
employment and enhanced the level of household income. It was also much less land­
34 In our sample, 97 respondents had secured wage employment in a variety o f local OFAs including public 
sector posts, and in both collectively- and privately-owned non-farm enterprises.
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intensive. By way of contrast, operating OAEs was a highly labour-intensive activity and 
doesn’t occupy arable land at all.
3.4.4 Other explanatory variables
The other explanatory variables specified in the production functions included the 
experience of the household head and its quadratic term (Table 3.4). This did not prove to 
be statistically significant for the majority of activities except for the AHs with cash crops, 
for which it is 2.9% and statistically significant. The most likely explanation was that most 
rural inhabitants possessed a threshold level of common experience - doubtless acquired 
from household farming (Schultz, 1964) - but this was not particularly appropriate for 
either agricultural work or indeed for operating OAEs. For the exceptional case, i.e., AHs 
with cash crops, the effect of household heads’ experience exhibits an inverse-U 
relationship with potential experience (defined as years since education was completed), 
peaking at 36 years of experience. In other words, an extra year of potential experience 
would raise their household products by 2.9% when evaluated at the mean value.
The education of the household head variable was statistically significant for those 
cash crops producing DHs. However, the t-ratios were less than one for the rest of 
agricultural activities. If education is indeed a good proxy for human capital in this peasant 
environment, there were few obvious returns to investing in years of schooling. This result 
implies that education offered little to enhance the value of conventional grain farming -  
which is still dominated by traditional methods. For the other OAEs categories of 
households, however, the t-ratios of the variable were all more than one. The returns for an
35 Concerning these latter effects, Chapter 2 has offered a detailed interpretation o f how villages and location 
influence the income-generating activities o f rural households making use of the same data set as deployed 
here.
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additional year of schooling for DHs with cash crops were 9.6%. When we considered 
returns for those operating OAEs, the rates are 8.5% for DHs and as much as 15% for the 
NAHs. Thus, the returns to investment in education followed the same course as the trends 
outlined for the MPl across household activity types, and rose progressively with the 
extent of diversification.
3.5 Conclusion
Drawing upon our a survey of 450 rural households in Xinmin County of Liaoning 
Province, there is mounting verification that human capital in terms of education, skills 
either agricultural or non-agricultural -  rather than political factors -  are assuming more 
roles in assisting rural households to diversify into non-farm activities. Besides, given the 
nature of imperfect or underdeveloped markets prevailing in rural sector, it is not 
unexpected that demographic or social factors still work in the countryside. The more 
workers a rural household has and the higher the dependency ratio the household bears, the 
more likely the rural household diversifies into family non-farm business.
As far as what rural households gain from diversification is concerned, there is clear 
evidence that peasants who diversified into riskier activities than grain farming were able 
to raise family incomes and employment, and also enjoyed increasing returns to their 
labour time. Despite an environment of imperfect and incomplete markets, diversification 
into more commercialized agricultural or non-agricultural income-generation activities 
conferred considerable material advantages relative to the traditional dominant farming 
pursuit of the locality. All three of our statistical procedures revealed gain to those 
diversifying, and most gain to those who went furthest in assuming risk. Moreover, the 
returns to an investment in education increased notably with the extent of income source
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diversification. Those households that managed to move surplus labour off-farm were able 
to enhance the marginal products of the labour for those remaining in primary production. 
Of course, the many constraints that continue to characterise the rural economy bite hard. It 
was therefore not surprising that the majority of rural households in our sample opted for 
income-generating activities that did not enjoy obvious economies of scale; indeed even 
those who risked operating OAEs chose labour-, rather than capital- or technology­
intensive pursuits.
The recent China’s entry into the WTO will surely accelerate the process of income 
source diversification and commercialisation already well under way in the countryside. 
Those rural households who resist diversification and persist with struggling on with only 
grain farming may well find their position becoming increasingly untenable. On the one 
hand, state-subsidised grain exports are not permitted under WTO rules and, on the other, 
it is no longer possible to protect the domestic market against low cost and high quality 
imports (Hua & Liu, 2002). To meet the challenges arising from stem competition and to 
maintain market share, Chinese farmers either have to adjust to market demand swiftly or 
will be dealt out of market. At the macro-level, the fundamental issue haunting rural China 
remains the existence of the vast numbers of underemployed “surplus” labour. In China, 
land is so scarce that, no matter how aggressive rural households diversify their income 
generating activities, the rural sector itself by no means can absorb fully and efficiently 
such amount of surplus labourers. Thus, moving rural surplus labour off-farm still has to 
depend on rural-urban migration. The good news is that the Chinese government has 
realised this serious issue and began relaxing the hukou system in order to allow rural- 
urban migrants settle down in cities. However, the issue will never be sorted out until the 
human migration-control obsessed hukou system is totally abolished.
121
Chapter 3 Diversification of Household Income Generating Activities
Table 3.1 Basic statistics of the sampled rural households’ income generating activities
1 2 3 4 5
AHs DHs with NAHs DHs with NAHs
engaged agriculture with only agriculture only
exclusivel and waged and running
y in waged work running OAEs
agriculture work OAEs
No. o f observations 259 86 15 48 34
Means:
HH1 farming net income (Chinese yuan) 4624.22 4413.91 3909.04
HH farming inputs (Chinese yuan) 4956.86 4386.79 3299.19
HH farming capital (Chinese yuan) 3929.97 2891.06 3336.77
Total no. o f annual working days on 434.79 343.47 292.15
farming
No. o f annual working days per labour 208.00 140.50 124.87
on farming
No. o f male annual working days on 253.41 187.64 175.82
farming
No. o f female annual working days on 201.20 184.78 169.15
farming
Land (Chinese mu) 17.63 15.62 12.17
Annual working days per labour (total) 208.00 252.32 296.61 272.16 296.80
HH OAE net income (Chinese yuan) 8798.96 26711.76
HH OAE capital (Chinese yuan) 7514.58 27294.81
HH OAE hired labour (annual days) 24.38 67.94
Total no. o f working days on HH OAE 316.77 576.76
No. o f male annual working days on 210.43 360.94
HH OAEs
No. o f female annual working days on 212.04 366.36
HH OAEs
Means o f household Characteristics:
HH heads’ education (school years) 6.74 7.43 7.41 6.83 7.44
Average HH workers’ education (school 6.73 7.19 7.36 6.90 7.64
years)
HH Head age 39.23 40.26 38.76 42.54 37.68
No. o f workers by HH 2.08 2.38 1.65 2.31 1.91
HH size 3.40 3.57 3.41 3.81 3.56
Dependency ratio2 0.694 0.580 1.225 0.802 1.108
Household Characteristics (%):
Agricultural skills 0.77 12.79 0.00 6.25 2.94
Non-agricultural skills 5.02 22.09 26.67 18.75 35.29
Party member 5.02 20.93 6.67 12.50 5.88
Township or village leader residing at 1.54 12.79 0.00 2.08 0.00
home
No. o f  each type o f HHs in the Villages
Village 1 37 4 2 4 3
Village 2 13 16 4 10 7
Village 3 39 3 0 2 3
Village 4 21 8 2 9 8
Village 5 26 5 3 7 8
Village 6 29 16 2 3 0
Village 7 36 11 0 3 0
Village 8 39 9 0 2 0
Village 9 19 14 2 8 5
Note:
1. HH denotes household.
2. Dependency ratio is defined as a ratio o f no. o f dependants to no. o f workers by household. 
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 3.1 A The AHs and DHs’ agricultural activities with and without cash crop products
1 2 3 4
AHs without AHs with DHs DHs
cash crop 
production








No. o f observations 
Means:
128 131 78 56
HH* farming net income (Chinese yuan) 4174.91 5063.24 3307.66 5522.02
HH farming inputs (Chinese yuan) 5085.02 6148.43 3793.29 5682.57
Seeds, fertiliser, etc. (Chinese yuan) 2477.67 2143.85 1938.49 1939.50
Water and electricity (Chinese yuan) 800.73 219.85 500.56 85.57
Fuel (Chinese yuan) 343.05 97.63 302.31 143.75
Husbandry expenditure (Chinese yuan) 277.42 2927.79 100.13 2695.00
Machine maintenance (Chinese yuan) 418.58 75.00 386.03 79.107
Transportation (Chinese yuan) 55.30 63.47 43.72 65.45
Machine hiring (Chinese yuan) 712.27 620.84 522.06 674.20
HH farming capital (Chinese yuan) 3953.05 2590.61 2044.10 3051.43
Land (Chinese Mu) 18.46 16.81 13.85 15.14
No. o f working days on HH farming 388.67 479.85 244.50 437.32
Mean No. of working days per labour p.a. on 
farming
192.137 224.86 107.947 172.44
No. o f male annual working days on HH 
farming
224.95 280.78 132.92 244.13
No. o f female annual working days on HH 
farming
Mean o f household Characteristics:
182.95 219.14 137.06 226.71
No. o f school years o f HH head 5.00 6.877 7.269 7.14
Average No. of school years o f HH workers 6.59 6.858 7.155 6.98
HH Head age 45.00 39.25 40.73 41.55
No. o f HH workers 2.03 2.137 2.24 2.517
HH size 3.35 3.45 3.615 3.71
Dependency ratio 
Household Characteristics (%):
0.73 0.655 0.69 0.61
Agricultural skills 0.78 0.76 8.97 12.50
Non-agricultural skills 3.91 6.11 23.08 17.86
Party member 5.47 4.58 23.08 10.71
Township or village leader at home 
No. o f  each type o f households in the 
Villages
3.13 0.00 12.82 3.57
Village 1 19 18 7 1
Village 2 7 6 18 8
Village 3 33 6 4 1
Village 4 0 21 0 17
Village 5 18 8 11 1
Village 6 9 20 7 12
Village 7 2 34 3 11
Village 8 22 17 6 5
Village 9 18 1 22 0
Note: HH denotes household.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
123
Chapter 3 Diversification of Household Income Generating Activities
Table 3.2.1 The application of the multinomial logit model of rural household choice of income- 
generating activities: the coefficients__________________________
1
Constant
HH No. o f school years o f head
HH head experience
HH head experience squared
HH with agricultural skills
HH with non-agricultural skills
HHs with a party member
HHs with s village or township 
Leader at home 














HHs with waged workers or with 

















































































Actual 0 1 2 Total
0 228 16 15 259
1 54 37 12 103
2 42 12 28 82
Total 324 65 55 444
Notes:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets.
3. HH denotes household.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 3.2.2 The application of the multinomial logit model of rural household choice of income- 
generating activities: the marginal effects______________ ______________________ _____________________
1 2 3
HHs with only grain HHs with wage HHs with wage
farming workers or with both workers or both
wage workers in running OAEs and
OFAs and agriculture agriculture
Constant 0.782 -0.625 -0.157
(2.95)*** (2.41)** (0.93)
HH No. o f school years o f head -0.028 0.026 0.003
(1.67)* (1.73)* (0.24)
HH head experience -0.006 0.020 -0.014
(0.41) (1.44) (1.62)
HH head experience squared 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002
(0.40) (1.37) (1.66)*
HHs with agricultural skills -0.339 0.271 0.068
(1.67)* (2.02)** (0.68)
HHs with non-agricultural skills -0.409 0.210 0.198
(4.02)*** (2.96)*** (3.14)***
HHs with a party member -0.120 0.078 0.043
(0.96) (0.80) (0.60)
HHs with a village or township -0.173 0.282 -0.110
Leader at home (0.82) (1.88)* (0.69)
No. HH workers -0.173 0.064 0.109
(2.76)*** (1.29) (2.47)***
Dependency ratio -0.145 0.030 0.115
(2.38)** (0.61) (2.73)***
Village 1 0.498 -0.315 -0.183
(3.66)*** (2.56)*** (2.18)**
Village 3 0.554 -0.336 -0.217
(3.91)*** (2.55)*** (2.27)**
Village 4 0.153 -0.163 0.010
(1.29) (1.64)* (0.16)
Village 5 0.264 -0.229 -0.036
(2.18)** (2.16)** (0.57)
Village 6 0.380 -0.045 -0.335
(2.89)*** (0.50) (2.72)***
Village 7 0.485 -0.187 -0.298
(3.54)*** (1.82)* (2.56)***
Village 8 0.496 -0.173 -0.323
(3.64)*** (1.71)* (2.43)**
Village 9 0.114 -0.046 -0.067
(0.97) (0.51) (1.00)
Notes:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets.
3. HH denotes household.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
125
Chapter 3 Diversification of Household Income Generating Activities
Table 3.2.3 The application of the multinomial logit model o f rural household choice of income- 
generating activities: Simulated Probabilities_______________________________________________________
1 2 3
HHs with grain HHs with w age HHs running OAEs
farming only workers or with both 
w age workers and 
agriculture
or with both O A Es 
and agriculture
In possession o f agricultural
skills:
“Y es” 28.12 54.40 17.47
“N o” 63.66 21.85 14.49
In possession o f non-
agricultural skills:
“Y es” 26.31 38.10 35.59
“N o” 67.45 20.21 12.34
Party membership:
“Y es” 50.95 30.34 18.71
“N o” 63.45 22.18 14.37
With a township or village
leader in the household:
“Y es” 36.71 57.75 5.54
“N o” 62.98 21.87 15.15
Village dummy variables
Village 1 84.98 12.37 2.65
Village 2 39.62 50.85 9.53
Village 3 87.40 10.61 1.98
Village 4 59.06 29.07 11.87
Village 5 69.79 21.59 8.62
Village 6 63.03 36.11 0.85
Village 7 78.45 20.40 1.15
Village 8 77.85 21.20 0.95
Village 9 49.96 43.69 6.35
N otes:
1. V illage 2 was defined as the default village.
2. HH denotes household.
Source: D erived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 3.3 Test of diversification variables in the agricultural production functions of AHs and DHs
1 2 3 4




Log (labour days) 0.401 0.182 0.240 0.176
(4.69)*** (2.66)*** (2.08)** (1.23)
Log (land) 0.465 0.651 0.295 0.362
(5.46)*** (5.88)*** (2.57)*** (1.68)*
Log (capital) 0.033 0.006 0.002 -0.016
(1.54) (0.27) (0.09) (0.49)
Log (seeds, fertiliser, etc.) -0.124 -0.161 -0.057 -0.258
(2.50)*** (2.21)** (1.17) (2.04)**
Log (water and electricity) 0.023 -0.010 0.038 0.148
(1.12) (0.31) (1.56) (2.44)**
Log (fuel) 0.046 0.042 0.032 -0.002
(2.52)*** (1.48) (1.39) (0.05)
Log (husbandry expenditure) 0.054 0.031 0.026 0.075
(4.63)*** (1.71)* (2.09)** (3.01)***
Log (machine maintenance) 0.018 0.005 0.043 0.030
(1.01) (0.23) (1.66)* (0.80)
Log (transportation) 0.045 -0.019 0.027 0.064
(2.53)*** (0.68) (1.15) (1.23)
Log (machine hiring) -0.034 -0.015 -0.008 -0.054
(1.53) (0.44) (0.27) (0.83)
HH head experience (years) -0.0014 -0.0282 0.0225 0.0734
(0.11) (1.11) (1.71)* (1.33)
HH head experience 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0012
squared-term (0.12) (1.19) (1.31) (1.18)
HH head school years 0.031 0.037 0.028 0.099
(1.67)* (1.55) (1.19) (2.62)***
Cash crops (dummy 0.235 0.228
variable) (2.92)*** (1.76)*
Ratio o f cash crops to total 1.057 0.543
agricultural output (5.97)*** (1.61)
Village 1 -0.968 -0.966 -1.055 -0.190
(5.78)*** (3.65)*** (5.19)*** (0.28)
Village 3 -0.509 -0.124 -0.877 -0.637
(2.95)*** (0.45) (3.62)*** (0.98)
Village 4 -0.525 -0.501 -1.139 0.278
(2.29)** (1.83)* (4 29)*** (0.58)
Village 5 -0.468 -0.382 -0.654 -0.144
(2.74)*** (1.95)** (2.96)*** (0.23)
Village 6 -1.193 -1.220 -1.204 -0.163
(5.37)*** (4.32)*** (4 41)*** (0.35)
Village 7 -1.003 -1.018 -1.111 0.0143
(4.42)*** (3.44)*** (4.18)*** (0.03)
Village 8 -1.271 -1.310 -1.138 0.002
(5.72)*** (4.24)*** (4.23)*** (0.00)
Village 9 -0.798 -0.611 -0.616 n.a.
(4.34)*** (3.46)*** (1.44)
Constant 6.321 8.033 7.005 6.739
(11.48)*** (15.39)*** (10.10)*** (7.02)***
No. o f observations 259 134 131 56
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.55 0.63 0.52
Standard error 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.21
Notes:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets.
3. HH denotes household.
4. The production functions of DHs agriculture and AHs agriculture with cash crops were estimated
with robust approach due to the existence of heteroscedasticity.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 3.4 The household production functions
1 2 3 4 5 6
AHs’ AHs’ DHs DHs DHs running NAHs
agriculture agriculture agriculture agriculture OAEs OAEs




Log (labour days) 0.219 0.420 0.136 0.281 0.530 0.825
(2.02)** (3.36)*** (1.97)** (2.14)** (2.55)** (1.66)
Log (land) 0.657 -0.121 0.584 0.279
(5.28)*** (1.03) (5.18)*** (1.30)
Log (capital) 0.041 0.025 0.0101 -0.033 0.053 0.028
(1.55) (0.89) (0.42) (0.99) (1.49) (0.37)
Log (hired labour 0.139 0.155
days) (2.50)** (2.54)**
Log (seeds, fertiliser, 0.028 0.081 0.155 -0.274
etc.) (0.24) (1.48) (1.60) (2.12)**
Log (water and 0.044 0.032 -0.024 0.140
electricity) (1.52) (1.18) (0.64) (2.26)**
Log (fuel) 0.050 0.036 0.033 -0.001
(2.04)** (1.42) (0.90) (0.02)
Log (husbandry 0.055 0.031 -0.021 0.080
expenditure) (2.98)*** (2.29)** (0.73) (3.19)***
Log (machine 0.007 0.024 0.010 0.026
maintenance) (0.34) (0.88) (0.46) (0.66)
Log (transportation) 0.008 0.039 -0.026 0.052
(0.39) (1.48) (0.99) (0.99)
Log (machine 0.030 -0.022 -0.037 -0.059
hiring) (1.02) (0.68) (1.15) (0.89)
HH head -0.023 0.029 -0.022 0.082 -0.018 0.060
experience(years) (1.05) (2.00)** (0.77) (1.47) (0.33) (1.06)
HH head experience 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
squared-term (1.09) (1.60) (0.88) (1.35) (0.31) (0.89)
HH head school 0.0205 0.0239 0.005 0.096 0.085 0.150
years (0.97) (0.94) (0.21) (2.49)** (1.47) (1.60)
Village 1 -1.017 -1.070 -1.015 -0.464 -0.866 -0.361
(4.98)*** (4.78)*** (4.32)*** (0.70) (2.02)** (0.60)
Village 3 -0.373 -0.804 -0.397 -0.594 -0.456 -1.426
(1.73)* (3.01)*** (1.52) (0.89) (0.85) (1.83)*
Village 4 n.a. -0.908 n.a. 0.357 -0.865 -0.883
(3.14)*** (0.74) (2.73)*** (L67)
Village 5 -0.338 -0.827 -0.274 -0.258 -0.015 0.402
(1.58) (3.37)*** (1.58) (0.41) (0.04) (1.26)
Village 6 -0.961 -1.083 -1.379 -0.230 -1.242 n.a.
(3.63)*** (3.58)*** (4.06)*** (0.48) (2.23)**
Village 7 -0.281 -0.930 -0.798 0.033 -0.459 n.a.
(0.76) (3.15)*** (2.14)** (0.06) (0.87)
Village 8 -1.236 -1.250 -1.400 -0.150 -1.028 n.a.
(4.59)*** (4.20)*** (4.15)*** (0.25) (1.65)
Village 9 -0.827 -0.183 -0.877 n.a. -0.749 -0.815
(4.16)*** (0.39) (5.25)*** (2.17)** (1.62)
Constant 5.543 6.129 6.612 6.800 5.506 2.587
(7.62)*** (8.01)*** (9.08)*** (6.93)*** (3.97)*** (1.15)
No. of observations 128 131 78 56 47 34
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.54 0.72 0.49 0.52 0.47
Standard error 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.43 0.33
Returns to scale 1.139 0.545 0.8201 0.491 0.722 1.008
Notes:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets.
3. HH denotes household.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 3.4A Marginal Products
1 2 3 4 5 7
AHs’ AHs’ DHs’ DHs’ DHs’ OAEs NAHs’
agriculture agriculture agriculture agriculture OAEs
without cash with cash without cash with cash
crops crops crops crops
Marginal Products
Labour (daily) 2.39 4.91 3.73 8.03 18.72 44.44
Labour (hourly) 0.30 0.61 0.47 1.00 2.34 5.56
Hired labour (days) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.72 27.16
Capital (yuan) 0.23 0.15 0.16 -0.22 0.14 0.05
Land (mu) 179.55 -60.52 241.83 21.75 n.a. n.a.
Average Net Products
AP-Labour (daily) 10.91 11.70 27.46 28.58 35.32 53.87
AP-Labour (hourly) 1.36 1.46 3.43 3.57 4.42 6.73
Hired labour (days) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 149.03 175.25
AP-Capital 5.72 6.05 15.39 6.52 2.65 1.96
AP-Land 273.29 500.19 414.09 77.94 n.a. n.a.
Notes:
1. The marginal products were derived from the production functions presented (Table 3) and the 
average products in this table.
2. AP denotes average product.
3. HH denotes household.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Chapter 4
ESTIMATION OF CHINESE RURAL LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND SUPPLY
WITH SHADOW WAGES
4.1 Introduction
Unlike in developed countries, labour participation and supply behaviour in the 
developing world, especially its rural areas, has been under-researched. A good example is 
rural China, where about five hundred million labourers live and work, but up to now, to 
my knowledge there has not been any published study on this issue. The main obstacles to 
conduct this kind of study are that rural labour markets are incomplete or even barely exist, 
with the majority of the rural labour force working on their own farms or family 
enterprises instead of in the market. Hence, market wage rates are not available to most of 
rural workers. Without them, modelling households or individuals’ time allocation seems 
very difficult. One notable study on this issue was made by Rosenzweig (1980), who 
applied the neoclassical family labour model to rural India by imputing wage rates from 
labour market participants to the self-employed on the assumption that rural Indian labour 
markets are efficient, free of transaction costs and with perfect substitution between family 
and hired labour. However, it is hard to apply this method to some developing areas, such 
as rural China, where most of rural households do not hire out or hire in labour but have
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their own labour working exclusively on their own farms. Fortunately, this methodological 
obstacle has been cleared by Jacoby (1993), who developed a general methodology for 
estimating structural time-allocation models for agricultural households whose members 
don’t work for wages, and applied it to rural Peru. The key to Jacoby’s approach is to 
estimate the opportunity cost of time, or ‘shadow wage’ which is determined from within 
the household, rather than by markets. Using Jacoby approach, Skoufias (1994) estimated 
the labour supply behaviour of rural Indian agricultural households.
Both Jacoby and Skoufias’s studies were only concerned with labour supply 
behaviour of agricultural households. However, some of the households in our rural survey 
have extensively diversified their income sources into non-farm activities, such as local 
non-farm wage employment, out-migrating and running own account enterprises (OAEs).
To get a complete analysis of rural labour supply behaviour, not only does one have 
to include rural labours engaged in all categories of income generating activities but also 
one has to consider those of working age not working for income. In other words, it is 
necessary to incorporate labour participation behaviour into labour supply. As a matter of 
fact, in our randomly selected rural household samples, all male household labourers in 
working age reported working, but nevertheless 13 percent of females in working age did 
not work for income at all.
The chapter is organised as before, i.e. theoretical discussion, data, econometric 
model specification, econometric estimation results, and summary.
4.2 Theoretical framework: rural agricultural households and their labour 
participation and supply
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In order not to divert our focus from modelling rural labour participation and labour 
supply behaviour by entering into the extensive debates on the intra-household model, we 
simply adopt the ‘agricultural household model’ (Singh, Squire & Strauss, 1986: 6; 
Bardhan & Udry, 1999: 7-11). In rural China or other developing countries, the agricultural 
household - with its workers exclusively working on its own farm and no hired labour - 
functions as a family enterprise. Its income is the outcome of the family’s collective effort 
such as decision making, management, labour, etc. Within the household, how much a 
working member should work and s/he can earn couldn’t fully be explained by her/his own 
human capital, because at surface it is decided by the entire household’s decision making, 
management level, etc., and it is profoundly determined by the household production 
function. It should also be noted that the nature of subsistence farming and 
underemployment in populous developing countries could influence rural labour 
participation and labour supply behaviour by making people be less likely to sacrifice 
potential income in order to enjoy leisure than are the people living in the developed world. 
Finally, as in the canonical agricultural household model, it is assumed here that a rural 
household acts as if it possesses and maximises a twice differential utility function decided 
jointly by the husband and wife:
( \ ) U  = U(lm,lf ,C)
where lm and //denote the amount of time spent in non-income generating activities in a 
certain time interval by male and female household members respectively, such as leisure 
or home production; C denotes budget constraint or consumption constraint that includes 
market goods and home produced goods. Each household member’s total time 7* (h=m,f )  
is allocated between non-income generating activities (/*; k = m, f )  and income generating
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activities (self-employed work either on own farm or in family business) (Z,*; k=m, f). In 
addition, the rural household might have hired labour (//*; k=m, j)  in its household income- 
generating activities either agricultural or non-agricultural.
Now that household utility function has been established, we try to model the most 
typical rural households with all household members working on own farm and no hired 
labourers. Actually the majority of Chinese rural households in the region of interest are of 
this type. In this case, a household’s preference over leisure and consumption enters into 
the own-farm labour demand decision, in other words, the household’s labour supplies are 
determined by agricultural technology (Jacoby, 1993). Besides, we assume that the 
household’s production function of agriculture as Equation (2) displayed is strictly concave.
(2) Y = F(Lm,Lf t I )
where Y  denotes agricultural output, Lm and T/denote the amount of time spent in income 
generating activities in a certain time interval by male and female household members 
respectively, I  represents a vector of other productive inputs like equipment, land, draft 
animals, fertiliser, seeds, etc. As we have assumed that own farm shadow wage rate wk be
equal to a household member k’s marginal product i.e. MPL resulted from households’
maximum output, and shadow wage rates of prime age male and female needn’t be same. 
This would lead to a non-linear budget constraint in term of hours worked. To overcome 
this difficulty, we follow Jacoby (1993) by adopting Hall’s 36 (1973) approach of 
linearizing the budget constraint at the point of wk where the household profit
36 Progressive tax on income leads to non-linear budget constraint (quasi-concave to the origin) for the 
working households in term of hours worked. However, given strictly convex indifference curves, the 
equilibrium tangency point o f the non-linear budget constraint and the convex indifference curve would be 
unique. Hall (1973) suggested that the non-linear budget constraint could be linearized at the tangency point 
(Bemdt, 1991, p. 929-631).
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maximization is reached. Therefore, the household budget constraint could be laid out as 
follows:
(3) C = 7t + wmLm+wf Lf +V
where n  is the profit generated from own-farm or family business with the opportunity cost 
of family labour deducted, V is other non-labour or property income.
Under this circumstance, the maximization of utility equation (1) subject to the 
budget constraint equation (3) leads to Lagrange function:
Lagrange(lm ,lf ,wk,C) = U (lm, I f , C) -  A[C ~(7r + wmLm+ wf  Lf  + V)\
= 8U _
81 k 8l t k t t t
dLagrange _ d U
8C ~ dC
dU IdU ,( 4 ) ---- / ------ = w.
81 k /  8C
Equation (4) says that, if both the household members work on their own farm or family 
business only, the male or female member’s marginal rate of substitution of consumption 
for leisure is equal to its shadow wage rate wk or his/her marginal product of labour from 
the household farming. Consequently, a working household member’s shadow wage rate
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wk is also his/her opportunity cost or price of leisure. Moreover, if a working family
member’s reservation wage rate wr is higher than his/her shadow wage rate wk, s/he would
not participate in family income-generating activities. In other words, his/her utility 
maximization problem reaches a comer solution instead of an interior one.
Therefore, a family member’s leisure demand function should be formulated as 
follows:
(5 ) lk =lk(wK,wf ,V) (k = m , f )
where V denotes non-labour income or property incomes.
Since Lk =Tk - l k, the corresponding labour supply function can be written as:
(6 )Lk =Lt (wm,wr ,V) (k = m , f )
From Equation (6), questions to be enquired naturally are that how the change of 
wage rate and non-labour income affect labour supply respectively. Firstly, we look at pure 
income effect, i.e. how a unit-increase of non-labour income will affect labour supply. We 
suppose that leisure in Equation (5) is a normal good, which means that an increase of non­
labour income will result in consumers taking more leisure. In other words, the pure 
income effect on labour supply is negative.
Now we turn to wage effect, for which the well-known Slutsky equation provides a 
solution. Due to the duality that exists between the Marshallian and Hicksian form of 
leisure demand function, i.e.
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('7)lk (wm ,w f ,U*) = lk(wm,w f ,V) (Jehle & Reny, 2001: 43). Then the Slutsky equation of 
leisure demand can be derived as:
dlk dlk dlk .(8) — = —----- / . —  (k = m , f )  and (j  = m , f )
dw. dw, J d v
where the first term on the right hand side of Equation (8) is the substitution effect of wage 
increase, the second term is the income effect of wage increase. If k is equal to y, then the 
first term of the right hand side is the own wage substitution effect; otherwise, it is the 
cross wage substitution effect. As we have supposed that leisure is a normal good, 
according to the Slutsky theorem, own wage substitution effects on leisure must be 
negative (Jehle & Reny, 2001: 51-53), whereas the income effect on leisure should be 
positive. Due to the fact that Ik =Tk -  Lk , correspondingly the own wage substitution 
effect on labour supply is positive, whereas the income effect on labour supply is negative. 
So the uncompensated wage effect on labour supplies i.e. dLk/dwk could be of either sign.
The decline in average hours worked together with increased real wage observed in the 
developed world during the twentieth century has been viewed as evidence that the income 
effect of wage increases has dominated the substitution effect (Sapsford & Tzannatos, 
1993: 27). However, due to the existence of enormous amount of surplus labour and 
underemployment in rural China, we wouldn’t expect this particular phenomenon to 
happen there as well. Additionally, by theory, male and females’ cross substitution 
elasticity should be equal because the Slutsky matrix is symmetric. So we are going to test 
whether this theoretical hypothesis is refused in rural China.
One more point that has to be made clear is that, if the separation property of the 
agricultural household model does not hold, a household’s production, consumption and
137
Chapter 4 Estimation of Chinese Rural Labour Participation and Supply
labour supply decisions are jointly decided (Bardhan & Udry, 1999: 11), then shadow 
wages, labour supplies, consumption and income are endogenous (Jacoby, 1993). In the 
case of subsistence farming, these decisions are made simultaneously. However, a large 
part of agriculture is made up of semi-commercial farms in which some inputs are 
purchased and some output are sold. In these circumstances, producer, consumer and 
labour supply decisions are no longer made simultaneously, although they are obviously 
connected because the market value of consumption can not exceed the market value of 
production less the market value of inputs (Singh, Squire & Strauss, 1986: 6).
The above theoretical discussion about labour participation and supply in an 
agricultural household model with their labour working exclusively on household farming 
can easily be applied to rural households of other kinds such as those running family non- 
agricultural business even with hired labour. The key is to derive the shadow wage rate. An 
extreme case is that all the members of some rural households might work exclusively for 
wages. In this case, rural labour supply can be fully explained by the neo-classical labour 
supply theory.
Clearly, the implicit assumption of our theoretical framework is a unitary model of 
the household, which argued that a family is supposed to pool all its income and hence to 
maximize utility from total family consumption and their members’ leisure subject to a 
family budget constraint (Ashenfelter & Heckman, 1974). The unitary model had been 
criticised as assuming the family decision making process like ‘a black box’, more 
fundamentally as not being built on individualism -  the core of the neoclassical 
microeconomics (Chiappori, 1992), and as being unable to explain intra-household 
inequalities. To overcome these drawbacks, a collective model is proposed, which 
supposes that members of a family share non-labour income according to some given rules,
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and that each family member is characterised by specific preferences and hence optimally 
chooses his/her own consumption and labour supply (Chiappori, 1992). However, the 
purpose of this chapter is to analyse Chinese rural labour participation and labour supply 
behaviour rather than to test whether the unitary or collective hypothesis is more 
appropriate in explaining family labour supply decision. Besides, the collective model has 
not been generalised to incorporate the case of non-working family members, namely, a 
comer solution (Fortin & Lacroix, 1997) which is central in explaining labour participation 
behaviour in this chapter. Finally, as a matter of fact, our data is unsuitable to test these 
two models in the sense that the data does not distinguish property income of the husband 
from the wife, which are the critical variables in testing whether the assumption of pooling 
family resources is correct (Schultz, 1990; Fortin & Lacroix, 1997). Due to these 
constraints, the unitary model is still used as a theoretical base of this chapter following 
Singh, Squire & Strauss (1986: 6), Jacoby (1993), and Bardhan & Udry (1999: 7-11). 
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that nothing can be done about the collective model. For 
example, some of the assumptions of the unitary model can be tested, such as the Slutsky 
symmetry of compensated cross wage effect restriction and the non-negativity of the 
determinant of the Slutsky matrix. If these assumptions of the unitary model were rejected, 
we can add to the evidence in the existing empirical literature against the unitary model 
(for example, Schultz, 1990; Fortin & Lacroix, 1997).
4.3 Data and econometric model specification
4.3.1 Data
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As we have given in Chapter 1 the detailed description of the fieldwork -  a survey of 
450 rural households conducted by the author in a clustering of nine villages scattered 
across Xinmin County of Liaoning Province of the northeast China in 1998, here only the 
relevant specification and variables are presented.
Tables 3.1, 3.1 A & 4.1 present the data in summary form. As we have said in 
Section 4.1 that the shadow wages or marginal products of household workers have to be 
estimated and computed from household production functions, we briefly introduce the 
types of households of our sample in the first place. Tables 3.1 & 3.1 A present the relevant
" X Idata in detail. Altogether 450 rural households were surveyed. We were able to 
distinguish three main categories of income-generating households (see Section 1.4 of 
Chapter 1).
As to our major concern, i.e. rural male and female labour supply, Table 4.1 reports 
the data in detail. The initial classification reveals that 523 males and 488 females are of 
working age. All the 523 males were reported working; 338 or 64.63% in household 
farming; 185 or 35.37% in OF As. Of the 488 females, 62 or 12.70% reported not working 
at all, 335 or 68.65% in household farming, 91 or 18.65% in OF As. Both male and female 
workers supply less labour (counted as mean of annual working days) in household 
farming than in OF As; that of males’ are 221.75 and 309.45 days respectively; that of 
females’ 190.17 and 298.18 days in that order. Besides, both male and female workers in 
household farming have about one year less education than those in OF As.
4.3.2 Econometric model specification
37 Eight o f the sample households were excluded as six did not engage in any productive activity whatever 
due to the elderly age composition, and two depended entirely upon farm labouring.
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A general model of labour participation and supply. In Section 4.2 we derived 
labour participation and labour supply model of agricultural households with their labour 
working on own farm or non-farm OAEs. In this section, our task is to specify the 
estimable econometric model for rural labour participation and labour supply. Let’s 
suppose a specific utility function for rural workers:
(9) U = [wk (Lk + e) + V f  [1 -  (Lk + e)Y
where a rural worker’s total time 7* is normalised to 1 so that Lk is the proportion of time 
spent on income work, wk denotes shadow wage rate, e is an unobserved error term
varying among different individuals, V includes the family’s property or non-labour 
income, and the term in the first bracket of the right hand side is disposable consumption 
budget C, and finally the term in the second bracket is the proportion of time in leisure 
(non-market activities). Thus, a working household member k's marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption for leisure, i.e. MRSkis:
(10) MRSk = / —  = [b/( 1 -  b)] [wk (Lk +e) + V}/[\ -  (Lk + e)]
olk /  DC
where b = p / ( a  + /?), lk = 1 -  (Lk + e ) . Now, if labour supply Lk is zero and hence leisure
lk is 1, the MRSk or reservation wage rate (see Section 4 about the definition of MRSk) is 
computed from Equation (10) as follows:
(11) w, =[b/(l-b)](wke + V ) / ( \ - e )
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If a rural household worker’s shadow wage rate were greater than his/her reservation 
wage rate, i.e. wk > wr , s/he would work for income or interior solution is reached; 
otherwise, s/he would stay away or labour participation decision is made at corner
TO
solution optimally (so called ‘comer equilibrium’) (Killingsworth, 1983: 7). By 
setting wk > wr and rearranging implies Lk > 0 if and only if s L > -  J , where s,  = -e  
Vand J  = ( \ - b ) - b —  (when setting MRSk =wk in Equation (10), the equation about J
can be derived). Hence we got the following equations:
(12) Lk > 0  if and only if eL > - J
(13) Lk = 0  if and only if eL < -  J  
where
(1 4 )^  = - e  and J  = (1 - b ) - b  —
If I ,  > 0 , labour supply equation can be derived by setting MRSk = wk in Equation
(10) as follows:
(15) L „ = ( l - b ) - b ^  + e,
By incorporating Equations (12), (13) and (15) together, the second generation’s 
labour supply model is at hand (Bemdt, 1991: 617-18). To make this labour supply model 
work, the following assumptions are necessary. Firstly, wage rates are assumed to be 
available to both workers and non-workers. Secondly, s L has a zero mean and a standard 
deviation of crL, and is normally distributed. This means that the standardized normal 
variable s Lj<JL has a mean zero and a variance of 1. Up to now, it is clear that the labour
38 The comer solution is to distinguish those unwilling to work because their would-be wage rate had they 
worked less than their reservation wage rate and those who cannot find a job even they accept the minimum 
wage rate. For the later case, there isn’t a solution, let alone a comer solution.
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supply model can be estimated empirically either by the well-known Heckman two-step 
procedure or by the Tobit model. When people do not work because wk < wr or labour
participation decisions are optimal at comer solution, theoretically there is no difference 
between the Heckman procedure and Tobit model in estimating labour supply behaviour. 
However, empirically they are different by virtue of the fact that the Heckman probit 
procedure does not restrict the two sets of explanatory variables in probit for labour 
participation decisions and linear regression of labour supply to be the same, whereas the 
Tobit does.
Labour participation and supply models and relevant variables. In our rural 
household survey data, except for the few incapable of working, all males of working age 
reported working, thus there isn’t a labour participation problem worth modelling for them. 
However, 13 percent of the females in working age reported not working for income at all. 
In this case, the above standardised econometric model can be deployed to analyse labour 
participation and labour supply behaviour (the Heckman model is chosen because it is 
more flexible). In the first stage of Heckman procedure, labour participation is analysed by 
the probit model as follows:
(16) z* = y W  + ut where Z = 1 denotes working for income, 0 otherwise; and u\ ~./V(0,l) 
Pr(z, = 1) = Pr(z* > 0) = <3>(y Wt) 
where W\ is a vector of explanatory variables, O denotes the normal distribution function, 
and ya  vector of associated coefficients. In the second stage of the model, the results of the 
probit are used to constmct Mill’s inverse ratios, X,. The labour supply function corrected 
by sample selection would then be derived as follows:
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(17) E[L, | Lj is observed] = e [l  | z > oj
=  / ■ . ' [ / .  | U, <y  »  J
= p 'x  + e [b, | n, < r  A
= 0 X  + p a sX,(atl)
= 0 X  + p i Xl(all)
where
a u =rw/<Tu
4 « » )=  j (y 'w /au)/<tty' w/er„)
Therefore, the female labour supply function would be:
(18) L | z* > 0 = E[L | z* > 0] + v,. = P X  + j3AA(ccp) + v, (Greene, 1997(a): 997), where v 
is an error term.
To correct selectivity for female labour supply function, we empirically identified an 
instrument variable ‘having a village or township leader in the household’ which affects 
female labour participation but not their labour supply. The coefficient of the variable in 
the probit analysis of female labour participation is statistically significant at 5% and of a 
positive sign, suggesting that having a leader in the household encourages females to work 
for income. In the female labour supply function, the selectivity variable generated by the
TOHeckman procedure is marginally significant at the 7% level (Table 4.4). It suggests that 
there is a positive relation between those unobserved factors affecting female labour 
participation and those determining how much they work.
Apart from the sample selectivity problem, two other practical obstacles still stand in 
the way of estimating rural female labour supply. One is whether a comer solution is 
reached or whether not working is due to the unavailability of work. The other is that wage
39 The first step o f the full Heckman two step estimation results is reported in Table 4.3.
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rates are not available to non-workers. However, in rural China’s case, it seems that these 
two obstacles do not exist. Firstly, in rural China, arable land is collectively owned by 
villagers of each village and is distributed on a generally equitable basis between 
cultivating households according to either household size or numbers of household 
members of working age registered in each village. In principle, therefore, every household 
member can work on their own farm if they wish. A relevant inference is that difference in 
labour supply cannot be explained by a household’s land quantity at least in the same 
village. Moreover, labour is in shortage in agricultural peak times. So, if a female does not 
work for income at all, it is because the wage or shadow wage she would get had she 
worked is less than her reservation wage. Therefore, unavailability of work cannot explain 
why females in the samples are not working. In other words, our model of labour 
participation is not disturbed by the problem of involuntary unemployment.
Secondly, the shadow wage rates for those exclusively working on their own farm or 
own OAE are generated by their marginal products of labour. The latter can be estimated 
from their household production functions. For those specialised in waged OF As, their 
wage rates are decided by market. For those involved in two or more two income 
generating activities (diversified between household farming and waged OF A, or between 
household farming and non-farm OAE, or even between household farming and waged 
OFA and waged farming job), their shadow wage or wage rates were based on the 
marginal product of labour or wage rate in the activity to which they supply the majority of 
their labour (Jacoby, 1993). For those non-working females, their wage rates can be 
simulated by their village’s estimated marginal product of female labour providing their 
households are engaged in these activities. For those non-working females whose 
households do not have any farming or family OAE, their shadow wage rates can be 
imputed as the mean of the female shadow wage rates of their village.
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Profit from either household agriculture or household OAEs could act as property or 
non-labour income in the labour supply function, but for households without these kinds of 
economic activities, for example, when all household workers are wage earners, their non­
labour income would be zero. Shadow wage and property income derived like this suffer 
from a potential endogeneity problem. To address this, we use instrument model to treat it 
(details and results will be explained in Section 4.5).
In addition to shadow wages and property income, explanatory variables should also 
include education, experience (defined as potential working experience after finishing full­
time education) and its quadratic term, health indicator and location dummy variables. To 
be in the line of the mainstream female labour participation and supply studies, the number 
of children aged less than seven and number of children aged seven to eighteen should also 
be included.
Finally, it should be stressed that like other populous developing countries, rural 
China is suffering from an enormous amount of surplus labour or disguised unemployment. 
Chinese official statistics report that there were 452.88 million rural residents of working 
age in the year of 2000. However, currently the agricultural sector only employs 322.6 
million rural workers (State Statistic Bureau, 2001). The rest of them have to find living 
off-farm either locally or by rural-urban migration. At a microeconomic level, previous 
studies (Knight & Song, 1997; Cook, 1999; Song, 2000) and Chapter 3 of this thesis have 
shown that the returns to labour in non-farm activities were much higher than those in 
household farming were. This microeconomic evidence suggests that there is still pressure 
for Chinese rural labourers to go off-farm. The existence of rural surplus labour on a large 
scale would definitely affect rural labour supply behaviour. To a certain extent, rural 
labour supply is constrained by the demand side rather than by the supply side, at least for 
those only engaged in household farming.
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Empirical labour supply function. The empirical function used in estimating rural 
labour supply is as follows:
(19) LnLk =J30 + p mwm + p f wf  + fivV + PzZ  + Sk + v,
where P's are the coefficients to be estimated, V denotes property income, Z other 
explanatory variables like education, experience, etc., k  is the sample selectivity 
correction term as explained above, and finally v is the error term. This functional form is 
different from the conventional ones (Killingsworth, 1983: 160) in the following respects. 
Firstly, the labour supply we use is measured by hours worked per year, because in the 
region of interest, the agricultural cycle is completed yearly. Secondly, the labour supply 
variable is in logarithmic form, which is mainly for convenience of explaining non- 
financial variables such education, experience, etc. Thirdly, shadow wage rates and 
property or non-labour incomes (i.e. farm or non-farm OAE profit after labour cost 
deducted (Jacoby, 1993)) cannot be put in logarithmic form due to the existence of some 
negative values. This is because some households got negative profit. However, these 
modifications lead to some changes of the computation of structural income and 
substitution effects as exhibited below.
Uncompensated wage elasticity. The male gross or ‘uncompensated’ wage 
elasticity of labour supply (3£/dw)/(Z/w) in our case could be derived by partial 
differentiating Equation (19) with respect to men’s wagewOT, and then the uncompensated 
wage elasticity can be computed as:
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(20) —  —  =  pJ,
v  s  /■>,■»' T r  m  ndwm L
Women’s uncompensated wage elasticity can computed along the same lines.
Property income elasticity. The property income elasticity is(dL/dV)V/L. In the 
same way with uncompensated wage elasticity, the property income elasticity in our case 
should be:
dl V
(2 1 ) = fivV
8V L v
Own and cross substitution effect. Regarding the Slutsky equation of labour supply, 
Killingsworth (1983: 106) defined it as:
(22) = S . (Lk) + Lj & ■ ) ,  k=m, f;  j=m, f
dWj oV
The substitution effect Sw (Lk) can be computed as the difference between the total wage
effect dLk / dWj and the income effect (dLk/ d V ) . The total wage effect and income
effect is computed by partial differentiating Equation (19) with respect to w . and V
(property or non-labour income) respectively. When k is equal to j ,  it is the own wage 
substitution effect; otherwise it is the cross wage substitution effect. In our case, males and 
females’ own and cross wage substitution elasticity should be as follows:
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(23) S w^ (Lm) ^  = (Pm- p yLm)Wm
m
(24) S Wi(Lf ) ^ -  = ( p f - p vLf )wf
L f
(25) S W/{ L J ^ -  = (Pf - p vLf )wf  
(26 ) S w_(Lf ) ^  = (Pm- p vL J Wf
L .f
4.4 Derivation of shadow wage rates for rural male and female labour
To derive shadow wages for rural labourers working either on their own farm or in 
their family non-farm business, not only does one have to estimate their household 
production functions in the first place but also male and female labour input should be 
regarded as different inputs. In terms of income generating activities, there are six different 
types of households in our rural household samples: the AHs and DHs engaged in 
conventional grain farming only, the AHs and DHs diversifying between grain farming and 
cash crops, the DHs and NAHs engaged in non-agricultural OAE production. It should be 
expected that rural households engaged in different types of income generating activities 
have different production functions. Indeed, it was discovered in Chapter 3 that the 
production functions of AHs and DHs’ agricultural activities with and without cash 
products cannot be pooled together, and thus we estimated them separately. Rather than 
pooling all rural households together and getting a single estimated production function, 
estimating household production functions separately by the different types of income 
generating activities should reflect the reality of rural economy more accurately. By this
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logic, production functions were also estimated for DHs and the NAHs’ non-agricultural 
OAE activities separately.
Functional form choice. We adopted the Cobb-Douglas form for estimating AHs 
and DHs’ agricultural production functions. The reasons for this are as follows. For the 
sub-sample of DHs’ agricultural production with or without cash crops, the number of 
observations was less than the number of explanatory variables (88) that the Translog form 
of production function requires. For AHs’ agricultural production function with or without 
cash crops products, although the number of observations is somewhat larger, the small 
number of degrees of freedom is problematic.
For the DHs and NAHs’ OAE production functions, F tests could not reject the null 
hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas model. Thus, the Cobb-Douglas functional form is also 
employed for them.
Heteroscedasticity. Except for NAHs’ OAEs, Cook-Weisberg (STATA 7 Reference, 
v. 3: 107) test results cannot reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in the other 
five production functions. Thus, for NAHs’ OAEs production function we use White’s 
heteroscedastic-consistent stand error.
Goodness of Fit. The goodness of fit measured by the adjusted R-squared statistics 
for the AHs and DHs’ agricultural production functions without cash crops is relatively 
high; they are 0.84 and 0.74 respectively. However, for the other production function (AHs 
and DHs’ agricultural production function with cash crops, and DHs and NAHs’ OAEs 
production functions), the adjusted R-squared statistics are somewhat lower, in the range of 
0.47 to 0.57.
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Sample Selection. It was only feasible to correct for sample selectivity when 
estimating the NAHs’ OAE production function. To do this, we applied the Heckman 
procedure using a probit, which modelled whether households were specialised in non- 
agricultural OAEs. However, the selectivity correction term was not significant at all in 
the NAHs’ OAE production function. With the other production functions, there were no 
appropriate sample correction procedures for the following reasons. Firstly, the households 
categorised as DHs with OAE production overlap with those categorised as DHs’ 
agricultural activities with or without cash products. Secondly, even AHs’ agricultural 
activities have to be estimated in two sub-groups with or without cash products. Therefore, 
all the production functions presented in Table 4.2 are without correction for sample 
selectivity.
Econometric results for household production functions. Except for separating 
male and female labour inputs, the six production functions presented in Table 4.2 are 
almost the same as those in Chapter 3. To save space, here we only mention the main 
findings from Chapter 3 and then focus on the comparison between the productivity of 
male and female inputs.
The main findings are as follows. Those rural households who diversified into cash- 
crops, OFAs and OAEs activities rather than only grain farming were able to raise family 
incomes and the level of employment, and especially enjoyed increasing returns to their 
labour time (Table 4.2A) under the background of incomplete or partial markets and 
enormous disguised unemployment. Moreover, households who managed to move surplus 
labour off-farm do raise marginal products of labour for those left behind in agriculture. 
However, the market risks imposed by incomplete or partial markets for inputs, outputs,
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credit, and poor information and transportation system still bite hard. To avert these risks, 
the majority of the rural households in our samples chose diversified income-generating 
activities that apparently do not benefit from economies of scale. Even those running non- 
agricultural OAEs have to opt for labour-intensive activities instead of capital or 
technology-intensive ones.
Given our focus on the relationship between male and female labour in household 
production, we also estimated all the six production functions using a Translog function or 
its reduced form.40 Remarkably, the interaction terms between male and female labour 
inputs were never significant statistically. This implies that the relation between male and 
female labour is complementary rather than substitutional, and increasing male working 
hours would raise female’s marginal product and vice versa, which had happened in rural 
Peru (Jacoby, 1992).
Now we turn to the elasticity or contribution of male and female labour to the 
production functions (see Table 4.2). Cash crops greatly enlarged females’ elasticity in 
both AHs and DHs’ agricultural activities especially in DHs’, in which female labour 
played a dominant role. On the contrary, cash crops considerably reduced males’ 
contribution in DHs’ agriculture but not in AHs. This phenomenon is similar to rural Peru 
where Jacoby (1992) found out that women spent relatively more time than men in 
livestock production, whereas men were specialised in field farm work. Compared to AHs’ 
household farming, off-farm activities led to a fall in males’ elasticity of labour in DHs’ 
agricultural production function but boosted the corresponding figure for females. This 
could be a result of men being more likely to go off-farm and females being left behind 
doing farming (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). However, in the DHs and NAHs’ OAE 
production, male labour was overwhelmingly dominant over female.
40 For the DHs’ agricultural production functions with and without cash crops whose observations are limited, 
we only put the second order term of productive inputs, and the interaction term of male labour and female 
labour and their interaction with land, equipment. These results are not reported here.
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Finally, we discuss the marginal products of labour. Diversifying into income- 
generating activities like cash-crop producing, OF As and OAEs greatly lifted up both male 
especially female marginal products of labour compared to pure grain farming. The 
exception is the marginal products of male labour in the DHs’ agriculture with cash crops.
4.5 Estimation of rural labour participation and supply
4.5.1 Treatment for endogeneity problem
Since households’ male and female shadow wage rates and property income 
(household farming or OAE profit) are generated from household production functions 
reported in last section, these variables can be regarded as endogenous to rural labour 
supply. To treat this endogeneity problem, we use the instrumented shadow wages and 
property income. In our case, consumption expenditure per capita by households, self­
estimated house values and household capital (productive equipments) can be identified as 
instrumental variables. In the northeast China, there are four seasons well defined in a year, 
and agricultural activities are conducted yearly by sowing seeds in spring and harvesting in 
autumn. Thus, what rural households consume is the output of last year. In other words, 
consumption of this year is not related to the year’s production. With respect to self­
estimated house value, it is also not directly related to the current year’s production. 
Finally, household productive equipments or capitals affect the marginal products of labour 
but it should not directly affect labour supply except through the shadow wage. However, 
choosing appropriate instrument variables is always a difficult issue in empirical studies, 
and validity of these instruments is an empirical matter that can only be judged by the 
results of over-identification tests (Jacoby, 1993).
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To test whether these instruments are valid, first we conduct the F tests to see 
whether the instruments are significant in predicting male shadow wage, female shadow 
wage and property income (household farming or OAE profit). These F tests reject the null 
hypothesis that the instrumental variables do not affect shadow wages and property income 
at the 1% significant level for all these three regressions. In addition, Chi-squared over­
identification tests41 were conducted to test whether these instruments are valid to deal 
with endogenous problem of shadow wage and household property income in male and 
female supply function separately. In the male labour supply equation, the Chi-squared 
statistic42 for shadow wage is 1.05, for household property income it is 4.76; in the female 
labour supply equation, the two corresponding figures are 3.07 and 1.53 respectively. The 
critical value of the Chi-statistic with degrees of freedom of three at the 5% significance 
level is 7.81. Therefore, the three instruments pass the over-identification tests indicating 
that the instrument variables identified are valid. Consequently, the predicted or 
instrumented shadow wages and household property income can be used as explanatory 
variables in the male and female labour supply functions.
4.5.2 Rural female labour participation
Since all male workers of working age in our rural household samples are working 
except for the few disabled, a male labour participation issue is out of the question. The 
reason for this could be that, in rural China, every household is entitled to have land, and 
male workers especially married ones as prime bread earners have no choice but to work. 
A further relevant issue of how rural workers choose farm or off-farm work has been
41 The test is described in Deaton (1997: 112).
42 The Chi-squared statistic is the product o f number o f observations and un-centred R-squared statistic, 
which is from the regression of residuals (predicted from the two stage least squares o f labour supply 
function) on the explanatory variables inclusive o f the three instruments but exclusive o f the endogenous 
variable (Deaton, 1997: 112).
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addressed in detail in Chapter 2. To save space, we don’t repeat it here. Therefore, in this 
section, what’s left is female labour participation.
In the region of interest or even in the whole China, every rural woman can work 
because every rural household is entitled to have land and labourers are in great shortage 
during the agricultural peak time. However, some working-age women still did not work 
for income at all. So, what are the determinants of female labour participation? To answer 
this question, we used a probit model to investigate the determinants. The estimated results 
are reported in Table 4.3. The goodness of fit - measured by the Likelihood Ratio (0.60) or 
the percentage of correct predictions (89%) -  is highly respectable. Of the 488 women in 
working age in our household samples, 426 (87.30%) reported as working for income.
The rest of this sub-section will be devoted to interpreting the explanatory variables 
affecting female labour participation. Of the explanatory variables, own shadow wage, 
husband shadow wage and property income (instrumented household farming or OAE 
profit) are all very significant statistically. If own hourly shadow wage rate were increased 
one Chinese yuan, the probability of female labour participation would rise by 5.7%. On 
the contrary, if their male family members’ (mainly husband) hourly shadow wage rate 
were added one Chinese yuan, the probability of female labour participation would fall by 
6.4%. These two findings are expected by labour economics and in the line of the findings 
for the developed countries (Killingsworth, 1983: 432). However, if property income 
increases a thousand Chinese yuans, the probability of female labour participation would 
go up by 0.4%. This result of property income effect is the opposite of what labour 
economics predicts.
The probability of female labour participation has an inverse-U relationship with 
potential experience (defined as potential working years since education was completed), 
peaking at 46 years of experience. The mean years of experience and full time education
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were 23 and 6.8 respectively, so at face value, the probit results imply that the probability 
of female labour participation increase until they are too old (about 60 year-old) to work. 
This could be explained by that rural married couples’ life burdens might increase with age. 
For example, middle-aged couples have to pay considerable amount of education 
expenditure for their children given that their children were qualified for high school or 
even higher education; if their children couldn’t go to further education after secondary 
school, their parents have to pay sometimes unbearable marriage and house-building cost 
for their sons (these kinds of cost for daughters are much less). When grown-up sons left 
home and lead their own life, their parents might have to work hard to repay any 
outstanding debts or at least to work to maintain themselves.
Being married or not does not affect female labour participation decision, nor does 
the number of children aged less than seven. In the region of interest or the whole rural 
China, the need for day cares for children might not hinder married women working. The 
reason is that most of their extended families live in the same village; elder people 
normally look after their grandchildren if the daughters or daughters in law need to work. 
In addition to family concerns, this kind of behaviour can also be explained by economic 
reasons.
In contrast, an extra child aged seven to eighteen would raise the female labour 
participation probability by 1.5%. This could be explained by the following reasons. In 
rural China, there is no financial support for family with children; children aged seven to 
eighteen constitute greater economic pressure on their families not only because of 
schooling cost but also the parents have to work hard in order to save enough money for 
their children’s future marriage expenditure especially for sons. In rural China, although 
primary and second school education are compulsory, all rural education costs are paid by 
rural residents themselves instead of the state, whereas in all urban areas compulsory
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education is guaranteed by the state budget. This urban-biased education policy apparently 
put more pressure on the already poor rural residents who mainly rely on subsistence 
farming. Note that this is only one example of many state policies that are discriminating 
against rural people.
Another interesting and statistically significant explanatory variable is whether a 
woman’s family has a village or township leader. The probability of female labour 
participation with such a leader in the household is 98.7%, whereas without such a leader 
in the household, the probability is 88.6%. This implies that having a leader in the 
household encourages women to work for income. Finally, an extra household worker 
working off-farm would raise a female’s possibility of labour participation by 1.5%.
To conclude, higher wage, higher property income, more children aged seven to 
eighteen, having a village or township leader in the household, and more household 
workers working off-farm all encourage women to work for income. By contrast, higher 
husband wage discourages women from working. Children aged under seven do not affect 
women’s labour participation decisions.
4.5.3 Rural male and female labour supply
The male and sample-corrected female labour supply functions are reported in Table 
4.4. Due to the existence of heteroscedasticity in both male and female’s labour supply 
regression, we use the White’s heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. The goodness of 
fit measured by the adjusted R-squared statistics for the female labour supply estimation 
(0.41) is better than that of males’ (0.31).
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Now we turned to the explanatory variables. Both the coefficients of own wage in 
male and female labour supply equation (0.071 and 0.153 respectively) are very significant 
statistically. This implies that own wages have significant effects on rural labour supply. 
Male workers would increase their labour supply by 7.1% annually if their wage rate goes 
up by one Chinese yuan, whereas women would raise their labour supply 15.3% annually 
on the same schedule. The women’s uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply 
(0.108) is substantially higher than men’s (0.072). Therefore, the coefficients of own wage 
and the uncompensated wage elasticities tell the same story that female labour supply in 
rural China is more sensitive to own wages than is male labour supply. This result is 
similar to that of rural Peru (Jacoby, 1993) but different from rural India where male labour 
supply was backward bending (Rosenzweig, 1980). Additionally, males’ uncompensated 
wage elasticity here is in the range that was found by the American second generation 
studies, whereas the females’ is much smaller than the result reported in those similar 
studies (Killingsworth, 1983: 185). The reason for this could that the male labour 
participation rate of our sample is not much different from that of the U.S., whereas the 
female labour participation rate of our sample (87%) is much higher than that of the 
American’s (50% or so) (Bemdt, 1991: 594). The majority of households in the region of 
interest are in a state of subsistence farming and hence cannot afford leisure if work for 
income is available. It is therefore reasonable that Chinese women’s uncompensated wage 
elasticity is relatively lower than that of American women, who are the richest people in 
the world and thus surely can afford to sacrifice some potential income in order to enjoy 
leisure. The coefficient of property income in the female supply equation (-0.005, the unit 
of property income variable is in thousand Chinese yuans) is not significant statistically, 
nor is the equivalent figure for the male labour supply equation (0.002). Thus there is no 
need to discuss the property income elasticity further.
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It isn’t a surprise that men’s compensated own wage elasticities or own wage 
substitution elasticities (0.068) are almost the same to their uncompensated wage 
elasticities. The same is true for women’s compensated own wage elasticity (0.115). The 
reason for this is that both the coefficients of property income (farming or non-farm 
business profit) in the male and female labour supply equations are essentially zero and 
insignificant statistically. However, both the male and female own wage substitution 
elasticity cannot reject the theoretical hypothesis stated in Section 4.2 that the own wage 
substitution effect on labour supply is positive. Moreover, these facts provide further 
evidence that female labour supply is more wage elastic than male labour supply 
(Killingsworth, 1983: 432).
In the female labour supply equation, the coefficient of male wage (0.004) is very 
small and insignificant statistically. Recall that in the probit analysis of female labour 
participation, female labour participation was significantly discouraged by the household 
males’ (mainly husbands) wage rate increasing. It seems that the males or husbands’ wage 
rate increasing deters female labour participation but does not reduce female supply once 
they have chosen for income work. By contrast, in the male labour supply equation, the 
coefficient of female wage (0.098) is statistically very significant and relatively large. It 
appears that husbands consider their wives’ earnings when they decide their own labour 
supply (contradicting the so-called Chauvinist model of labour supply43). Increase of 
wives’ wage rates do stimulate husbands to work more. Perhaps this is because husbands 
cannot bear to be outperformed by their wives’ earning capability. This would not be 
surprising given the ingrained pride and prejudices still very much alive in most places of 
rural China. The compensated cross wage elasticity for men is 0.056, whereas for women,
43 The male chauvinist model assumed that, when a married woman makes her labour supply decisions, she 
regards her husband’s earnings as part o f her family’s total property or non-labour income; on the contrary 
the husband decides his labour supply solely on his own earning and the family property income but without 
considering his wife’s earnings (Bowen & Finegan, 1965, 1969).
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it is much smaller (0.012). Clearly, this rejects the hypothesis in Section 4.2 that males and 
females’ cross wage substitution effects are equal. Now that the Slutsky restriction of the 
symmetry of compensated cross wage effects is rejected, there is no need to test the non­
negativity of the determinant of the Slutsky matrix (Fortin & Lacroix, 1997). This finding 
about rural China’s labour supply behaviour provides further evidence additional to that in 
the existing literature (for examples, Schultz, 1990; Fortin & Lacroix, 1997) against the 
unitary model of the household.
Apart from these wage and income effects, we also need to report the effect of other 
explanatory variables on rural labour supply. The coefficients on experience and 
experience squared term are statistically significant for males but not for females. Both 
males and females’ labour supply had an inverse-U relationship with potential experience, 
peaking at 26 years of experience. Taking into account of the years of education, male and 
female labour supply would both peak at about the age of 39. In contrast, the coefficients 
on years of education and being married are not significant. As far as health indicators are 
concerned, those reported in bad health significantly reduced labour supply. Finally, the 
coefficients of number of children are statistically insignificant.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explored in depth the previously unstudied issue of Chinese rural 
labour participation and labour supply on the basis of a survey of 450 rural households in 
Northeast China. The probability of female labour participation increases with the shadow 
wage, property income and number of children aged seven to eighteen but decreases with 
their husbands’ shadow wage. With respect to labour supply behaviour, female labour 
supply is much more sensitive to own wage changes than is male labour supply, but male
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labour supply is much more sensitive to compensated cross wage effects. The Slutsky 
restriction of the symmetry of compensated cross wage effect was rejected, and hence this 
result provides further evidence against the unitary model of the household.
Like other populous developing countries, rural China is suffering from its enormous 
amount of surplus labour or disguised unemployment. In this sense, the majority of rural 
households especially for those only engaged in farming could not fully employ their own 
labour. Taking into account of this background, some odd behaviour of rural labour supply 
exhibited in the region of interest can be explained. For example, the probability of female 
labour participation increases with family property income and the number of labour 
engaged in off-farm activities. Rural households raise profit by either extending their 
income generating activities to cash crops, animal husbandry, poultry and aquatic products, 
or going off-farm through local farm wage jobs, rural-urban migration and family non­
farm business (Chapter 3). In the process of raising income, these rural households also 
create more employment opportunities for their own labour even for their fellow villagers 
(Chapter 3).
Due to the existence of a vast amount of surplus labour or disguised unemployment, 
labour supply is constrained by the demand side rather than by the supply side in rural 
China. Chinese government’s implicit urban-biased and rural-urban migration control 
policies certainly would not help ease this worrying issue. The five hundred million 
Chinese rural labourers can never be fully and efficiently absorbed by agriculture and local 
rural non-farm activities themselves (Chapter 3). Therefore, the only solution is to return 
the full national citizenship to the rural residents, namely, treating them equally as urban- 
residents and allowing them to migrate freely within China’s territory to pursue their 
economic interests.
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No. o f observations 0 338 185
Annual working days n.a. 221.75 309.45
Mean o f own hourly shadow wage rate (Chinese yuan) n.a. 0.45 1.97
Mean o f  female hourly wage rate (Chinese yuan) n.a. 0.42 0.84
Property income (Chinese yuan) n.a. 3447.51 7172.13
Mean o f consumption expenditure per capita (Chinese 
yuan)
n.a. 1739.87 2794.66
Mean o f self-estimated household value (Chinese yuan) n.a. 17355.62 27735.14
Household head experience in years n.a. 28.19 28.18
Household head education in years n.a. 6.65 7.30
Mean o f education in years n.a. 6.79 7.66
Mean o f age n.a. 36.92 35.81
Mean o f experiences in years n.a. 24.13 22.15
Being married n.a. 87.57% 82.16%
Being party member n.a. 4.73% 10.27%
Township or village leader at home n.a. 2.07% 7.57%
Ratio o f dependents to labours n.a. 0.605 0.773
No o f labourers n.a. 2.33 2.318
No. o f labour going off-farm n.a. 0.16 1.66
Bad health n.a. 2.66% 0.54%
Village 1 n.a. 48 (14.20%) 16(8.65%)
Village 2 n.a. 19(5.62%) 40 (21.62%)
Village 3 n.a. 43 (12.72%) 12 (6.49%)
Village 4 n.a. 32 (9.47%) 26(14.05% )
Village 5 n.a. 27 (7.99%) 23 (12.43%)
Village 6 n.a. 46(13.61% ) 18(9.73%)
Village 7 n.a. 51 (15.09%) 14(7.57%)
Village 8 n.a. 42(12.43% ) 11 (5.95%)
Village 9 
Female
n.a. 30 (8.88%) 25 (13.51%)
No. o f observations 62 335 91
Annual working days 0.00 190.17 298.18
Mean o f own hourly shadow wage rate (Chinese yuan) 0.66 (predicted) 0.58 1.04
Mean o f male hourly wage rate (Chinese yuan) 2.23 0.57 1.57
Property income (Chinese yuan) 5720.35 3622.70 8.397.95
Mean o f consumption expenditure per capita (Chinese 
yuan)
2528.42 2276.65 2808.47
Mean o f self-estimated household value (Chinese yuan) 25911.29 19079.70 26810.99
Household head experience in years 31.74 26.60 26.96
Household head education in years 6.61 7.01 7.40
Mean o f education in years 6.81 6.68 7.32
Mean o f age 36.48 36.59 32.84
Mean o f experiences in years 23.68 23.90 19.52
Percentage o f being married 79.03% 95.22% 81.32%
Kids aged less than seven 0.45 0.21 0.24
Kids aged between seven and eighteen 0.41 0.82 0.58
Township or village leader at home 1.61% 3.58% 4.40%
No o f labourers 1.79 2.32 2.44
No. o f labour going off-farm 0.81 0.30 2.04
Bad health (%) 8.06% 3.88% 0.00%
Village 1 (%) 10(16.13%) 36(10.75% ) 10(10.99%)
Village 2 (%) 20 (32.26%) 22 (6.57%) 11 (12.09%)
Village 3 (%) 4 (6.45%) 44(13.13% ) 5 (5.49%)
Village 4 (%) 3 (4.84%) 35 (10.45%) 20 (21.98%)
Village 5 (%) 12(19.35%) 31 (9.25%) 9 (9.89%)
Village 6 (%) 2 (3.23%) 42 (12.54%) 11 (12.09%)
Village 7 (%) 0 (0.00%) 49(14.63% ) 3 (3.30%)
Village 8 (%) 5 (8.06%) 46(13.73% ) 0 (0.00%)
Village 9 (%) 6 (9.68%) 30 (8.96%) 22 (24.18%)
Source: Derived from our Fieldwork Survey. Notes: HH denotes household.
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Table 4.2 Production functions
1 2 3 4 5 6
AHs AHs with DHs DHs with DHs’ OAEs NAHs’
without cash crops without cash crops OAEs
cash crops cash crops (robust)
Log male labour days 0.134 0.171 0.100 0.032 0.195 0.116
(1.67)* (1.28) (1.18) (0.21) (1.98)* (3.28)***
Log female labour days 0.055 0.143 0.095 0.643 0.043 0.022
(0.77) (1.65)* (1.08) (3.67)*** (0.86) (0.96)




Log land (mu) 0.485 0.025 0.612 -0.181
(3.90)*** (0.19) (4.15)*** (0.62)
Log equipments 0.082 0.028 0.007 -0.031 0.066 0.096
(3.79)*** (1.02) (0.22) (0.82) (1.79)* (2.98)***
Log (seeds, fertiliser, 0.299 0.003 0.058 0.102
etc.) (2.23)** (0.04) (0.44) (0.37)
Log (water and 0.033 0.023 -0.032 0.168
electricity) (1.33) (0.82) (0.67) (1.97)*
Log (fuel) 0.031 0.025 0.031 -0.025
(1.60) (1.00) (0.74) (0.59)
Log (husbandry 0.046 0.039 -0.045 0.073
expenditure) (3.01)*** (2.68)*** (1.33) (2.74)***
Log (machine -0.003 0.025 0.006 0.052
maintenance) (0.14) (0.82) (0.23) (1.22)
Log (transportation) 0.006 0.042 -0.031 0.036
(0.35) (1.64) (0.91) (0.69)
Log (machine hiring) 0.092 -0.024 0.016 -0.022
(3.66)*** (-0.72) (0.34) (0.36)
HH head experience -0.052 0.025 0.049 0.013 -0.003 0.092
(2.60)*** (1.50) (0.91) (0.23) (0.04) (3.76)***
HH head experience 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
squared term (2.90)*** (0.88) (1.11) (0.15) (0.06) (3.23)***
HH head school years 0.006 0.041 0.000 0.104 0.117 0.035
(0.32) (1.61) (0.01) (2.81)*** (1.99)* (0.92)
Village 1 -0.790 -1.223 -0.865 0.293 -0.740 -0.255
(4.35)*** (4.37)*** (2.89)*** (0.41) (1.58) (1.17)
Village 3 -0.320 -0.855 -0.109 (dropped) -0.299 -0.880
(1.50) (2.74)*** (0.32) (0.53) (3.19)***
Village 4 (dropped) -0.959 (dropped) 0.229 -0.942 0.781
(2.93)*** (0.34) (2.82)*** (3.96)***
Village 5 -0.085 -0.831 -0.309 -0.422 -0.054 0.690
(0.39) (2.86)*** (1.41) (0.67) (0.15) (5.18)***
Village 6 -0.887 -1.298 -1.233 0.291 -0.637 (dropped)
(3.87)*** (3.55)*** (2.94)*** (0.42) (1.00)
Village 7 -0.158 -1.141 -0.968 0.193 -0.645 (dropped)
(0.52) (3.24)*** (2.04)** (0.25) (1.20)
Village 8 -1.241 -1.470 -1.360 -0.083 -1.558 (dropped)
(5.47)*** (4.22)*** (3.33)*** (0.10) (2.73)***
Village 9 -0.615 -0.348 -0.974 (dropped) -0.542 0.061
(3.46)*** (0.70) (4.95)*** (1.38) (0.28)
Constant term 3.979 7.271 6.189 3.834 6.764 6.414
(4.73)*** (8.39)*** (6.15)*** (2.28)** (5.63)*** (13.51)***
No. of observations 112 117 59 49 47 34
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.53 0.74 0.57 0.47 0.53
Standard error 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.29
Notes:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets.
3. HH denotes household.
4. The production function of NAHs’ OAES was estimated with robust approach due to the existence
o f heteroscedasticity.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 4.2A Marginal products of male and female labour




















Male Labour (daily) 2 .99 2.94 6.44 0 .79 9.38 10.56
Female Labour (daily) 1.49 4.24 3.58 14.16 2 .36 2.62
Male Labour (hourly) 0.37 0.37 0.81 0 .10 1.17 1.32
Female Labour (hourly) 0.19 0.53 0.45 1.77 0.30 0.33
Notes: The marginal products were derived from the production functions presented (Table 4.2). 
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
164
Chapter 4 Estimation of Chinese Rural Labour Participation and Supply
Table 4.3 Probit modelling female labour participation (1, working; 0, not working)
1 2
Coefficients o f Probit Marginal effects
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Constant term 1.392 0.98 0.057 0.97
Female hourly shadow wage (predicted) 1.380 4.33 *** 0.056 2.58 ***
Male hourly shadow wage (predicted) -1.569 -8.24 *** -0.064 -2.74 ***
Property income (farm profit predicted) 0.100 3.10 *** 0.004 2.27 **
Log consumption expenditure per capita -0.043 -0.15 -0.002 -0.15
Log self-estimated house value -0.047 -0.31 -0.002 -0.31
HH head experience -6.34E-02 -0.95 -2.59E-03 -0.95
HH head experience squared term 3.41E-04 0.33 1.39E-05 0.33
HH head education in years 0.048 0.60 0.002 0.58
Experience 1.43 E-01 2.13 5.84E-03 1.67 *
Experience squared term -3.10E-03 -2.49 *** -1.27E-04 -1.84 *
Education in years -0.094 -0.99 -0.004 -0.94
No. of kids aged 0-6 -0.008 -0.02 0.000 -0.02
No. of kids aged 7-18 0.370 1.76 * 0.015 1.59
No. o f labour off-farm 0.370 2.21 ** 0.015 1.68 *
Reported in bad health -0.767 -1.37 -0.031 -1.21
Married 0.648 1.03 0.026 0.99
With township or village leader 2.273 2.43 *♦ 0.093 1.93 **
Village 1 -0.114 -0.24 -0.005 -0.23
Village 3 1.128 1.81 * 0.046 1.74 *
Village 4 -0.617 -1.19 -0.025 -1.08
Village 5 0.985 2.03 ** 0.040 1.78 *
Village 6 1.394 1.74 * 0.057 1.74 *
Village 8 0.120 0.22 0.005 0.22




The log-likelihood ratio index 60.44
Predicted
Actual 0 1 Total
0 47 15 62
1 6 420 426
Total 53 435 488
Notes:
1. *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%.
2. The t-ratios are in brackets.
3. HH denotes household.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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Table 4.4 The estimated equations of rural male and female labour supply (labour supply are 
measured by annual working hours per labourer) _________________________ ______________
1 2
Male Female
Constant term 4.824 4.317
(37.40)*** (20.45)***
Own hourly shadow wage (predicted) 0.071 0.153
(2.94)*** (2.67)***
Opposite sex workers’ hourly shadow wage (predicted) 0.098 0.004
(3.13)*** (0.08)
Property income (farm profit predicted) 0.002 -0.005
(0.55) (0.80)
Experience 2.47E-02 2 .10E-02
(2.08)** (1.41)
Experience squared term -4.82E-04 -4.01E-04
(2.13)** (1.44)




No. o f kids aged 0-6 -0.062
(0.90)
No. o f kids aged 7-18 0.044
(1.18)
Bad health -0.585 -1.169
(3.30)*** (8.46)***
Village 1 0.190 0.590
(1.97)** (4.15)***
Village 3 0.398 0.788
(4.56)*** (5.48)***
Village 4 0.531 0.885
(7.02)*** (6.78)***
Village 5 0.230 0.559
(3.34)*** (4.48)***
Village 6 0.081 0.378
(0.89) (2.45)***
Village 7 0.306 0.616
(3.41)*** (4.52)***
Village 8 0.428 -0.031
(4.70)*** (0.20)
Village 9 0.009 0.329
(0.10) (2.46)***
Selectivity variable (lambda) 0.243
(1.77)*
No. of observations 523 426
Adjusted R-square 0.3058 0.4077
Uncompensated shadow wage elasticity 0.072 0.108
Own-substitution elasticity 0.068 0.115
Cross- substitution elasticity 0.056 0.012
Gross property elasticity 0.010 -0.024
Mean o f own shadow wage 1.020 0.709
Opposite sex workers’ shadow wage o f the sample 0.596 0.821
Mean o f  own labour supply (annual hours) 255.925*8 215.370*8
213.543*8 255.062*8
Mean o f property (1,000 Chinese yuan) 4765.015 4779.671
Note:
1. Male labour supply has been sample-corrected by Heckman probit-OLS procedure.
2. Female labour supply has been sample-corrected by Lee multinomial logit -  OLS procedure.
3. *** = Significant at the 1% level; **= Significant at 5%; *= Significant at 10%.
4. The t-ratios are in brackets.
5. HH denotes household.
6. Unit o f wage and property income is in Chinese yuan.
Source: Derived from the Fieldwork Survey.
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The main task of this thesis has been to examine the rural people’s livelihood in term 
of income generating activities using a survey of 450 rural households in the northeast 
China. To conclude, a general summary of what have been found and concluded in 
previous chapters will be presented. Additionally, this chapter also concludes by discussing 
two issues as follows. What did this thesis contribute? What policy suggestions can be 
drawn from this research? The summary and answers to these two questions will be given 
in the rest of this chapter in turn.
5.1 A general summary
This thesis has modelled the allocation process of income generating activities 
among rural dwellers at both the individual and household levels. The evidence from this 
study suggests that market forces rather than political factors decide the allocation of 
private off-farm opportunities. The most important aspect of human capital -  school 
education has demonstrated as a potent factor in assisting rural residents to get local non­
farm waged jobs and to migrate to secure urban employment. The possession of non- 
agricultural skills significantly encourages rural households and individuals to go off-farm.
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The political factors identified as party memberships or having a local government official 
in the household still have positive influence on helping rural workers to obtain some 
increasingly restricted types of non-farm waged jobs in local public sector. As far as social 
factors are concerned, the number of household members of working age and the 
dependency ratio still exert significant effects on pushing rural households and individuals 
off farm and into non-agricultural self-employment.
To sketch a full landscape of the determinants of earnings in a variety of income 
generating activities, this thesis has estimated Mincerian earnings functions for local non­
farm wage earners, rural-urban migrants and local agricultural waged workers, and 
modelled production functions for household farming and family non-farm enterprises. 
With respect to waged jobs, once again we have revealed that market forces are far more 
important than political factors in determining earnings, especially in the ever-growing 
private off-farm sector. The results from both earnings and production function estimation 
show that school education is well rewarded for those running family non-farm enterprises 
and those out-migrating. Finally, the three statistical procedures deployed in Chapter 3 
have uncovered that rural households having diversified into riskier income generating 
activities such as cash-crop producing or family non-farm enterprises rather than staying 
on conventional grain farming were able to raise family incomes and employment, and 
more importantly enjoyed increasing returns to their labour time. Indeed, those households 
that managed to move surplus labour off-farm were even able to raise the marginal 
products of labour for those left behind in primary production.
Besides examining the allocating and remunerating process of different income 
generating activities among rural dwellers, Chapter 4 the final key chapter of this thesis 
explored the previously unknown characteristics of Chinese rural labour participation and 
labour supply behaviour. The econometric results suggest that the probability of female
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labour participation increases with their shadow wages, property income and number of 
children aged seven to eighteen but decreases with their husbands’ shadow wages. Female 
labour supply responds much more to own wage changes than male labour supply does, 
but male labour supply is much more sensitive to compensated cross wage effect. Finally, 
the statistical results also rejected the null hypothesis of the unitary model of the household.
5.2 Contribution of the thesis
For my PhD studies, I myself conducted a 450-rural-household survey by using 
scientific sampling methods with purpose-designed questionnaires in a cluster of nine 
villages located in Xinmin County (Liaoning Province, the northeastern China) in 1998. To 
pick up some missing values, I went back to these nine villages again in the year of 1999. 
Think of the nine villages scattered in boundless countryside, not only how much time 
visiting them one by one would take, but also the household survey had to be carried out in 
great patience and carefulness. Were it not for the crucial and kind help from the mayor of 
Xinmin City and many other friends, my fieldwork would not have been done so 
successfully.
With respect to the thesis based on the 450 rural household surveys, the three 
questions as stated at the very beginning of Chapter 1 have been examined. Of them, the 
systematic analysis of the Chinese rural labour participation and labour supply behaviour 
(Chapter 4) might be considered as a major contribution of the thesis. The reason is that, to 
my knowledge, there hasn’t been any published study of Chinese rural labour participation 
and labour supply.
Additionally, the three procedures designed to investigate what rural households 
gain from active diversification (Chapter 3) are innovative. Not only were the gains of
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rural households from diversification analysed in terms of income, employment and returns 
to household labour, but also two explanatory variables were constructed as surrogates for 
income source diversification in a series of household production functions. By these 
procedures, the gains of diversification were explored thoroughly and rigorously.
The question of the allocation of and remuneration to off-farm activities (OFAs) in 
rural China (Chapter 2) had been investigated by previous studies (Knight & Song, 1997; 
Cook, 1998). However, probably this thesis was also the first attempt to disclose the labour 
prices and determinants of earning during agricultural peak time in Chinese context. 
Additionally, as was said before, the region targeted by my fieldwork is different from 
those covered by the previous studies.
A very interesting issue remains to be addressed at the end of this thesis is whether a 
unitary model or a collective model better explains the intra-household income distribution, 
labour participation and labour supply behaviour. Sex discrimination inside the household 
still largely exists in rural China, where the traditional boy-biased custom has been much 
strengthened by the ‘one child’ state policy. However, the extent and results of sex 
discrimination within the household in terms of income distribution and education 
investment are far from clear. Lack of understanding of this issue definitely hinders the 
formation of appropriate policy suggestions on tackling the intra-household sex 
discrimination.
5.3 Future rural development in China and policy implications
As we have found out and stressed repeatedly that the fundamental problem 
haunting rural China is that there are too many people but too few lands and the existence
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of policy obstacles of labour mobility especially between rural and urban. Besides, rural 
China also faces a series of difficulties, such as slow growth of income relative to urban 
areas, rising income inequality especially between rural and urban, the existence of chronic 
poverty in some middle and western areas, stagnation of rural non-farm sector, ceaseless 
natural disasters caused by weak environmental protection, extremely poor rural human 
development conditions and the challenge of WTO accession (Yao, 2002). In the rest of 
this section, a few aspects about the future development in rural China related with this 
thesis, and the corresponding policy implications drawn and arranged immediately after 
each particular aspect of the future development, will be presented in turn.
Rural-urban migration. According to the economic development experience from 
the developed countries, a long-term solution to the rural surplus labour should be rural- 
urban migration. This is because the capacity of job creation of urban industrial and 
service sectors is far greater than that of agricultural and other rural non-farm sectors. A 
country’s industrialisation process is just the one in which rural labour force is 
continuously transferred by the market forces to urban industrial and service sectors. 
However, in the ex ante reform period, the rural-urban migration in China had been 
artificially blocked by the state policy. Since the economic reform started in the late 1970s, 
although the rural-urban migration has been increasing all the time, Chinese government 
never officially allows or encourages it. The recent nationwide massive retrenchment of 
workers by the state-owned-enterprises has put more pressure on the urban labour market. 
Not only have rural-urban migrants encountered fierce competition in the urban job market 
but also the xia gang policy has led to tighter controls on migrants, aimed at restricting 
their numbers and in this way assisting retrenched urban workers (Appleton et al., 2001). 
With millions of urban workers staying unemployed, the future of potential rural-urban
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migrants is not bright. Indeed, many migrants have to go back to household farming during 
some bust periods (Zhang, Rozelle & Huang, 2001). Institutionally, the migration-control 
oriented hukou system has been relaxed over the time and this trend will continue in the 
future. However, there is no sign that Chinese government will completely abolish it 
(Solinger, 1999, p. 282). At the same time, the entrenched and unchallenged urban 
bureaucracy, the urban rationing system (such as education for children, medical care, 
pension, etc.) and the unobservable institutionalised prejudice will continue to operate 
discriminating against rural-urban migrants. In other words, these marginalised migrants 
still cannot hope to get urban citizenship in foreseeable future.
Against these gloomy portents, there are also positive aspects and developments. 
The rural-urban migration, with the 88 million strong migrants44 in the cities themselves -  
along with markets -  has been exerting and will further exert influence towards 
dismantling the prejudices of all sorts and the institutional arrangements that discriminate 
against migrants. At the same time, migrants are always capable of creating jobs for 
themselves and their own labour markets. Moreover, the established migrant societies in 
cities will facilitate more rural-urban migration through their own urban-rural links, 
network and information systems. In a historical view, the bureaucratic system would 
never beat market forces. Once the water gate is opened, the raging torrents would be 
unstoppable. A recent study by de Brauw et al. (2002) found out that the rapid increase of 
rural-urban migration has continued and accelerated during the late 1990s. Another 
positive development is that the new Wen Jiabao cabinet which sworn in March 2003 has 
promised to give rural-urban migrants better treatment.
An immediate policy implication about the rural-urban migration is that there should 
be a state legislation to give rural-urban migrants the equal rights with urban residents such
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as industrial relations, work conditions, compulsory pension, medical insurance, education 
of migrants’ children, etc. To maximise the net benefit from WTO membership, China 
have to adopt a policy to gradually relax its rural-urban migration control in conjunction 
with its labour market reform (Zhai & Wang, 2002). In the long term, the hukou system 
aimed rural-urban human migration control has to be abolished. This is because 
institutionally discriminating against one’s own rural population and treating them as the 
second-class citizens in a modem country is a shame and hence untenable in a long­
standing view. Once the hukou system being abolished, certainly surplus labour pressure 
on rural sector will be gradually reduced. Although greater competition triggered by the 
mobility of labour forces and breakdown of entry barriers often drives people with less 
comparative advantages out of business, the country as a whole will benefit. In this sense, 
greater labour mobility will boost the country’s macroeconomic efficiency and bring about 
Pareto improvement. In other words, the social and economic deadweight loss caused by 
the nationwide block of labour mobility would be greatly reduced, and hence the whole 
country’s social welfare would be increased.
Rural non-farm sector. The findings of this thesis show that returns to labour time 
are much better in local non-farm activities than in household farming and just the next to 
what rural-urban migrants have earned. However, this sector has experienced recession 
rather than any booming since the mid-1990s (Oi, 1999; Yao, 2002; Zhao & Wong, 2002). 
Given that the whole Chinese economy has fundamentally stepped onto a new stage of 
over-supply of all goods from the old stage of shortage since the mid-1990s, it could be 
doubted what sort of comparative economic advantages the rural industrial or 
manufacturing enterprises still have considering their weak state of transportation,
44 During his inaugural press conference held in Beijing at 19 March 2003, China’s new prime minister Mr
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information, technology, high-skilled labour, distance to market, etc. Perhaps this is the 
profound reason that rural industrial sector has moved into recession in recent years 
(Johnson, 2002). In fact, the existence of some heavy-polluted rural industrial enterprises 
has been and will carry on damaging the country’s vulnerable environment system (Yao, 
2002). Although these rural enterprises could provide some income and jobs for the local 
peasants, their negative externalities will eventually exceed their positive benefits. These 
facts suggest that the future of the rural industrial sector is not optimistic.
Although more than twenty years have passed since the economic reformed started 
in the late 1970s, China’s economy is suffering from the too much and too arbitrary 
government intervention, which is the legacy of the centralised and planned economy. For 
example, to reduce rural-urban migration and over-urbanisation, Chinese government had 
encouraged rural collective industrialisation in the 1980s (Liang, Chen & Gu, 2002). 
However, as Liang, Chen & Gu (2002) found out, this strategy did not have significant 
effect on rural-urban migration. Another problem related with the government intervention 
is that governments at lower level are not well disciplined or controlled by the central 
government. In fact, the central government cannot perfectly differentiate between lower 
level governments’ simple incompetence and wilful or strategic disobedience such as 
arbitrarily intervening into enterprises and rural households’ economic decision making 
process, rent-seeking, corruption, protecting regional interests (Wedeman, 2001). Perhaps 
this is one of the reason why the rural collective-owned township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) had over-flourished before the mid-1990s. Since then, the majority of collective 
TVEs had been privatised under the central government’s decree. Consequently, the whole 
TVE sector stepped into restructuring, consolidation and slight recession. The results of all 
these government intervention are distorted markets, uneconomic resource allocation and
Wen Jiabao admitted that the correct number of the current rural-urban migrants is 120 million.
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waste of scarce resources, stockpile of unwanted products, heavy debt, etc. Policy 
implication drawn from these lessons is to significantly reduce government intervention 
and let market forces decide the fate of rural industrial enterprises. This implication is also 
applied to the small town development. With respect to the pollution caused by rural 
industrialisation, there should be tough laws and tough enforcement of these laws to 
protect the country’s fragile environment against pollution.
The agricultural sector. Following the dramatic success in raising grain output and 
peasants’ income from the late 1970s’ reform, the agricultural sector has stepped into 
stagnation since the early 1990s. The economic deflation since the mid-1990s has led to 
weak market demand and unprofitable prices for agricultural products. At the same time, 
the peasants have to pay the notoriously heavy taxes and fees imposed by the ever-growing 
local bureaucracy in order to finance the compulsory education for rural students who 
account for 70 percent of the country’s student population, and to maintain 70 percent of 
the country’s bureaucracy at and below the county level (Zeng, 2002). The consequence is 
that the urban-rural income gap has been continuously widening in the 1990s (Table 1.2; 
Yao, 2002). Rather than boosting demand, China’s very recent successful entry of WTO 
would strip off the state protection against foreign cheap and high quality food import 
(Huang, Rozelle & Zhang, 2000). This has begun hitting and in the future will hit harder 
the domestic agricultural products of high cost and poor quality (Lin, 2000; Hua & Liu, 
2002; Rempel, 2002). This was why there were nationwide outcries about peasants’ 
miserable condition. In words, Chinese farmers’ future is also not optimistic.
A positive development is that Chinese government has now realised the heavy 
taxes and fees levied on rural households and rural enterprises by the local administration, 
and started legalising rural taxation standards to restrict the countless taxes and fees. Once
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a standardised rural taxation system being set up, the tax burden on peasants could be 
reduced on a large scale. Another favourite development is that Chinese central authority 
has started downsizing its huge bureaucratic system from top to bottom and then fixing the 
quantity of civil servants from now onwards. Peasants have been suffering from the ever­
growing and ridiculously large local bureaucracy all the time. Any attempt of downsizing 
before ironically always led to further enlargement of them. However, this time might be 
different because governments at the central and provincial levels have already finished 
their downsizing scheme by cutting half of the civil servants. The new Wen Jiabao cabinet 
has pledged to further downsize governments at and below county level. This reform will 
percolate down to the governments at the bottom level very soon.
In principle, the current schemes of downsizing governments or shedding non- 
essential government functions and legalising rural tax standards are the right road map for 
rural development. On one hand, leaner governments would reduce public expenditure on 
personnel cost, and hence spend the saved budget on other important areas such as 
education and reduce tax burden on rural residents. On the other, it will reduce the amount 
of government officials’ protecting regional economic interests, rent-seeking and 
corruption if this measure is unable to erase these negative sides (Young, 2000; Morduch 
& Sicular, 2000; Che, 2002). Another serious problem existing in rural China is that local 
governments often sacrifice peasants’ interests for rent-seeking and corruption. For 
examples, local governments sometimes expropriate land without the consent from 
peasants; some village administration regularly reallocated land and changed land 
contracts signed with peasant households to get some illegal income (Guo, 2001; 
Wedeman, 2001). These imply that on one side, local governments should be constrained 
and regulated; on the other, rural residents are powerless and voiceless. Therefore, there
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should be a clear legislation on village’s collective land ownership to protect the peasants’ 
interests.
The rural human development arrangements. There is no sign that the state will 
fund rural compulsory education system and medical care, let alone the state pension for 
rural olds. Although paying taxes to the governments at both local and central levels, 
Chinese peasants still have to continue funding education for their children by themselves, 
buying medical care by themselves and relying on their offspring when getting old. To 
maintain the struggling education system and the ever-growing local bureaucracy, the 
majority of local governments at the township and village level are heavily in debt, which, 
of course, is also the accumulative result of establishing and running inefficient collective- 
owned enterprises. Additionally, the formidable and ever-growing higher education tuition 
fees will definitely create more obstacles for the sons and daughters of Chinese peasants to 
go to university. In general, in an absolutely government-dominant society like China, 
ordinary people especially peasants are voiceless, powerless and vulnerable. The 
vulnerability is particularly reflected in the lack of medical care across the countryside. A 
sick family member would cause the whole household stepping into poverty, whereas a 
serious illness would knock a family out in the sense that the family could be bankrupted.
To assist rural human development, if not being able to shore up medical care for 
rural residents and the state pension for the rural olds, the government can at least spare a 
share of the state budget to spend on rural compulsory education. Furthermore, the 
government can aid rural talented youths, whose parents cannot afford tuition fees for 
them, to get higher education through a state cheap student loan arrangement, which many 
other countries have been doing all the time. However, in the long-term Chinese 
government should gradually build up a countrywide medical insurance system and state
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pension scheme (Ding, 2002). In theory, a country’s sustainable economic growth relies on 
her well-educated and balance-developed labour force. At the end of the day, if not for 
healthy human development across the country, what is the purpose of a nation’s economic 
growth?
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APPENDIX
RURAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
PARTI 
RURAL HOUSEHOLD





No. o f household members No. o f labour No. o f working labour in 1997
2. Contact of household with urban areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relatives or friends Location When moved? What kind of Frequency of
Note:
(1) Relatives or friends: there are three answers,
a) there are relatives or friends in the city, and contacts frequently;
b) there are relatives or friends in the city, and contacts not frequently;
c) There are no relatives or friends in the city.





a) contacting every two months;
b) contacting every half year;
c) every year;
d) every two years;
e) almost no contact.
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3. Member of household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Index Name Relation with
household
head



































e) primary school grade of 4 to 6,















c) not working at all
(10) Reason of not working
a) being student
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b) Doing home work
c) Too ill to work
d) Too old to work
e) Too young to work
4. Area of land and water contraclted by household or household member in 1997




Lease-In (Mu) & 
rent per mu
Sub-contract-out or 












Uncultivated sloping land 11
Silted land 12
Other uncultivated land 13
Water area 14
Fish pond 15
Other cultivated water area 16
5. Household agricultural activities income in 1997
Index Income items o f agricultural activities in the 
whole year
Income (RMB) Of them from outside the 
township
1 Sale o f grain
2 Sale o f other agricultural products produced from 
land
3 Sale o f fruit and timber products
4 Sale o f poultry and animal products
5 Sale o f products produced in water area
6 Value o f products o f not sold out and for use in 
household
7 Sale of household sideline products
8 Income from attending to collective agricultural 
activities or agricultural capital construction
9 Income from the employed agricultural activities
10 Income from other agricultural activities
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6. Household expenditure on agricultural activities in 1997




O f them from outside the 
township
1 Chemical fertiliser, pesticide, seeds and farm 
plastic film, etc.
2 Water, electricity
3 Diesel, petroleum, and coal etc. for production
4 Fodder, stud stock, and other foster activities
5 Machinery maintaining and repairing
6 Training, purchasing materials for learning, and 
employing experts
7 Temporary employees
8 Transportation cost for sale o f agricultural 
products
9 Agricultural tax and other taxes fees related with 
agricultural activities
10 Rent o f leased-in land
11 Other agricultural expenditure
7. Projects of non-farm activities run by household or household members alone or co-
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8. Net income earned by household members employed by other enterprises, organisation,
households and inc ividuals to do non-farm activities in 1997
Index Industry Wage income from 
home township
Wage income from 
outside home 
township but inside 
home county
Wage income from 














9. Household's other income in 1997
Income item Social relief Dividend distributed 
by village or team
Presented by 
relatives or friends





10. Household property and debt in the enc of 1997
Property Debt





1 Fixed property for farming 6 Bank loan and interest
2 Fixed property for non­
farm
7 Borrowing from village 
collective
3 Bank deposit, stock, and 
bond etc.
8 Borrowing from individuals
4 Estimated value of house 9 Current value o f borrowed grain 
and other property
5 Lending-out 10 Other debt
11. Teenager and Child ^abour
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PART 2 
ATITUDE AND ASPIRATION






















(b) If the answer of (a) was (2), how many months are your household's labour idle per 
labour?
5. (a) Whether do your household wish to increase or reduce the contracted land?
(1) Wish to increase.
(2) Wish to reduce.
(3) Wish no change.
(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), how many Chinese Mu of land do you wish to 
increase?
(c) If in (a) the answer was (2), how many Chinese Mu of land do you wish to 
reduce?
6. (a) If the contracted area of land or water are not increased, Whether or not the net
income from farming can be increased?
(1) It can.
(2) It is possible but very difficult.
(3) It is impossible.
(4) Don't know.
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(b) If in (a) the answer was (1) or (2), through which kind of ways can your 
household increase agricultural net income?
(1) Invest more labour;
(2) Change the structure of planting, such as increase different kinds of cash crop;
(3) Increase investment, such purchasing chemical fertiliser, machinery etc.
(4) Improve the skills of planting or fostering;
(5) Depending on the condition existed, expanding fostering scale;
(6) Others.
(c) If in (a) the answer was (3), what are the reasons?
(1) There is no much profit by selling agricultural product;
(2) Planting cash crops or fostering is very risky;
(3) Investment in agriculture has been enough, so increasing investment will be 
worthless;
(4) The household members think that it is not interesting to do farming, so they do 
not wish to spend more time on it.
(5) Others.





(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), main reasons:
(1) More channels to get income can increase income;
(2) More channels to get income can reduce risk and maintain stable income level;
(3) Other reasons.
(c) If in (a) the answer was (1), from how many kinds of channels should your 
household get income ?
(1) Farming;
(2) Commercial activities;
(3) To set up and run a industrial enterprise;
(4) To set up and run a service enterprise;
(5) Getting job in local rural enterprises;
(5) Getting job outside local place.





(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), main reasons:
(1) Lack of capital;
(2) Lack of technology;
(3) Lack of information for production or job opportunity;
(4) Lack of social contacts;
(5) lack of urban contacts;
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(5) Lack of information
(6)Others.
9. (a) Does your household have a concrete plan to engage in non-farm activities for 
increasing income with your home township?
(1) Yes. (2) No. (3) Don't know.
(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), the channels to increase income should include:
(1) Increase investment on the current production activities and expand its scale;
(2) Increase more labour or employing more employees on the current production 
activities, then expand its scale;
(3) Run new project or setting up new enterprise;
(4) Household member should improve their skills to increase wage income;
(5) Household member try to find jobs in other enterprises;
(5) Others.
(c) Which kind of industry do you plan to expand production scale or set up new 




(4) Communication and transportation;
(5) Business and catering;
(5) Services;
(6) Other non-farm activities.
10. (a) Does your household have someone intend to get job outside local town or
increase time period of working outside local town?
(1) Yes. (2) No. (3) Don't know.
(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), what are the main reasons that your household 
members have not worked outside local town or worked insufficiently?
(1) Don't know how to get job outside local town;
(2) Nobody introduces job;
(3) There is someone introducing jobs but household members are not qualified;
(4) There is too much farming task to go away;
(5) Communication is inconvenient;
(5) Others.
(c) If your answer to (a) is (1), what reasons can encourage your household 
member to make his/her mind?
(1) Too many family members but with too few land
(2) Low harvest due to natural disaster
(3) Earning more in urban area
(4) To save some money
(5) Try to run away from rural life
(5) To learn some technology in urban area
(6) Others
(d) If in (a) the answer is (2), main reasons are:
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(1) Going outside local town is not secure, so not dare to go outside;
(2) Working outside hometown is too arduous, so don't want to go;
(3) Being afraid that expenses may be too much and can not get saving by working 
outside hometown;
(4) No travelling funds;
(5) Being afraid of not finding jobs;
(5) Inconvenient transportation;
(6) Never thinking about going away from hometown;
(7) Others.
11. What are the main difficulties and obstacles that affect your household to raise
income level and to improve employment situation in your opinion?
(1) Policy restrictions;
(2) Lack of capital;
(3) Lack of good job opportunities;
(4) Lack of technology;
(5) Low education level of household members;
(5) Lack of household labour or household member are not in good health;
(6)Lack of information
(7) Others.
12. If your household member has got a urban job which your household member 
thinks is good, then
(1) Keep it as long as possible
(2) Save enough money then go back to home village
(3) Leave after getting technology or experience
13. Whether have you heard the situation of employment and income of other places?
(1) Yes; (2) no
14. If you have heard, who provide these information to you?
(1) Family members or relatives
(2) Friends or home town mate
(3) Newspaper, broadcast or advertisement
(4) Local official or half-official employment introduction organization
(5) By chance
(5) Others
15. If you feel that urban life is happier than rural life, what’s reason?
(1) You like urban prosperity and convenience
(2) You have opportunity to earn more money
(3) It is possible for you to develop your own business
(4) Settling in urban area is good for children’s future
(5) Others
16. If your household has migrant, what is the behind reason for their migration?
(1) No much work to do if staying at home
(2) To earn more money
(3) To get more experience of life
(4) To learn more skill
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(5) Others
17. (a) Do you or other your household member have intention to learn a kind of skill?
(1) Yes. (2) No. (3) Don't know.
(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), what are skills that you wish to learn?
Grain planting ( ) Carpenter ( ) Hostel service ( )
Fruit tree administration ( ) Bricklayer ( ) Electronics application repairing ( ) 
Vegetables gardening ( ) Automobile driver ( ) Typing ( )
Fostering ( ) Automobile repairing ( ) Accounting ( )
Mechanic process ( ) Cooking ( ) Tailor ( )
Electrician ( ) Barber ( ) Knitting ( )
Others
18. If you or other members of your household wish to learn skills, would you like to 
spend money on skill training?
(1) Yes;
(2) No;
(3) Yes but have some prerequisites (such as expense is not high and can learn some 
skills);
(4) Don't know.
19. (a) If you or other members of your household wish to attend to skills training, are
there any difficulties in your opinion?
(1) Yes. (2) No.
(b) If in (a) the answer was (1), main difficulties are:
(1) There is no suitable training class;
(2) No time to attend to skill training;
(3) There is no enough money to pay training fees;
(4) The education level is too low; there is difficulty in learning;
(5) Wish to learn but don't know which kind skill is suitable;
(5) Other difficulties.
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PART 3 
LABOUR
Household Code Family Member Code Name
A. General Information
1. Personal detail and social experience
Time of 
beginning work
Technical skills Accepted training 
and how many 
month
Main job engaged 
in 97























Had ever been to 
cities above 
middle level in 
other province
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4. The time engaged in agricultural activities and its income in the whole year of 1997








Busy season Idle season No. of 
working 






No. of  
working 






No. o f 
working 






No. o f days o f the busy seasons
No. o f days o f the idle seasons
5. Time engaged in the non-farm activities and income from it in the whole year of 1997
Non-farm activities run by household Employed by other enterprises or household
No. o f working 
day in the whole 
year
Individual income's 
proportion o f the household's 
that item income (%)
No. o f working 




Wage income of  
the whole year 
(Yuan)
6. No. of working day in 1997
No. o f working day Of these
No. o f whole day No. of half day No. o f below half day
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B. Non-Agricultural Employment
Household Code Family Member Code Name
1. Where is s/he working now?
(1) Municipality directly under central government or provincial capital
(2) Provincial prefecture city
(3) County level city or county council base town
(4) Town
(5) Other rural area
(5) Economic special region
(6) Others
(la). Where is his/her rural enterprise job located?
(1) Home village.
(2) Home township but not home village.
(3) Home county but not home township.
(4) Home city (or prefecture) but not home county.
(5) Home province but not home city (or prefecture).
(5) Other provinces
2. What are their current working unit?
(1) state-owned unit
(2) Urban collective unit
(3) Urban private unit
(4) Township or village-owned enterprises
(5) Rural private enterprises
(5) Joint venture or foreign sole owned enterprise








4. What kind of job does s/he do?
(1) Officer or administration staff
(2) Professional or technical staff
(3) Office clerk
(4) Service or supporting worker
(5) Non-agricultural manual worker
(5) Non-agricultural technical worker (including driver)
(6) Agricultural manual worker
(7) Self-employed business
5. What’s his/her current income per month?
6. How much money will s/he remit per month and per year averagely if you are migrant?
7. How many month occupation training has s/he got?
8. How far is his/her working point from his/her home village?
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(6) Through discussion with other family members
(7) Through discussion with friends
(8) Others
10. Why does s/he choose to work in that place (city or town or others)?
(1) There are relatives (family members)
(2) Friends or hometown mates
(3) It was heard that it is easy to find job there
(4) It was heard that income is high there
(5) That city or town is near to your home village
(5) Suitable for the weather, living customs, and language of that place
(6) Others
11. If his/her goal of migration is earning more income, his/her income has been (or will 
be) mainly used for
(1) Building house
(2) Purchasing house or apartment
(3) For other family members’ usual expenditure
(4) Saving for setting up his/her own enterprise (or business)
(5) For his/her own or other family members’ wedding
(5) For the unpredicted expenditure (illness, death, natural disaster, others)
(6) Saving for his/her old age
(7) For buying stock, bond
(8) For children’s current and future education
(9) Paying debt
(10) Others
12. Where is his/her accommodation when s/he works as non-agricultural worker?
(1) Home
(2) Accommodation provided by working unit
(3) Live in relative or friends’ home
(4) Rented accommodation
(5) Others





14. Whether does his/her working unit give the following?
(1) Holiday for women producing child, how many days?
(2) Holidays for illness, how many days?
(3) Holiday for training, how many days?
(4) Other holiday of pay, how many days?
15. What’s form of wage distribution?
(1) By hour
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(2) By piece rate
(3) Fixed wage
(4) Fixed wage plus bonus
(5) Group piece rate
(5) Others
16. Is s/he distributed municipal price subsidy?
17. How did s/he get the current job?
(1) Through personal relation
(2) Through official channel
(3) By own luck
(4) Others
18. To get the current job, whether has s/he paid deposit (or the payment of this kind)?
19. If s/he did pay the deposit, how much did s/he pay for the current job?
20. How much was the other initial cost?
21. How long have you been in non-agricultural work?
22. When did you get the current rural enterprise job?
23 How long have you been in migration work? How long have you been employed by the 
current unit?
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PART 4
THE BASICS OF THE VILLAGE INVESTIGATED
1. No. of household, population and labour
No. of household Population No. of labour
2. Location
Distance to township 
location
Distance to local town Distance to the belonged 
county city or city
Distance to the nearest 
prefecture city
3. Communication
(1) A railway station inside 2 kilometres.
(2) A bus stop inside 2 kilometres.
(3) No bus but have road inside 2 kilometres.
(4) Road or railway station in 3 - 5 kilometres.
(5) No road or railway station in 5 kilometres.
4. Main agricultural resources
Cultivable land (Chinese Mu) Grass land (Chinese Mu)
Irrigated land Uncultivated land
Non-irrigated land Uncultivated sloping land
Plain land Silted land
Sloping land Other uncultivated land
Forest land Water area
Fruit garden Fish pond
Timber forest Other cultivated water area
Other forest
5. Economic relationship
(1) All the cultivable land is contracted according to head of person.
(2) Subsistence land are contracted according to head of person, responsibility land are 
contracted according to head of labour.
(3) Other version of household contract.
(4) Contracted by the collectives.
(5) Other economic form.
6. Main agricultural crops
Grain crops Cash crops
7. Main non-farm production projects
8. Rural enterprises
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How many labour had ever worked outside home township in 1997?
Outside home township but inside home county
Outside home county but inside home province
Outside home province
How many labour from outside township had ever worked in this village?
Outside home township but inside home county
Outside home county but inside home province
Outside home province
10. Net income per capita in late ten years from 1988 onwards.
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